Re-think

In my last piece, I mistakenly portrayed the symptom as discursive entity. Instead, although the symptom appears discursive, it is actually an effect of the real. However, does this symptom have political potential discursively, or is it only the real that creates the potential for radical change? This essay reviews the work of Ernesto Laclau and Slavoj Zizek in relation to their differing conceptions of optimum political strategy for the real. While both theorists share similar terminology and an analogous notion of the real, they differ greatly in their political approaches. Whereas Laclau investigates the possibility of developing a broad form of political program, Zizek suggests that the very process of such a method between the universal and the particular subverts the radical potential of the real. Instead, Zizek contends that the Left should focus its attention on capitalism, rather than pure politics, and in particular within the capitalism universal itself, in terms of its constitutive excess.

In this essay it is considered that the complex, extimate relationship between the real and symbolic is the key to the debate, particularly the definition of what is real and the conception of an outside to the symbolic, both in the ‘Other’ and in the disavowed foundations of the system. Thus while we cannot proscribe a progressive position for psychoanalytic politics, this does not mean that from a psychoanalytic point of view there should not be such a program. Indeed, in the case of anti-capitalism, the creation of a new economic prospectus could come under the category of a political Act.

Laclau and Zizek come from a very similar theoretical positions, combining the insights of Psychoanalysis, Marxism and Post-structuralism, although both disavowal the continued influence of the latter (Zizek & Daly, 2004:46). Laclau and Zizek each agree on the fundamental importance of the radically negative essence of society, which effectively means that ‘society does not exist’, it can never be full, neutral nor natural. This formulation has led both to rejecting the prospect of utopian theorising. However the shape of these advances differs, leading to political positions which are in many ways different, although they share many of the same characteristics. Ultimately I believe that while Laclau’s Radical Democracy is of great value for politics, it is Zizek’s work which provides most productive political method for change, which is the most valuable strategy for the Left at this point in time. This is not the vulgar conception of Zizek found in the works of Homer (1996) or Robinson and Tormey (Robinson, 2004; Robinson & Tormey, 2003, 2005), but as we shall see, a more considered Zizek than that normally cited by critics.

Before entering into this discussion though, I believe that it is important to lay out the central concepts that Laclau and Zizek have in common. In particular after my last essay, I would like to focus on the distinction between the symbolic and real. These concepts are;
- Antagonism;
- Symptom; and
- Dislocation.

Antagonism is the experience of the limit of all objectivity within discursive formations (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985:122). Thus there is no content to antagonism; it is simply the effect of the real upon the symbolic. As such antagonisms institute a radical negativity into discourse It is at the point of antagonism that hegemonic battles for meaning are contested (Howarth & Stavrakakis, 2000:9). Thus antagonisms are vital for politics as they are the point at which meanings can be changed by forces outside of the discourse. However, although Laclau and Zizek notionally agree with the concept of antagonism, Laclau’s political position does not extend beyond the role of antagonism in altering meanings. For Laclau it is these battles that produce political change. However, Zizek takes a much more radical position than Laclau. In order to understand it, we must re-introduce the notion of the symptom.

The symptom is a concept that I have covered widely and as such I will not dwell long on it. However, I believe that it is valuable to alter it slightly in light on the concept of antagonism. The symptom is evidence of the antagonism. Antagonism reveals the limits of discourse and the symptom fills the place of antagonism. This is not to suggest that the symptom subverts the effect of antagonism. On the contrary the symptom is the necessarily sedimentation of the process of antagonism. Thus if we feel the effect of the real in antagonism, the on going effect is the symptom; the symptom holds the place of antagonism.

Antagonisms and symptoms are created because of the discursive movement of attempting to conceal the negativity of the social. These attempts at ‘hegemony’, in Laclauian terms, produce a false universalising discourse which is abstracted from a particular notion; there is no chance of a ‘true’ universal occurring. Therefore, because of the negativity (the real) that is constitutive of the system, the abstract universal always fails. This failure occurs at the limit points of the discursive. Thus antagonism is the effect of the real. However, although this limit point shows itself only in effect and in performance, there is still a left over content that is evidence of this antagonism. This content is the symptom. However, the symptom is still an effect of the real. Indeed the difference between antagonism and symptom is only abstract, a symptom is an antagonism, however it is more entwined with the symbolic order;

‘ The symptom is, strictly speaking, a particular element which subverts its own universal, a species subverting its own genus’ (Zizek, 1989:21).

Therefore the symptom arises as the excess which is a necessary condition of the relationship between the symbolic and the real. Because the symbolic is always incomplete, there will necessarily be an element left out from any hegemonic, or universal abstraction. The symptom is this element and thus it is evidence of the gap between the universal and the particular caused by the real and showed in antagonism.

However, one has to be careful in describing a symbolic conception of antagonism. This position rides a fine line with the post-structuralist definition. Laclau used this version of antagonism in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, where it is the presence of the ‘Other’ which prevents the full identity of the subject or system; the existence of the capitalist is antagonistic for the worker (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985:125).

However, Laclau has since move beyond the Post-structuralism position, taking on Zizek’s critique of his work, particularly in Beyond Discourse Analysis (Zizek, 1990, 2005a). Here Zizek suggests that it is important to distinguish between antagonism as the limit of the social, the very impossibility around which the social is based, and antagonism as conflict between subject positions (Zizek, 2005:276). This ‘double’ of antagonism means that while the latter antagonism may very well be an actual antagonism for the subject, at the same time it is just a foil for the true, constitutive antagonism. Thus;

‘It is precisely in the moment when we achieve victory over the enemy in the antagonistic struggle that we experience antagonism in its most radical dimension’ (ibid, 274).

This is what Zizek refers to when he speaks of ‘the negation of the negation’. This notion of the negation of the negation differs from that I had discussed in previous pieces. The initial negation in both cases is the fundamental negativity of the social. However, I had previously seen the second negation as the covering up of this fundamental negativity in fantasy and ideology, such that the primary negation was not seen to exist. However, in the context of antagonism, a different economy is at work. Here antagonism is a necessary failure, much like that produced in ideology; indeed antagonism in the form of subject positions is the very stuff of ideology; the ‘Other’ has stolen my identity and thus I do not see that I never had it in the first place.

Thus the negation of the negation is the time when antagonism is most vividly experienced because it is then that the true negativity in the system is revealed in its naked form. Rather than hiding behind fantasy and ideology through desire, the lack inherent in the social is revealed. Therefore the subject/system requires the existence of antagonism in some form in order to maintain its stability. Politicians often need, and seek out, minor failure that they can fix in order to hide the major, universal, failings of their government. For example, George W. Bush has admitted to the problem of Guantanamo Bay prison camp, suggesting that it is a blight on the system that he would like to remove. By giving the appearance of fixing particular antagonistic problems, Bush is able to relieve the pressure on the more universal aspects of his government, such as the ‘war on terrorism’.

However, this is not to state that Zizek disagrees with Laclau’s basic conception of antagonism. Zizek believes that social antagonism as ‘perhaps the most radical breakthrough in modern social theory’ (Zizek, 2005a:271). Zizek describes social antagonism as the real; it is the point of fundamental impossibility around which the socio-symbolic field which is structured; a certain fissure that cannot be symbolised. The real is impossible, but it can always be felt by its effects. Zizek contends that in developing the concept of antagonism, Laclau and Mouffe have been able to incorporate the Lacanian real as a tool for social and ideological analysis through antagonism as a limit which is nothing in itself, but prevents the social from suture(Zizek, 1989:163)

Although Laclau claims to take on Zizek’ double conception of antagonism, he does not extend it fully and take on Zizek’s resulting conceptions of ideology and fantasy, also suggested in Beyond Discourse Analysis (1990, 2005). Zizek believes that these factors are extraordinarily important politically as they conceal the ‘negation of the negation’. The full political consequences of this will be further discussed below.

However, it is at the point of the negation of negation, the place of concrete universality, which dislocation can occur. According to Stavrakakis, dislocation is;

‘… the process by which the contingency of discursive structures is made visible’ (Howarth & Stavrakakis, 2000:13).

This is of course very similar to Zizek’s Hegelian concept of concrete universality. Although, because of Zizek’s addition of the symptom to social antagonism, concrete universality, because of its intimate link with the symptom, adds a different dimension to dislocation. Concrete universality is brought about by the gap that the symptom opens up through antagonism and occurs where the symptom is presented for what it is; the constitutive exception to the social. Where the symptom is the gap between the universal and the particular, concrete universality is the gap between the universal and its symptom (Zizek, 2006:30). As such it reveals the truth of the universal; the universal is failure. Thus, just as the effect of the real in antagonism is played out through the symptom, dislocation occurs when the truth of universal is revealed through the presentation of the symptom as a concrete universal.

However, although Laclau and Zizek agree about the basic ontological construction of the social, and the primary parameters of change, they do differ in the political consequences and potential strategies that led from this ontology. While both do not believe that one can prescribe an a priori political strategy for the left, Laclau believes that a contingent program, which he labels Radical Democracy, should be the site of politics for the Left; in contrasts Zizek contends that such a move subverts the possibility of radical change. While Zizek does not deny that politics must occur, his work does not theoretically enter this realm. Rather Zizek believes that the main focus of the Left should be the repoliticization of the economy.


Where Zizek seeks radical change, particularly in the economy, through the dislocatory effect of the real, Laclau believes that it is only through hegemony and chains of equivalence in a positive social imaginary that the Left can proceed. It is Laclau’s position that I shall turn to first. The central political premise of Laclau’s work is clearly democracy; what he labels Radical Democracy. Radical Democracy, first developed in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (1985), is based on spreading the influence the democratic ethos and the deepening of democracy. Radical Democracy operates by revealing the contingency of every foundation, which is possible because there is no unique privileged position upon which to place a foundation, any ‘foundation’ must be constantly renegotiated (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985:169).

However, this is not to suggest that Radical Democracy is an a priori normative foundation in itself. It is impossible to define a priori the surfaces upon which antagonism will be constituted; there is not one politics of the left which can determine the content of the movement. The imaginary of radical democracy is always in constant tension; this tension should be affirmed and not denied- it is what constitutes Radical Democracy. It is the moment of tension which gives the social its open character that every project for Radical Democracy should seek to institutionalise. As such, Radical Democracy seeks to operate between the extremes of utopian myth and positivistic reformism (ibid: 190).

Thus Laclau believes that Radical Democracy should be the current necessary face of the left in regard to the neo-liberal and conservative movements of the right. He does not declare that it is the only, or necessary, foundation for the left. However, Radical Democracy does hold a certain advantage in that it seeks to institutionalise the key elements of social antagonism, and thus does not produce ideological illusion to the same degree as utopian politics. Thus, Radical Democracy is compatible with the insights of Laclau’s Discourse theory, although it becomes incompatible when;

‘this space of equivalence ceases to be considered as one political space among others and comes to be seen as the centre, which subordinates and organises all other spaces’ (ibid:186);

Thus the foundations of Radical Democracy and Radical Democracy itself need to be constantly renegotiated as;

‘ A free society is not one where a social order has been established that is better adapted to human nature, but one which is more aware of the contingency and historicity of any order’ (Laclau, 1990:211)

Therefore democracy as a form should also be plural as it has to be adapted to the social spaces in question (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985:185). The form of Radical Democracy should also be institutionalised, as it requires a political space compatible with the democratic struggle. This includes state and economic organisations; governments need to be organised around the free exchange of ideas and debate (ibid: 186). However, Laclau does not state how this could be achieved, particularly in the difficult area of the economy.

Laclau seeks to establish a principle of democratic equivalence by the strengthening of specific democratic struggles linked by a chain of equivalence under hegemony of democracy (ibid: 182). This democratic equivalence cannot be based on the possessive individualism that characterises contemporary capitalism, in which the equality of one group prevents that of another, but rather on a new common sense which alters the identity of all groups to such a degree that the demands of each becomes equivalent to the demands of others. However, Laclau also states that the insistence on equality is not sufficient, but needs to be balanced by the demand for liberty; this is radical and plural democracy (ibid: 184). Therefore, Laclau does not seek to deconstruct liberalism, as we shall later see that Zizek does, rather;

‘It is not liberalism that should be called into question, for as an ethical principle which defends the liberty of the individual to fulfil his or her human capacities, it is more valid than ever’ (Ibid: 184)

The task of the Left therefore cannot be to renounce liberal-democratic ideology, but on the contrary to depend and expand it in the direction of a radical and plural democracy (ibid: 176). Laclau believes that the fundamental enemy of this process is essentialism of any kind; the conviction that the social is sutured at some point. However, it is clear from Laclau’s conception of Radical Democracy that the left cannot simply rely on the empty negativity of the social. Rather any political movement must produce a positive imaginary, a ‘strategy of construction of a new order’, as opposed to a ‘strategy of opposition’ (ibid: 189).

However, the notion of a positive imaginary appears to contradict much of Laclau’s work. On the other hand, Laclau does not seek to construct a natural, true universal imaginary. Rather, the new imaginary should be constructed on a different basis; hence the contingent notions of Radical Democracy. The logic of Radical Democracy is not a logic of the positivity of the social, and it is therefore incapable of founding a nodal point of any kind around which the social fabric can be reconstituted; the unity between hegemony and democracy is contingent, purely the result of articulation (ibid: 188-9).

Zizek does not totally reject Laclau’s notion of a positive imaginary as a necessary part of Left politics (Zizek, 2000b:325). However, Zizek does not believe that such an imaginary should be the fundamental site of struggle for the Left. Zizek believes that the social has already been hegemonised by capital (Zizek, 2000a:223; 2000b:319), which forms something of a ‘symbolic real’, a background to all discourse (Zizek, 2002:xii). Therefore, any notion of pure politics which does not take into account the hegemonic power of the economy is bound to failure (Zizek & Daly, 2004:144-5); indeed for Zizek it is a cynical discourse of failure. There instead of operating in the terms of the dominant universal, Zizek’s work suggests that the Left needs to evoke the dislocatory power of the real.

This distinction from Laclau stems from Zizek’s differing conception of the utility of the real. Where Laclau sees the real, through antagonism, as preventing the closure of the social and this providing the basis for Discourse theory and Radical Democracy, the latter still operates through the distorted logic of the symbolic. In contrast, Zizek’s political theorising seeks to utilise the dislocatory power of the real. Because of this Zizek can not, or rather refuses to produce a political program of any kind; a point that pushes many theorists to suggest that his work is politically impotent. However, while a refusal to operate while the terms of the symbolic may make Zizek impotent for politics, it makes his work particularly productive in the realm of the political. However, for Zizek, any attempt to symbolise the real with the relationship between the universal and particular domesticates its destructive effect.

We see this position in Zizek’s treatment of the symptom. The symptom is both real and symbolic, in that it is an effect of the real (through antagonism), but in being named as a symptom it becomes part of the symbolic order. However, for Zizek once the symptom has been named and taken symbolic form within the realm of the hegemonic universal, even if it is in opposition to this universal, than it is no longer real, it is pacified and takes a different role, that of maintaining the universal. This is because the failure inherent in the presence of the symptom is taken up by the particular, rather then the universal. This process, which is regulated by ideology and the super-ego, concedes failure, but projects it as fixable, thus maintaining the status of the universal. In this conception, change only occurs through the real; all symbolic attempts get sucked into this cycle.

However, to say that Zizek takes no position, and rejects anyone who take a position is a vulgar and inaccurate caricature of his work; it is clear that he takes a strong stand on many issues. Many theorists appear to misunderstand critique (e.g. of multi-culturalism) as a complete rejection. This is not the case, rather Zizek attempts to reveal the flip side to a discourse that may appear universal, tolerant or utopian e.g. The Obscenity of Human Rights (2005b).

Zizek’s main political demand is the repolicization of the economy; he rejects forms of politics which does not place the economy as the fundamental site of struggle. This is not to suggest that Zizek does see the value in the multi-culturalist post-modern politicisation/democratization of various spheres of society (Zizek, 1999:356). Indeed Zizek acknowledges the ‘great achievements of liberal capitalism’ in bringing freedom and an advanced material standard of living to the western world (Zizek, 2000b:322). However, Zizek does reject multi-cultural tolerance and liberal-capitalist democracy as the fundamental sites of struggle for the left (Zizek & Daly, 2004:144). Additionally, Zizek believes that these minor changes have given the illusion of change, at the demise of true radical change in the underlying foundation of our society- the economy;

‘The depolitized economy is the disavowed fundamental fantasy of post-modern politics- a properly political act would necessarily entail the repoliticalization of the economy’ (Zizek, 1999:355).

Neither does Zizek reject the idea of taking a stand, indeed he believes that it is academically dishonest and arrogant to refuse to do so (Zizek & Daly, 2004:45). This is in direct opposition to the views of Robinson and Tormey (2005:2) who contend that;

‘Whilst Zizek’s work is intellectually ‘radical’, this is not, despite appearances, a radicalism that left politics can draw sustenance and hope from’

Or Laclau;

‘What is the alternative model of society that he (Zizek) is postulating? Without at least the beginning of an answer to these questions, his anti-capitalism is mere empty talk’ (2000:206).

The latter statement is particularly unusual for a theorist, who, as I noted earlier, does not believe that an a priori foundation for left politics can be found. What Zizek does suggest is an alternative political strategy for change. Zizek does not reject the idea of a new left imaginary, indeed he states that this is required for politics, but not for the political (Zizek, 2000b:325). Nor does he believe that politics exists outside of the order of signification, between the universal and the particular, in Laclau’s terms (Zizek, 1999:177).

However, this kind of politics is outside of the direct scope of psychoanalysis, but the political is not. The distinction between politics and the political is made by Stavrakakis (1999). Politics is defined as a separated bounded system, that of the maintenance of the political. The political is inexhaustible realm of contingent social relations (ibid: 71). Thus Zizek seeks not to operate politically between the universal and the particular, as Laclau does, but in the realm of the political within the universal. This gap is between the universal and its exceptions. Therefore while Laclau seeks to occupy and hegemonise the dominant position, Zizek wants to stand outside of this ground and the refuse the very terms in which the universal operates (Zizek, 2000b:326).

As such, Zizek wants to work with the excess of capitalism, its symptoms. In doing this Zizek seeks to invoke the real, the disavowed foundations of capitalism, such as global climate change and absolute poverty. However, he believes that these symptoms can be easily subverted through the relationship between the universal and the particular. When the particular, the symbolic field of the dominant position, takes on the demands of the symptom, they get caught up in the field of ideology and the super-ego and as such become a problem to be fixed, rather than constitutive and dislocatory. Here we must remember the aforementioned role of ideology in not revealing the ‘negation of the negation’ and thus showing the failure of the universal. Instead, as much as is possible Zizek seeks to maintain the status of these symptoms in the real, rather than having them caught up in the relationship between the universal and the particular.

To maintain a symptom as real for political purposes appears to be an oxymoronic task. If the real is the unsymbolisable, the impossible, how can it be dealt with symbolically? To answer this question we must rexamine the nature of the real. The real is revealed in the symbolic through its effects and performance only- this is antagonism, the naming of such effects. Additionally, antagonism itself is named in the symptom. The process of naming the real is never complete, something is always missed, but it is politically vital. A symptom can be interpreted as part of the relationship between the universal and the particular, especially on the side of the particular. In doing so it is unable to challenge the dominant universal. It may produce small alterations, but not major change.

However, if the symptom is named in a different manner, as something that is outside of the dominant order, which cannot be symbolised within it, it takes on a different potential. In this case the symptom becomes part of the disavowed foundation of the dominant order. The real, with the symptom as part of it, is what is impossible to symbolise from a certain perspective, not what cannot be symbolised at all. Just because something cannot be symbolised from one perspective, does not mean that it cannot be from another (Fink, 1995:28). This is not the same as discursive antagonism, where the presence of the ‘Other’ blocks the full identity of the subject position. Rather it is the notion of a symbolisable symptom that is outside of the realm of the dominant order coming to impact on the system. Here the symptom refuses to be pacified by the terms of the dominant universal and domesticated into a particular; the innocent victims of war refuse to be ‘collateral damage’ or the victims of absolute poverty do not take on the position of ‘developing nation’, but rather refuse to get caught up in the capitalist economy itself. In this the symptom is able to become a concrete universal.

However, does that mean that we liberal intellectuals cannot help develop the concrete universal of the capitalist economy? No, and this is where I break from Zizek. Where Zizek states that;

‘Today , in the face of this Leftist knavery, it is more important than ever to HOLD THIS UTOPIAN PLACE OF THE GLOBAL ALTERNATIVE OPEN, even if it remains empty, living on borrowed time, awaiting the content to fill it in’ (Zizek, 2000b:325, emphasis in original).

In complete contrast, I believe that the true anti-capitalist act is not the formless and radical break with the system, but rather the act of actually creating a post-capitalist program. It is taken that the any attempt to create a program beyond the act subverts the act itself. Thus, psychoanalysts who take an anti-capitalist position leave their critique at anti-capitalism; they are unable, or unwilling, to engage with an alternative programme. Instead they employ cynical and fantasmatic posturing about the need to break with capitalism. However, does not this critique simply help to maintain the stability of capitalism by resigning ourselves to the idea that there are no available alternatives?

Therefore I suggest that the role of the Left should be to develop a new economic foundation in opposition to capitalism. This need not come from psychoanalysis, indeed it seems unlikely that it could. However, as Laclau suggests in Radical Democracy, this program does not to be complicit with the principles of psychoanalytic politics, particularly the notions of antagonism and contingency. Thus I believe that a position can be found between and within the work of Ernesto Laclau and Slavoj Zizek. This position seeks to utilise the dislocatory power of the real and develop a position political program. Thus while Laclau’s approach is appropriate for politics, it is Zizek who provides the most productive approach in terms of political change, especially given the complete domination of the global capitalist economy.

References

Fink, B. (1995). The Lacanian Subject: Between Language and Jouissance. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Homer, S. (1996). Psychoanalysis, Representation, Politics: On the (im)possibility of a psychoanalytic theory of ideology? Paper presented at the Third Annual Conference of the Universities Association for Psychoanalytic Studies, The Three Impossible Professions, LSB College.
Howarth, D., & Stavrakakis, Y. (2000). Introducing discourse theory and political analysis. In D. Howarth, A. J. Norval & Y. Stavrakakis (Eds.), Discourse theory and Political analysis: Identities, Hegemonies and Social Change. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Laclau, E. (1990). New Reflections on the Revolutions of Our Time. London: Verso.
Laclau, E. (2000). Structure, History and the Political. In J. Bulter, E. Laclau & S. Zizek (Eds.), Contingency, Hegemony, Universality; Contemporary Dialogues on the Left. London: Verso.
Laclau, E., & Mouffe, C. (1985). Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a radical democratic politics. London: Verso.
Robinson, A. (2004). The Politics of Lack. BJPIR, 6.
Robinson, A., & Tormey, S. (2003). What is not to be done! Everything you wanted to know about Lennin, and (sadly) weren't afraid to ask Zizek. Retrieved 22/06/2006, from http://homepage.ntlworld.com/simon.tormey/articles/Zizeklenin.pdf
Robinson, A., & Tormey, S. (2005). A Ticklish Subject? Zizek and the Future of Left Radicalism. Thesis Eleven, 80.
Stavrakakis, Y. (1999). Lacan & the Political. London: Routledge.
Zizek, S. (1989). The Sublime Object of Ideology. London: Verso.
Zizek, S. (1990). Beyond Discourse-Analysis. In E. Laclau (Ed.), New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time. London: Verso.
Zizek, S. (1999). The Ticklish Subject. London: Verso.
Zizek, S. (2000a). Da Capo senza Fine. In J. Bulter, E. Laclau & S. Zizek (Eds.), Contingency, Hegemony and Universality. London: Verso.
Zizek, S. (2000b). Holding the Place. In J. Bulter, E. Laclau & S. Zizek (Eds.), Contingency, Hegemony, Universality. London: Verso.
Zizek, S. (2002). For they know not what they do: Enjoyment as a political factor (2nd ed.). London: Verso.
Zizek, S. (2005a). Interrogating the Real. New York: Continuum.
Zizek, S. (2005b). The Obscenity of Human Rights: Violence as a Symptom. Retrieved 22/06, 2006, from http://www.lacan.com/zizviol.htm
Zizek, S. (2006). The Parallex View. London: Verso.
Zizek, S., & Daly, G. (2004). Conversations with Zizek. Cambridge: Polity.

Environmental Hypothesis: Cold has frozen my brain

As global concern for the environment appears to be growing strongly, the environmental movement has become one of the strongest components of left-wing politics. However, in psychoanalytic terms this concern takes the form of ideological fantasy and super-ego demand. Therefore rather than achieving a radical transformation of the capitalist economy in the name of environmentalism, the more common outcome is ecological modernism and its associations with positivist science and the capitalist free-market. While these efforts may make minor changes within the dominant imaginary, they entrench the hegemonic (universal) fantasy of the environment as under mans’ control. Rather, greater potential lies in an alternative strategy. Compared to other areas of anti-capitalist critique, environmentalism has a much stronger relationship with the real. The real in this sense is not the constitutive exclusion but more importantly the biological real. In this essay I promote a distinction between the natural and nature, the discursive rendering of the natural; the biological real. The interactions of symptoms of nature and the natural is what provides the potential for a dislocation of the existing order, achieved by elevating these symptoms to the status of concrete universal. However, because of the potential for dislocation, the efforts of ideology and super-ego to maintain the status quo are strengthened. Thus, although there is greater potential for dislocation through the natural if the fantasmatic hold is able to be broken, these system bonds are particularly resilient.

Politically, change can occur through two different spheres of the environment. I shall refer to these spheres as nature and the natural. Nature is the discursive representation of the natural. In contrast, natural is the real in itself. However, this is not the real in the sense of an exclusion from the symbolic. Rather it is the biological real; the realm of matter and its interactions. Because we do not have access to this biological real, in itself, it is meaningfully represented in the symbolic and imaginary. This representation is nature. Therefore we never know whether our representations of the natural are accurate, but when nature is exposed to the natural, as the real, nature is left open to dislocation. Therefore nature, as a discourse, is much more open to dislocation than other, symbolic, discourses. This is not to suggest that nature is not symbolic; as we know matter can only be meaningful in terms of the symbolic, but rather its unique position in terms of its referent creates a greater opportunity for materialist influence. As such a firm distinction should not be made between nature and the natural (outside of an abstract distinction). Rather the two have a complex, extimate relationship, much like reality and the real; the natural cannot be simply thought to be outside of nature.

Nature, as a discursive formation, takes the form of any other discourse. It is formed by the dynamic contradiction between the abstract universal and the particular. The particular in this sense is the full range of symbolis discourse relating to the natural (and because of the nature of language, beyond) and the universal is the hegemonic representation of this particular and the associated chains of equivalence that fill the universal and its representative; the empty signifier. In contemporary New Zealand political discourse, this may be the image of the environment as robust and controllable.

However, because the universal is always abstract and false, something must necessarily be excluded for it to be constituted. This excluded element, the excess of the universal, is known as the symptom. The symptom is evidence of the failure of the universal; it is the effect of the real upon the symbolic and as such provides a potential for symbolic dislocation. If the universal is nature as robust, then the symptom would be the evidence against this, where it is evident that nature is not robust. As an example, a 2004 National Institute of Water and Atmospheric Research (NIWA) study showed that 95% of New Zealand’s lowland rivers and streams were too polluted for people to swim in or drink from (Larned, Scarsbrook, Snelder, Norton, & Biggs, 2004). This is a symptom of the hegemonic universal; that the universal is false.

However, the presence of the symptom does not provide a dislocation. Rather the symptom is normally subverted by the effect of ideological fantasy and the super-ego in support of the abstract universal. Ideological fantasy works by presenting the social as a sutured and positive entity; therefore the presence of the symptom has to be externalised to another cause, or a solution to come. In terms of nature, the strongest hegemonic ideology is based around scientific knowledge, an approach known as ecological modernism. This ideology suggests that rather than radical change, what is required is increasing technology to deal with the symptoms. Ultimately the ideology contends that we should not worry about the natural; science and technology will prevent all problems in the future.

Super-ego demand works in a similar fashion to ideology in attempting to present the social as full by domesticating the effect of the symptom. In the Lacanian conception, the super-ego is the obscene supplement to the symbolic law; it is the guilt/surplus enjoyment which presses the subject to believe in the fullness of the social and thus the universal. The super-ego helps to maintain the possibility of symbolic fullness. It presses‘guilt’ upon the subject when gaps in the social appear if the subject does not follow the symbolic law. In this sense the super-ego forms an obscene underlying law which operates, and supports, the public law. This operation is seen most vividly at the point of failure of the law (Zizek, 1994:54). In terms of environmentalism the super-ego presses upon the subject the need to follow the notions of ecological modernism; to recycle and conserve energy. Although these actions are not a bad thing in themselves, they do help to maintain the fantasy that the universal is still full, that the environment is not a fundamental problem because the capitalist system is sustainable.

Therefore both ideology and super-ego work to avoid the horror of exposure to the real, or in this case, the natural. Rather than viewing the symptom for what it is, it is subverted in the name of the universal and the jouissance available in the possibility of fullness. If this were not to occur, if the symptom was to be revealed and presented as a constitutive element of the system, then it has reached the status of concrete universality. Concrete universality is brought about by the gap that the symptom opens up. Where the symptom is the gap between the universal and the particular, concrete universality is the gap between the universal and its symptom (Zizek, 2006:30). As such it reveals the truth of the universal; the universal is failure. In environmentalism, this would be the act of seeing that the universal conception of nature as robust and under the control of man as false and instead deeming the capitalist system unsustainable.

The natural, although of course intimately and extimately related to nature, operates according to a different logic from the symbolic and imaginary orders. This operation is similar to that of the real. As with the real, our understanding of the natural can only come through nature; the external limits of the system can only be revealed through the internal failings of the discourse; we can never map the real, only encircle it.

By the natural I am referring to the realm of matter, that which operates independently (although not isolated from the effects of) the symbolic. The natural can thus be termed the biological real. The natural interacts and changes often outside of the influence of the symbolic, but it is not mutually exclusive from nature. The effect of the symbolic, particularly its symptoms, interacts with the symptoms of the natural.

Symptoms of the natural take the form of medical symptoms; the manifestation of an underlying illness; the distinction here is between surface and depth, between phenomena and the hidden causes of those phenomena which cannot be experienced but must be inferred. The main dissimilarity between this conception and that of the psychoanalytic symptom is the variance between surface and depth, a distinction that does not exist in the symbolic. Also, in the biological notion of the symptom, the key is to battle to cause of which the symptom is a manifestation; in psychoanalysis the symptom is the cause and is thus to be dealt with in its own right.

The important factor in environmental discourse (in terms of potential dislocation) is the interaction of the two types of symptoms; biological and symbolic. This occurs at the border of the real and the symbolic. However, it is not just the influence of the real upon the symbolic, but also the other way round. As Fink states

‘True understanding… is actually a process which goes beyond the automatic functioning of the symbolic order and involves an incursion of the symbolic into the real: the signifier brings forth something new in the real or drains off more of the real into the symbolic’(Fink, 1995:71).

The relationship between the symbolic and the real described above by Fink is the same as the relationship between nature and the natural. The symptoms of nature have an affect on the natural and likewise the natural intrudes into nature. An example is illustrative. If we carry on from the example given earlier, the abstract universal view of nature is that of a robust system under the control of made, supported by the ideology of ecological modernism. The symptoms of this position are numerous and not all symptomatic. However, for the sake of simplicity one of the most prominent and dangerous symptoms can be selected; global pollution.

This symptom is a creation of the discursive, of course in interaction with the natural; we cannot forget that the natural is always at the same time symbolic, it just also interacts outside of the symbolic. Therefore, through a hegemonic conception of the environment guiding the actions of those who identify with the universal, a symptom is produced which affects the natural world; we believe that our production and consumption is unlimited, but because this does not correspond to the natural world, it is produced as a symptom. This symptom reveals the relationship between nature and the natural. If natural could take unlimited production, global pollution would not be a symptom, such pollution would not be created. It is quite conceivable that another universal could be produced that represented the natural better- such is the benefit of super-ego dominated science in ecological modernism- and this kind of symptom would not exist. This is not to suggest that a symptom would not exist, but just that it would not have the same effect on the natural world.

Thus a symptom of nature, when its interacts with the natural, becomes an active and powerful symptom. A symptom such as global pollution interacts with the natural, which is somewhat independent of symbolisation and produces global warming. In turn this symptom impresses on the symbolic order. This creates the possibility of the symptom coming to be viewed as a concrete universal. In the case of global warming, the universal of sustainable capitalism could produce the symptom of waste, which interaction at the intersection of the symbolic and real, producing a biological symptom of global warming and climate change. As such, global warming increases the pressure on the universal (showing it to be false) and creating the possibility that the symptom, global pollution, could become a concrete universal by being seen as constitutive of the universal of unlimited growth.

However, despite the promise evident in this example, such a case, although right before us, does not occur. Instead the efforts of the ideological and super-ego realms are redoubled. Although often the above case is treated with respect unlimited growth is impossible, it is not treated as a universal truth, but rather a contingent one; unlimited growth is not possible unless we begin to recycle or conserve energy. Worse still is the ideological idea that unlimited growth is possible, because the market will deal with the problem once it becomes starts to impact upon people with enough money to pay to do something about it e.g. once oil runs out, we will start selling electric cars.

The west also deals with the possibility of dislocation by rehearsing this trauma in fantasy, such as Hollywood cinema, such movies as The Day after Tomorrow, Dante’s Peak, and The Perfect Storm. This makes the prospect of such incursions of the real more palatable, as if they exist only in fantasy. Zizek makes a similar point about the impact of the 9/11 attacks on the United States public in Welcome to the Desert of the Real (2002).

Thus, despite the potential for dislocation of the symbolic and the elevation of symbolic symptoms to the status of concrete universal, I am not convinced that any real change can be achieved in this manner; such is the strength of ideology and super-ego in maintaining, or slightly altering the universal. Instead, it appears that only a dislocation, purely from the natural, in the form of a global disaster could truly change the global capitalist system. However, this conception is particularly politically impotent (although in line with Zizek’s conception of revealing the fantasy by taking the universal to its nth degree) and as such I believe it is worth investigating what a possible political position would take, from a Laclauian position, given that my review of the Zizekian/Lacanian standpoint.

Laclau would advocate a position of contingency, but also the institutionalisation of this contingency. This instutionalisation would take the form of a universal. I believe that this universal would look to take on as much from the natural, or the real as possible. Rather than being stuck in ideology, it would take the opposite view of the currently hegemonic universal (that of ecological modernism) and endorse the view that the natural knows best. Such a view is promoted in A Radical Green Political Theory (Carter, 1999). Here Carter suggests that the third law of ecology is that ‘Nature knows best’;

‘Any major human-made change in a natural system is likely to be detrimental to that system. The reason for this is that ecosystems, like watches, are extremely intricate and are unlikely to be improved by random tinkering’ (Carter, 1999:21-22).

This position is a fantasy in itself (that there is nothing lacking somewhere) and is in its fullest sense impractical; man is an intricate part of the natural system and can in no way withdraw itself. However, I wonder whether a limited version of this impossible position is possible. This could be an example of elevating the symptom to the universal. For example, in various places around the world predators have been removed from various eco-systems in order for them to become more comfortable for man. However, these systems often collapse as the predator played a vital role in regulating the system. On the other hand, it is impossible to simply follow the rule of nature as an ethic; part of being in nature is manipulating it. The problem is that humans have the ability to manipulate nature past the point of benefit. Perhaps it is simply a contingent ethic, rather than a guarantee, to follow the way of the natural.







Carter, A. (1999). A Radical Green Political Theory. Routledge: London.
Fink, B. (1995). The Lacanian Subject: Between Language and Jouissance. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Zizek, S. (1994). The Metastases of Enjoyment. London: Verso.
Zizek, S. (2002). Welcome to the Desert of the Real. London: Verso.
Zizek, S. (2006). The Parallex View. London: Verso.