Environmental chapter

Green ideology has provided a stern challenge to ethos of economic growth and thus of industrialism itself. Despite this challenge, however, industrialism and in particular capitalism, has retained its hegemonic position. Indeed it may be argued that capitalism is as strong as it has ever been. Having said this, ecological critique remains one of the strongest dislocatory factors against capitalism, Dryzek describing it as the ‘most significant ideological development of the late 20th century’ (Dryzek, 2005:225) This chapter seeks to achieve two tasks. Firstly, investigate the possibilities for radical economic change stemming from Green ideology. Secondly, this investigation will serve as a vehicle for the analysis of the work of Ernesto Laclau and Slavoj Zizek. The analysis aims find the most useful parts of the work of each theorist, both for understanding political change and stability and evoking radical change. Of particular interest in Laclau’s work is the ‘war of position’ for hegemony and empty signifiers in the symbolic realm, change occurring through dislocation and ‘chains of equivalence and difference’. In contrast Zizek’s work focuses on the role of enjoyment in social stability, but also the symptoms which give evidence of the internal breakdown of the discourse, an identification with these symptoms, the process of concrete universality, thought to produce radical change.

Therefore this chapter reviews several different Green discourses which form part of the Green ideology, considering the key elements of their structure, the manner in which they construct meanings and their symptoms. Examples of these discourses are taken from New Zealand politics, which while not exhaustive of Green ideology, gives an adequate guide. It is theorised that each discourse is dealing with a primary dislocation, that of the Green critique of industrialism and also the universal hegemonic power of the capitalist economy. Capital provides a fundamental limit to each of the discourses, a Real limit that produces a deadlock around which a plurality of discourses is created, as well the displacement of the effect of the real to various social antagonisms. Thus, although there are possibilities of radical economic change through the constant dislocation of industrialism and capital through the natural, these dislocations and the symptoms they produce are too well domesticated by discourses that cannot move beyond the limit imposed by capital. Therefore only a radical, natural dislocation provides a possibility of change. This work relies predominately on the theory of Laclau and Zizek, however, the analysis of Green discourses by Yannis Stavrakakis, John Dryzek and Toby Smith are also heavily drawn on.

The first prominent dislocations in our notions of environment began in the later 20th century. A concern with the environment began to develop into a discourse of its own in the 1960’s, along with a host of other changes in social politics at the time, including anti-racism, feminism and the peace movement. Indeed, Dryzek suggests that a concept of the ‘environment’ did not exist until the 1960’s (Dryzek, 2005:5). Environmentalism, however, did not really become a strong force until the 1970’s, when a radical environmental movement developed, part of which was a damming critique of capitalism (Hansen, 1991:444). Around this time Green political parties were also established, such as the Values Party in New Zealand, which first formed in 1972 (Dryzek, 2005:203).

In New Zealand the environmental movement only captured the attention of the masses when it began to threaten the national identity, or ‘Thing’ in a Lacanian sense. The first risings in the 1970’s were based around protests against the Manapouri dam and then nuclear issues in the pacific. It was institutionalised by the state by the anti-nuclear ban of 1985 following various other moves in the 1970’s, particularly by Kirk’s 3rd Labour government. This follows Zizek’s concept of ‘theft of enjoyment’ in antagonisms involving fundamental fantasies (Osborne, 1996:38). New Zealanders gain a lot of jouissance from their national identity or Thing, that unknowable ‘X’ which can be compared to the objet a (Evans, 1996:205), the environmental movement gained a lot of traction from this nationalistic jouissance because people believed that it was being threatened, either by development, as in the Manapouri dam, or foreigners in the French nuclear tests. Environmentalism, whether accurate or not, has become a part of New Zealand identity. For example, National has formed the ‘Blue Greens’ and United Future calls themselves the ‘common sense Greens’(UnitedFuture, 2005). The ‘ACT’ party too is getting in on the ‘Green’ message. These spread of environmental politics is mirrored in western nations around the world, with the notable exception of the United States.

The rapid progression of environment discourse has been a response to dislocations of the universal conception of the environment. These dislocations were unable to be pacified within the discursive/fantasmatic resources available and thus produced a plurality of discourses which sought to pacify and understand them. The pacification of a dislocation is not an arbitrary process, rather, as Stavrakakis states;

‘ the direction of the response (to dislocation) depends on the course of action which seems to be more capable of neutralising the terrorising presence of the impossible real’ (Stavrakakis, 2000:109).

A dislocation did occur in industrialism, however, because it was unable to fully integrate the impact of the Green critique. Thus new, environmentally orientated discourses developed;

‘Increasing numbers of people look for a solution to problems such as unemployment and economic deterioration in Green ideology…If today people are increasing looking to Green ideology in order to solve these problems this means that previously hegemonic identifications have been dislocated’(Stavrakakis, 2000:111)


This did not, however, mean a full breakdown of the industrial ethos. Rather industrialism has formed the background against which Green ideology has been played out, although this discourse differs as to whether it is reformist or radical (Dryzek, 2005:13-14). As an illustration, sustainable development discourse seeks to reform capitalism along more ecological lines, whereas Green Radicalism calls for the downfall of the capitalist economic system. Thus, whatever Green position is taken, it relates back to industrialism.

The reform/radical divide is similar to the division between environmentalism and ecologism. These terms are often used interchangeably within Green discourse, however, a distinction does lie between them. This distinction relates back to the reformist/radical divide. Environmentalism is thought to relate more to reformist, particular Green discourses, whereas ecologism takes a stronger, often ecocentric stand (Heywood, 1998:264; Smith, 1998:66). Therefore, in this chapter when referring the total field of thought relating to the environment, the term ‘Green’ will be used, whereas ‘environmentalism’ and ‘ecologism’ will be reserved for their respective particular discourses and ‘environment’ used to refer to the total natural entity outside of language.

Yannis Stavrakakis, in his work of Green ideology (1997; 2000), describes two separate dislocations that have occurred for Green thought to establish itself as an ideology. The first occurred in our conceptions of the environment. Previous to the establishment of Green ideology, the environment, if it was conceptualised at all, was thought of in a predominantly robust manner, particularly following the enlightenment. The conception of the environment as somewhat fragile was a major shock and dislocation, which bought with it a similar dislocation in industrial discourse, which could not longer be thought to simply carry on with its unlimited growth.

The first such discourse to take on this dislocation can be labelled Survivalism (Dryzek, 2005). Survivalism, first constituted through the Club of Rome report, is based on the belief that industrial production and economic growth is pushing the earth towards, or perhaps past its carry capacity; the maximum supportable resource use in an ecosystem before its collapse (ibid:27). Survivalism is the discourse which first established Green ideology as a political force, although it never fully instituted itself as a positive movement, rather as a threat the current universal. This was a role that it played particularly successfully, based on a core belief in the limits of the capacity of the planet. As such it became the symptom of industrialism and looked likely to threaten the universal status of industrialism, in both its capitalist and communist forms. Survivalism rejected any expansion of technologies in expanding limits, suggesting that these simply slowed the process and not by much when exponential growth is occurring, such as in human population. The ‘29th day’ metaphor is a common survivalist metaphor. This metaphor makes a comparison between Lily’s in a pond and the carrying capacity of the Earth, asking which day the pond would be half full on if the number of Lilies doubles each day and is full on the 30th. The answer of course is the 29th day, on which it would appear that there is plenty of room for expansion. This kind of imagery proved an enormous threat to the hegemonic system of production.

The Survivalist threat was subverted, however, through its particularisation by industrial ideology, first by ‘Promethean’ discourse and than through a plurality of discourses such as ‘Ecological Modernism’ and ‘Sustainable Development’(Dryzek, 2005). These discourses domesticated the threat of Survivalism by playing on its symptoms, particularly its lack of alternative economic strategy and public participation, and because industrial ideology is simply too strong. Indeed, the value of economic growth is one of the few shared understandings which hold together liberal capitalist societies. However, Survivalist discourse has still set the terms of the Green debate(ibid:62).

The first response to Survivalism was from what is termed ‘Promethean’ discourse (ibid). The basic premise of Promethean discourse is that Man has ultimate control of the environment and it thus able to push the limit of global carrying capacity indefinitely. This is based on free-market economic arguments that suggest that price is the ultimate measure of scarcity; as resources become scarcer, price will increase producing conservation efforts and a search for substitutes. In order to develop and have access to this technology, societies need to be wealthy. Therefore the key to the environmental health is economic wealth. Promethean discourse is illustrated in the following excerpt from a speech by ACT leader Rodney Hide;

‘resources aren't defined physically but by science and technology combined with our ability to organise and to make use of them. That’s why the human race continues to flourish and prosper 30 years after the environmental doomsday books so terrifyingly predicted our imminent demise. We didn't run out of resources for a very simple reason: we can expand our knowledge and thereby expand our resource base. We now have more resources than ever before. We will have even more tomorrow
I did travel to countries that had run out of everything. These were the eastern bloc countries. Their problem wasn't the physical limits of their resource base but their failed economic system. That's the other problem with the doomsday books. They said a lot about ecology, systems and feedback loops, but ignored, first, the economic system within which natural resources are defined and used and, second, the feedback loop that prices provide. The failure was fatal to the models' predictive power. If something gets scarce, its price goes up, spurring conservation, the search for more supplies and discovery of alternatives’ (Hide, 2005).
Therefore the Promethean response to the Survivalist threat was successfully able to domesticate the symptom it revealed in industrialism and maintain its universal status. Promethean discourse therefore exposed the symptom of Survivalism itself. This symptom was the limit that was imposed by industrialism. At the point survivalist discourse was unable to constitute itself any further. Thus it continues in its limited state, unable to go past industrial economics, although the threat of global resource limits is still often invoked in Green ideology, ‘All human activity takes place within the limits of a finite planet’ (GreenParty, 2005b). Survivalism was also unable to prescribe further modes of action, which left people threaten and anxious. Thus any discourse which either denied the threat, such as Promethean, or offered a solution like sustainability was taken up instead, even if elements of Survivalism remained in Green ideology.
The threat of environment collapse, however, did not simply dissipate. It constantly impacts on the social order. Now, however, although was are still threatened by environmental dislocation, which as Zizek shows is one of the modalities in which we regularly meet the real (Zizek, 1999:4) this threat is increasingly particularised and dealt with within a plurality of other discourses around this fundamental blockage; the paradoxical relationship between economic growth and environmental limits. But this threat continues to impact and thus the Promethean discourse ultimately failed because although it fits in well with the hegemony of economic growth it failed to adequately domesticate its symptom, the continued failure of the environment.
The failure of Promethean discourse bought with it the development of other discourses within the Green ideology. These discourses fit two categories, according to Dryzek (2005), reformist problem-solving and the more radical sustainability discourse, although the latter is not radical by the standard set in this thesis. Both these types of discourse are common in New Zealand and it is the former that we shall turn first.
Problem solving discourses, such as Democratic Pragmatism, Administrative and Economic Rationalism take the status quo as given and do not debate the issue of environmental limits which was at the centre of the Survivalist/Promethean division. Instead, problem-solving discourses reject any call to ‘ideology’ and rather focus on pure ‘scientific’ evidence. New Zealand environmental politics rotates around these three types of problem-solving discourses. The Green Party may enter further into the more radical sustainability discourses, but increasingly is looking to democratic participation and economic instruments.
Although there is much political debate over the differences and benefits between the three problem-solving discourses, they are very similar. Administrative rationalism takes a more centralised approach, whereas Democratic Pragmatism seeks more public participation and voluntary agreements. Economic Rationalism takes less of a pragmatic approach, based on economic theory and has many similarities with Promethean discourse. These discourses are particularly good at managing environmental problem, but fall short of being able to produce any kind of structural change. This change is sought in Ecological Modernism and Sustainable Development discourses, to which we will soon turn.
By taking the capitalist status quo as a given, problem solving discourses are able to supplement the universal appeal of capital whilst somewhat dealing with the symptom of environmental change, either through domestication through particularism e.g. No real change or sacrifice is required, just good management, or through social antagonism; ‘we are not captured by the extremist fringe of the environmental movement or it’s ideology (NZFirst, 2005a). Indeed, some parties, such as New Zealand First, take a purely economic line; one of New Zealand First’s 15 fundamental principles is;

‘Wise Governments view the preservation and enhancement of the environment as sound economics. All environmental policies will be proactive with a view to creating employment and sustainable wealth whilst improving one of our few competitive advantages’ (NZFirst, 2005b).

Likewise, David Benson-Pope, the Government Minister for the Environment states;

‘ While there are challenges ahead to maintain economic growth without damaging the environment or quality of life, I’m determined to face up to these challenges- there is no alternative’ (Benson-Pope, 2006a).

Economic Rationalism is very similar to the Promethean discourse; it includes much the same actors and assumptions, but makes more of an effort to account for environmental threat. Instead of simply letting the market take care of the environment, Economic Rationalist discourse seeks to establish markets where they did not exist previously, for water or pollution. Carbon trading and the Kyoto agreement are examples of this. At its most radical Economic Rationalism enters into a certain restructuring of the capitalism economy, similar to the discourse of Ecological Modernism. The former discourse is most readily associated with the political and economic Right, but increasingly even social democratic political parties and discourses are seeking to ‘harness the power of the market’. Even the Green party utilises these kind of movements, seeking to ‘Naturalise’ capitalism (GreenParty, 2005a, 2005d, 2005e).

The use of economic instruments in New Zealand Politics is confirmed by David Benson Pope, the Environment Minister states that the Government will focus on ‘effective and pragmatic approaches to managing waste in New Zealand…There are mixed opinions about the effectiveness or appropriateness of economic instruments. Where they can be shown to be effective when dealing with environmental issues the Government considers them’ (Benson-Pope, 2006b)

In reply, the opposition National party spokesperson on the environment, John Carter rejects the ‘effective and pragmatic’ claim, suggesting that Labour’s approach is ‘Sledgehammer legislation’ ‘a compliance cost nightmare’ and ‘prescriptive nanny state regulation’(Carter, 2006).

This small portion of a wider debate reveals the ideological positions of the respective main parties in New Zealand politics. Whereas Labour favours a brand of pragmatism, public participation and economic rationalist methods, the National party leans heavily towards the later. In doing so, it presents Labour’s alternative as a social antagonism, implicitly invoking the ‘disinvestment’ argument and thus once again revealing the limits of problem solving reformist discourses; capital.

Economic rationalist approaches to Green ideology are an interesting area to review the hegemonic flow of meanings and their limits. As well as this, the free-market discourse produces some strong symptoms which are only dealt with to a certain degree. These symptoms have lead to the production of social antagonisms through ideology, but also the alternative and more radical sustainability discourse. One must ask, however, whether there is a greater potential in the symptoms of the Economic Rationalist discourse (or problem solving discourses in general) that can be identified with in order to produce a dislocation of the kind that would produce radical economic restructuring, such as the breakdown of industrialism and global capital.


The Economic Rationalist discourse is a powerful one because it is able to particularise the environmental threat by maintaining the stance that a radical change is not possible; they do not deny the issue, but suggest an easy solution, obtainable without sacrifice. These solutions, however, hit a limit at capital. This limit is revealed in its symptoms, such as the rejection of Green taxes in New Zealand, such as the now infamous ‘Fart Tax’, as well as the ‘Carbon Tax’. These moves were rejected through the threat of ‘disinvestment’ from capital. The disinvestment threat is not direct, but it is real. Governments in liberal-capitalist democracies stand or fall on their abilities to increase and maintain economic growth. Any discursive move and policy that may directly threaten the interests of capital is immediately written off as a threat to economic growth and rejected. Efforts to move environmental protection along market lines were rejected because of their costs to capital. When this rejection is compared to the readiness to accept and take on similar free-market/user-pays measures in Health and Education, the symptom of economically based environmental management is revealed. It has a limit, and that limit is the interests of capital.

This symptom has been recognised and an alternative, more radical discourse has been developed, known under the general term of ‘Sustainability’, including the discourses of Ecological Modernism and Sustainable Development. These discourses do not seek to bring down capitalism, but rather to strengthen its position. They implicitly and explicitly accept that capitalism is the ‘only game in town’ and therefore ecological movements have no option but to seek to make it profitable for capital to be ‘Green’. This involves some restructuring of capital, but mostly in the name of capital, not the environment.

However, although these discourses seek to ecologise capitalism, all they end up achieving is a pacification of the ecological symptom and a market advantage, playing to the super-ego demand of the consumer, which is what we see in the Green consumerist movement. These include ‘Green’ shopping that plays at super-ego demand, such as re-usable shopping bags (Hickman, 2006). An interesting alternative to the super-ego approach is provided by the Conservation Fund and their Carbon Zero Calculator. Here the consumer is able to approximate their carbon footprint and then ‘Go Zero’ by making a donation towards the planting of native trees to balance out your production of carbon. I could remove my guilt, pollute all I want and ‘Go Zero’ for US$35.50! (TheConservationFund, 2006).

Green consumerism is one of the strongest Green discourses because its erases our doubts about the feasibility of consumption (over-consumption being suggested as a symptom of capital), suggesting that we can continue consuming at the same rate, as long as we do it in a more efficient and ecologically sensitive manner (Smith, 1998:88). Green consumerism also hooks into the very seductive ideological pleasures of the act of consumption itself. Although Green consumerism cannot be dismissed outright- undoubtedly it is better for the environment to buy recycled toilet paper than regular- the obscene underside of this action is that it domesticates the environmental symptom. It reduces the environmental problem to an individual one, rather than a constitutive structural fault and suggests that through small actions the problem can be solved. Ultimately then, Green Consumerism cannot be viewed in a positive manner.

Green Consumerism fits within the boundaries of the discourses of Sustainable Development and Ecological Modernism. These discourses are very similar, although Dryzek suggests that Ecological Modernism has a sharper ‘edge’ to it than Sustainable Development and tends to be more technical (Dryzek, 2005), however, for the benefit of the purposes of this chapter they can be treated as one and the same under the banner of ‘Sustainability’. The key metaphor of discourses of sustainability is ‘reassurance’. Sustainability discourse takes a stronger ecological/environmental stand, but ultimately sticks with the free-market and argues that we can have environmental protection, and economic growth at the same time, if the economy is re-structure to meet the demands of the environment. In taking on all these demands, the term ‘Sustainable Development’ becomes an empty signifier in the Laclauian sense; it is filled with meaning by whichever discourse appropriates it, normally the most powerful. Thus while Green parties and movements may insist on the value of being ‘Sustainable’, the term is being appropriate by capital to mean sustainable growth, which may or may nor have an environmental edge. This is the value of ‘Sustainable Development’; it can be taken on by many discourses without compromise, most notably capital. This is a grand example of a hegemonic occupation of a term and its political implications; it removes a strong Green influence from power and allows the continued degradation of the environment.

Politically then, there is some value in battling for the resignification of the term ‘sustainable’, including previously excluded meanings through a logic of difference and by attempting to show the manner in which meaning has been contingently constructed. However, given the status of the economy and the limits that I have shown in this chapter, it is an unlikely solution. As an illustration, although the New Zealand Green parties seeks to resignify ‘Sustainable’ and project alternative meanings as mere empty talk, it is unable to act on these sentiments. They are politically limited because they know it is electoral suicide to take on a position that may evoke ‘disinvestment’ threats. Other political parties in New Zealand also know this, accusing the Green Party of being ‘Watermelons’; green on the outside, red in the middle (Baldock, 2005; Hide, 2005). It is as if capital provides a fundamental blockage in the discourse; as Zizek states, capital is the real, it has hegemonised hegemony (Zizek, 2000a:223; 2000b:319).

Thus, although the Green Party (in their Charter) state what appears to be an anti-capitalist manifesto;

‘Unlimited material growth is impossible. Therefore the key to social responsibility is the just distribution of social and natural resources, both locally and globally’ (GreenParty, 2005c).

They are politically forced to re-interpret ‘Sustainable’ in a capitalistic manner, in the naïve hope that they can manipulate its meaning beyond its corporate sense. In the initial issue of the Green’s business publication ‘The Real Bottom Line’, co-leader Jeanette Fitzsimons suggests that Sustainable business is about ‘Future-proofing the New Zealand Economy’(Fitzsimons, 2006b). Similarly, in an article entitled ‘More Power to Consumers’ Fitzsimons advocates for more information for consumers to make better choices about their choice of energy supplier (Fitzsimons, 2006a). Indeed, Green Consumerism is a large element of the Green Party political strategy

There are, however, alternative possibilities, such as;
- Green radicalism;
- Identification with the symptoms of ‘Sustainability’ and ‘Problem Solving’ Green discourses;
- Ecological collapse.

Green radicalism is by far the most common of these possibilities. Of all the Green discourses that I have analysed in this chapter, it is only Green Radicalism that is not totally anthropocentric. There are anthropocentric elements in Green Radicalism, but a large element of this discourse focuses on the largely excluded ecocentric component of Green ideology. There is some value in Green Radicalism, as it largely refuses the terms of the debate that other Green discourses involve themselves in. However, it is neither able to propose a viable alternative discourse to capital and industrialism, or maintain itself as a symptom of modernism enlightenment thinking; the ecological critique is too easily subverted into other discourses that are prepared to play the capitalist game, such as Ecological Modernism. The greatest impact of Green Radicalism is in the Survivalist discourse (the original Green Radicalism) and the hegemonic appeal of Green Consciousness; Green ideology impacts on many areas of politics, even if this impact is largely empty or simply reformist.

Green Radicalism is also a flawed discourse, although in a different manner from other Green discourses. Radicalism is very essentialist and totalitarian. Radical Green discourse seeks to find a fundamental and essential unity between its elements, based on a ‘natural’ bio-centric harmony between man and nature. Like any essentialist discourse, when this link, which I have previously shown to be impossible (and the fundamental illusion of the social), the dislocation is dangerously displaced onto a social antagonism. This occurs particularly in the paradoxical ecocentric element of Green Radicalism. As we have seen, there is no link between language and the Real, therefore any direct link with nature is impossible. Thus the paradox with ecocentricism is that it can only be expressed anthropocentrically through language.

It is possible, as Smith (1998:163) suggests, that Green Radicalism could make more of an impact if it focused more on the role of culture, fighting for the meanings of terms and the hegemonic re-occupation of terms that originated from the Green movement, such as Sustainability, rather than leaving it to capital and those who are prepared to compromise with capital. I believe that this would be a more viable strategy, although it is unlikely to succeed based on current Green Radical discourse. At best it can hope to maintain the dislocatory influence of the environment in the hope of pushing discourse to further deal with the threat of ecological collapse.

I believe a more feasible option would be identification with the symptom of both the problem solving and sustainability discourse discussed earlier. The symptoms of these discourses are very similar, relating back to the limit of the discourse, the Real. The Real in this sense is not capital, but rather the limits imposed by capital. It is these limits around which Green discourses revolve, unable to pass beyond the realm of capital. At the limit imposed by capital, symptoms appear. These symptoms are the evidence of the failure of the discourse; the effect of the Real upon the Symbolic. An example of these symptoms are the limits of the market approach; not everything can be privatised- what about water, or air, or genes? Surely there cannot be owners for these items. Or the slowness with which the free-market has taken the environment compared to health or education. Or the general failure of markets to take into account environment degradation. These symptoms show how capital, economic growth and the environment cannot functionally interact. But this are not revealed as such. Rather they are domesticated in their effects through ideological fantasy, which presents the symptom either as a social antagonism (the fault of an external cause e.g. the free-market does work, if only governments would not get involved) or a particular failure to be dealt with. Indeed these failures are necessary for the stability of the discourse; if the Economic Rationalist approach was working at its optimum efficiency and the environment was still failing, then the discourse would break up. Therefore the capitalist Green discourses require a certain degree of failure and antagonism to occur; without the symptom they would be nothing.

It is the symptom, however, that also has the potential to break-up a discourse, if it is revealed as a concrete universal; constitutive of the discourse. In a position of concrete universality it is recognised that the discourse requires the symptom for its existence; capitalism requires increasing resource use for its continued growth. Ultimately, as the population gets larger and, through capitalism, richer (but not in proportion, as we shall see in the following chapter, capitalism also requires an excluded poor) more and more pressure is placed on the environment. Discourse of sustainability or reform can particularise this symptom, but ultimately it is only an identification with it that gives hope of change. This identification cannot be false; I know very well that capitalism rapes the environment, but I still believe we can modify it to fit. Rather it has to be Real- in the strict Lacanian sense- it has to be a horrific collective realisation that prompts much anxiety and change to the point that the impossible becomes not an alternative to capital, but capital itself.

What is the possibility of this occurring? This brings me to the third alternative, alongside Green Radicalism and identification with the symptom; ecological collapse. At the moment it is too easy for capitalism to subvert the dislocation that comes with environment failure. As I have shown, it is easy and seductive to suggest that with a little bit of effort all our environmental issues can be solved. Therefore I suggest that it is only with a stronger environment breakdown that people will really start to feel the capitalist environmental symptom. As well have seen, as environment failure continues, discourses have become stronger in dealing with the dislocation. This does produce some change; Ecological Modernist measures are more effective than Economic Rationalism, but it also has the effect of fooling us into the idea of progress. It is only when the dislocatory affect becomes too strong, when the symptom is simply unable to be domesticated by capital that change will occur; whether this is too late for humanity is yet to be seen.



Environmentalism, I believe provides a good example of the strengths and limitations of both Laclau and Zizek’s approaches. Whilst the Laclauian method, both theoretical and political is productive for explaining the manner in which environmental discourse has been constituted as an ideology, it cannot adequately explain why it stalls at the fundamental blockage of capitalism. Given this theoretical failure, nor can we state that radical democracy is capable of overturning this deadlock. The fantasy and enjoyment inherent in global capital are simply too strong to be overturned through the flow of meanings; these are simply subverted.

The Zizekian alternative of identification with the symptom in producing change, as well as the role of ideology, enjoyment and the Real in stabilising a discourse. Zizek also goes further suggesting two alternatives, the first I have already laid out; ecological collapse of some degree. Zizek contends that liberal-capitalism cannot go on forever; ecological collapse is one of the possible explosions that can destroy it; all we can do is be prepared when this explosion does occur (Osborne, 1996:44). This is not a particularly pro-active of positive position. The second Zizekian alternative is to resist the terms of the debate, to resist the need to act, because such an action will be simply within the co-ordinates of global capital; it is better to simply question the very ideological background against which all action can occur; capitalism (Zizek, 2006:238). This alternative would be not to enter into Green ideology, knowing that is inevitably played out against the background of capital, but rather to question the very lack of alternative, why, in Zizek words ‘It is easier to imagine the end of the world then the fall of capitalism’(Taylor, 2005).



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Zizek, S. (1999). The Ticklish Subject. London: Verso.
Zizek, S. (2000a). Da Capo senza Fine. In J. Bulter, E. Laclau & S. Zizek (Eds.), Contingency, Hegemony and Universality. London: Verso.
Zizek, S. (2000b). Holding the Place. In J. Bulter, E. Laclau & S. Zizek (Eds.), Contingency, Hegemony, Universality. London: Verso.
Zizek, S. (2006). The Universal Exception. London: Continuum.

Redefining terms

During the process of developing my theoretical method for this thesis, I have used the terms ‘antagonism/social antagonism’ and ‘dislocation’ somewhat interchangeably. This is, however, an error that needs to be corrected. Therefore I seek to clarify the use of the terms before I go any further.

A conflation of these terms is not an uncommon error. In Hegemony and Socialist Strategy Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe assumed an identity between antagonism and dislocation, considering antagonism to be responsible for the impossibility of society (Torfing, 1999:128). This, however, assumes that the impossibility of society is external, rather than internal to society. As Zizek points out, what is negated in social antagonism is already negated by a force prior to it- the Real (Zizek, 1990).

It is the Real that is responsible for the impossibility of society, and this impossibility is inscribed in the term ‘dislocation’. Stavrakakis contends that dislocation an ‘unrepresentable’ moment is much closer to the Real than antagonism, which is more the attempts to negate the initial negation caused by the Real (Stavrakakis, 1997: 126). Thus dislocation reveals the lack around which the social is based, whereas antagonism involves the competing efforts to suture this lack. This is a distinction between internal and external responses to the Real; dislocation is an internal response as it is between symbolisation and the Real, whereas antagonism, as an external response to the effect of the Real lies in the limit between different competing antagonisms.

Therefore, because of the effect of the real, every identity is dislocated. This dislocation produces both the symptom, the internal effect of dislocation and social antagonism. Thus social antagonism is a displacement of the effect of the Real. Social antagonism occur because of any attempt at universalism requires both the negation of alternative meanings and of the initial lack, for which alternative meanings compete to cover up. As an illustration, in market environmentalism, the failure of the market in the production of global climate change is a symptom, but this symptom, as effect of the basic dislocation of the discourse (it cannot be fully universal) is inscribed in a social antagonism, normally against ‘control economies’ which are making the problem worse. The main aim of social antagonism is to domesticate and externalise the threat of dislocation and the symptom; this is the effect of ideology.

There are, however, different kinds of responses to dislocation in through social antagonism. Jacob Torfing categorises these as;
Torfing (1999:120) suggests that this produces several different kinds of responses;
- Open confrontation between discourses;
- Displacement; social antagonism;
- Super-ego demand;
- Internalisation; concrete universality.

These responses all, with the exception of concrete universality (which produces radical change), are attempts to subvert the effect of the Real and maintain the stability of the discourse. This stability is, however, an illusion; through the negation of the negation we are under the illusion that the annilhation of the antagonistic force will allow our full constitution. Rather, as Zizek states, the moment of the dissipation of antagonism is when we feel dislocation at its strongest- and start looking for new enemies.

I should also note that dislocation can occur in an already established discourse; an identity can be dislocated (initially) and later suffer a dislocation when ‘A dislocation of a discourse results from the emergence of events which cannot be domesticated, symbolised or integrated within the discourse in question’ (Torfing, 1999:301). Therefore while dislocation produces antagonism, antagonism can also produce dislocation, as can the symptom. Dislocations also occur to certain depths and thus requires/produces different responses; a discourse can be deeply dislocated, which we either produce radical change or a major antagonistic enemy, or subtly dislocated, in which the same would occur on a much smaller scale.


Stavrakakis, Y. (1997). Ambiguous Ideology and the Lacanian Twist. Journal of the Centre for Freudian Analysis and Research, 8-9, 117-130.
Torfing, J. (1999). New Theories of Discourse; Laclau, Mouffe and Zizek. Oxford: Blackwell.
Zizek, S. (1990). Beyond Discourse-Analysis. In E. Laclau (Ed.), New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time. London: Verso.

Wealth and Poverty

This week I have been investigating some capitalist 'solutions' to economic development and poverty. Within these 'revisionist' approaches to development, there are three predominant postulated responses to poverty;
- The non-opposed exterior (Those 'passively' in poverty);
- The antagonistic exterior ( Socialism);
- The antagonistic interior (World Bank's perspective of the IMF).

Capitalism is considered to be the only possible economic system. Formalist logic suggests that capitalism has been more successful at producing economic growth than any other alternative, therefore capitalism= wealth. Under this ideology, poverty exists because of a lack of capitalism.
Paradoxically, a parallax is produced between wealth (as identity, abstract universal) and poverty (non-identity, concrete universal). No relationship is conceived between the production of wealth and the production of poverty. Nonetheless, the gap between the two is reproduced as a possible object; that poverty can be eliminated by becoming wealth.

Capitalist development ideology suggests that for poverty to be eliminated capitalism must be globalised and the conditions of capitalisation reproduced in this non-opposed exterior. No possibility is given to an incommensurability between wealth and poverty. This is the true parallax (poverty as the disavowed foundation of wealth) and the aim of psychoanalytic ideological critique; not to reveal something new, but a disturbing underside to what is already known.

Nonetheless, texts which take poverty seriously cannot deny its continued existence, despite the rapid globalisation of capitalism. Cause must be found. It is located in two areas of anterior, either exterior or interior. Both forms of antagonism are credited with causing, either initially or contemporarily, the existence of poverty. We shall first deal with the former.

Exterior antagonism is what would be dialectically considered a constitutive outside; an exterior which affirms interior identity. Within the operation of formalist ideology exterior antagonisms work in much the same manner, giving cause to that which is excessive to identity. There are numerous modalities of exterior antagonisms. Three forms are predominant within capitalist development discourse; natural/historical, internal and external.

External exterior antagonisms are elements that are discursively presented as the cause of poverty, which are exterior to capitalist identity, but also external to the victims of poverty. Marxist ideology, as an illustration, is posited as a external exterior antagonism, enforced onto those in poverty.In contrast, an internal exterior antagonism is a cause of poverty (exterior to capitalism) which has been produced by those in poverty e.g. poor work ethic or corrupt governance.

Natural/historical antagonisms are perhaps the most powerful explanatory force in that they are perceived to be beyond politics. Jared Diamond's text 'Guns, Germs and Steel' is an element of this modality of discourse. Here, Diamond suggests that global distribution of wealth has been caused by various historical/geographical factors. This sort of antagonism removes the political tension from the discourse. Poverty then becomes a matter of the super-ego; a paternal responsibility.

The final salient factor in development discourse is interior antagonisms. Interior antagonisms are discourses that battle for the hegemonic space within the empty signifier 'development'. A prime example is Joseph Stiglitz's 'Globalisation's and its discontents'. Here Stiglitz's attributes the continued existence of poverty to poor policies by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), as opposed to Stiglitz's World Bank.

The collective effect of these antagonisms is to give contingent cause to poverty. This is the role of ideology; to reproduce the gap between symptom and abstract universality in a more palpable manner. The role of ideological critique than becomes not to uncover something new, but the disturbing hidden underside of what is already known. In my next piece I will investigate the work of leftist/anti-capitalists’ on the relationship between poverty and wealth.

Environmental Framework

This essay seeks to lay out the basic parameters of the chapter focused on environmentalism in my thesis. As such I do not seek to develop a psychoanalytically informed ecological theory, nor have I performed a full discourse analysis, although I imagine elements of both will be present in the complete thesis chapter. Rather, in this entry I seek to investigate how Laclau and Zizek’s conceptions of political change are played out in environmental discourse (particularly in New Zealand) and, further than this, debate the potential for radical anti-capitalist change stemming from environmentalist discourse.

The initial structure of this debate, examining the manner in which Green ideology has constituted itself, follows the work of Yannis Stavrakakis work (Stavrakakis, 1997, 2000). Stavrakakis works within the theoretical perspectives of both Laclau and Zizek and investigates three core elements in the rise of Green ideology;
- Dislocation of the hegemonic notions of the environment
- Dislocation of the political, particularly in regard to the environment
- Green thought as an ideology.

The first prominent dislocations in our notions of environment[i] began in the later 20th century when a concern with the environment began to develop into a discourse of its own in the 1960’s, along with a host of other changes in social politics at the time, including anti-racism and anti-sexism. Environmentalism, however, did not really become a strong force until the 1970’s, when a radical environmental movement developed, part of which was a damming critique of capitalism (Hansen, 1991:444). The rapid progression of environment discourse was a response to antagonisms in our conception of the environment. These antagonisms were unable to be pacified within the discursive/fantasmatic resources available and thus produced a dislocation.

All identities are dislocated to some degree, in that they require something outside of them to be constituted (Laclau, 1990:39-41), but dislocation is not always revealed; indeed it is only the negation of the dislocated element of the universal which maintains its universal status as an identity (Thomassen, 2005:16). When it is exposed, dislocation provokes antagonism, as revealed in the symptom. The presence of an antagonism, however, does not automatically mean an identity crisis;

‘ the direction of the response (to antagonism) depends on the course of action which seems to be more capable of neutralising the terrorising presence of the impossible real’ (Stavrakakis, 2000:109).


In order to maintain the purity of the identity, the effect of the antagonism is subverted onto a social antagonism, an ‘Other’ who has stolen ‘it’. In the case of environmental discourse, however, the antagonism was not able to be adequately displaced and a dislocation occurred.

The dislocation of the hegemonic discourses on the environment, caused by an antagonism in these notions, became an antagonism in itself in political terms. Neither the ‘Old Left’ nor the Right were able to include it as a particular within their chain of equivalences. Therefore a second dislocation occurred, this time within political discourse.

There are two possible explanations for this second dislocation. Stavrakakis hypothesises that for citizens to identify with the environmental movement, a second dislocation had to occur within political discourse. This dislocation occurred on several fronts, environmentalism perhaps the most prominent. Stavrakakis suggests that;

‘Increasing numbers of people look for a solution to problems such as unemployment and economic deterioration in Green ideology…If today people are increasing looking to Green ideology in order to solve these problems this means that previously hegemonic identifications have been dislocated’(Stavrakakis, 2000:111)

I agree that a dislocation did occur in political discourse that allowed a Green identification. I would like to suggest, however, that it was the advent of the dislocation of Green thought and the resulting antagonism that helped to produce the dislocation in political discourse, particularly of the Left. I do agree with Stavrakakis though that this discourse only became political through the dislocation of the Old Left.

Green ideology has itself developed into a universalism that competes with other, more traditional ideologies, such as liberalism and conservativism (Stavrakakis, 1997). To suggest, however, that the advent of a Green ideology has been the final victory for the environment cause would be a grave error. I state this for two main reasons. Although Green ideology, particularly at its most radical, is very essentialist. Green discourse seeks to find a fundamental and essential unity between its elements, particularly in the paradoxical ecocentric version. The paradox with ecocentricism is that it can only be expressed anthropocentrically, through language; no pure access to nature is possible. Thus, as with any universal, environmentalism produces its own symptoms.

As well as this, although Green ideology has become politically prominent, it has only been able to achieve change up to a certain threshold. It is this limit which is of vital importance in the debate between the relative merits of Laclau and Zizek’s work. Although Green ideology has been able to establish itself as an ideology and dislocate both the predominant conceptions of nature and the political treatment of these conceptions, it has not been able to fully deconstruct the unconscious supplement or fantasy that maintains the hegemonic capitalist ideology. It is this universalism that environment discourse has been unable to crack.

For a universalism of any kind to survive it has to subvert the various threats that come from being a fundamentally decentred entity. The regular process for dealing with such threats is to particularise them in a manner- present them as fixable- which maintains the unconscious supplement of the universal. This supplement is what binds together the universal. For example in New Zealand the environmental movement only captured the attention of the masses when it began to threaten the national identity, or ‘Thing’ in a Lacanian sense. The first risings in the 1970’s were based around protests against the Manapouri dam and then nuclear issues in the pacific. It was institutionalised by the state by the anti-nuclear ban of 1985 following various other moves in the 1970’s, particularly by Kirk’s 3rd Labour government. This follows Zizek’s concept of ‘theft of enjoyment’ in antagonisms involving fundamental fantasies (Osborne, 1996:38). New Zealanders gain a lot of jouissance from their national identity or Thing, that unknowable ‘X’ which can be compared to the objet a (Evans, 1996:205), the environmental movement gained a lot of traction from this nationalistic jouissance because people believed that it was being threatened, either by development, as in the Manapouri dam, or foreigners in the French nuclear tests. Environmentalism, whether accurate or not, has become a part of New Zealand identity.

In New Zealand this has helped maintain the position of Green ideology in politics, but it does not guarantee any practical effect. Rather, although all the political parties pay lip-service to environmentalism, competing to fill the empty signifier ‘Green’ and thus control the meaning of the term, this does not mean that all are seriously environmentally concerned. In particular, parties are attempting to bring the term away from the control of the Green Party and particularise it within their own ideology, thus subverting its effects.

For example, National has formed the ‘Blue Greens’ and United Future calls themselves the ‘common sense Greens’(UnitedFuture, 2005). ACT too is getting in on the ‘Green’ message. In a 2005 speech, Rodney Ride stated;

‘resources aren't defined physically but by science and technology combined with our ability to organise and to make use of them. That’s why the human race continues to flourish and prosper 30 years after the environmental doomsday books so terrifyingly predicted our imminent demise. We didn't run out of resources for a very simple reason: we can expand our knowledge and thereby expand our resource base. We now have more resources than ever before. We will have even more tomorrow

I did travel to countries that had run out of everything. These were the eastern bloc countries. Their problem wasn't the physical limits of their resource base but their failed economic system. That's the other problem with the doomsday books. They said a lot about ecology, systems and feedback loops, but ignored, first, the economic system within which natural resources are defined and used and, second, the feedback loop that prices provide. The failure was fatal to the models' predictive power. If something gets scarce, its price goes up, spurring conservation, the search for more supplies and discovery of alternatives’ (Hide, 2005).

Likewise, one of New Zealand First’s 15 fundamental principles is;

‘Wise Governments view the preservation and enhancement of the environment as sound economics. All environmental policies will be proactive with a view to creating employment and sustainable wealth whilst improving one of our few competitive advantages’ (NZFirst, 2005).

Once the ‘Green’ link has been established and the antagonism has been domesticated, it simply becomes a particular within the free-market universal and has very little influence. This is not to state, however, that right wing parties are the only political groups to concede to the power of the economy. It is just that groups like the ACT party are more honest about it. In contrast the Green Party, both of New Zealand and Britain, implicitly claim to have anti-capitalist principles, but both work well within the confines of the capitalist economy. One of the principles of the British Green party manifesto is;

‘A rejection of materialism and the destructive values of industrialism’ (Stavrakakis, 1997)

Likewise the Green Party of Aotearoa, in their Charter state;

‘Unlimited material growth is impossible. Therefore the key to social responsibility is the just distribution of social and natural resources, both locally and globally’ (GreenParty, 2005).

Although these principles do not overtly state an anti-capitalist position, the implicit message is certainly anti-capitalist. Green ideology, however, is not able to act on these sentiments. They are unable to take the final act because they know it is electoral suicide, as other parties do, accusing them of being ‘watermelons’; green on the outside, red in the middle (Baldock, 2005; Hide, 2005). It is as if capital provides a fundamental blockage in the discourse; as Zizek states, capital is the real, it has hegemonised hegemony (Zizek, 2000a:223; 2000b:319).

Now, however, although was are still antagonised by environmental threat, which as Zizek shows is one of the modalities in which we regularly meet the real (Zizek, 1999:4) this threat is increasingly particularised and dealt with within a plurality of other discourses around this fundamental blockage. One particularly common discourse is the scientific ideology that all environmental issues will eventually get solved with greater knowledge and better technology. Accompanying this ideology is the idea that the radical Green position is simply an ‘ideology’ in itself, unlike ‘objective’ science (Hide, 2005; UnitedFuture, 2005).

Particularism also occurs within the Green Party, abet in a more ecological universal manner. The Green Party (NZ) cannot make any fundamental changes in the economic structures, so works in a very particular manner promoting, practical, ‘Tool Kit’ solutions, such as better waste management. Such attempts stay with a win-win fantasy. It is appears to be politically unthinkable in western societies to such any kind of sacrifice has to be made.

Other interesting attempts to deal with the environmental antagonism fully enter into the consumerist fantasy. These include ‘Green’ shopping that plays at super-ego demand, such as re-usable shopping bags (Hickman, 2006). An interesting alternative to the super-ego approach is provided by the Conservation Fund and their Carbon Zero Calculator. Here the consumer is able to approximate their carbon footprint and then ‘Go Zero’ by making a donation towards the planting of native trees to balance out your production of carbon. I could remove my guilt, pollute all I want and ‘Go Zero’ for US$35.50! (TheConservationFund, 2006).

While these approaches do have a benefit, as has the entire environment movement, in getting Green ideology in the political sphere and having a material effect on the world, to its benefit, as pointed out by environmentalist such as Lomborg (Lomborg, 1998), and Suzuki and Dressel (Suzuki & Dressel, 2002) who suggest that by changing our ways humanity has largely turned around the environmental problem and will continue to do so into the future. What this kind of approach ignores, however, is that there is a limit to the benefit that this kind of approach can provide. Whilst the capitalist system still operates, corporations will still do whatever they can to make a profit, and as, Zizek states in regard to expansion of liberal-capitalism;

‘There is a limit to it, and where that limit is, is for me the only serious question’. (Osborne, 1996:37).

Environmentalism, I believe provides a good example of the strengths and limitations of both Laclau and Zizek’s approaches. Whilst the Laclauian method, both theoretical and political is productive for explaining the manner in which environmental discourse has been constituted as an ideology, it cannot adequately explain why it stalls at the fundamental blockage of capitalism. Given this theoretical failure, nor can we state that radical democracy is capable of overturning this deadlock. The fantasy and enjoyment inherent in global capital are simply too strong to be overturned through the flow of meanings; these are simply subverted, as I have described earlier with environmental antagonism.

What then is the Zizekian alternative? Any approach from this perspective must deal both with the real of capital and its associated deadlock, as well as the enjoyment that is gathered out of it. One strategy noted earlier was association with other strong fantasies, such as nationhood. The movement between capitalism an totalitarian nationalism is something that has often occurred, particularly in Eastern European states and is a false dichotomy that Zizek strongly opposes (Osborne, 1996:27-32; Zizek, 2001). Nationalism is a futile strategy in terms of anti-capitalism within the capitalist system because it is so heavily tied within the system. Therefore, just as the Laclauian ‘war of position’, this strategy is doomed to failure.

Instead, I believe that the answer lies within capitalism itself, through a concept that I have discussed previously and as such will not dwell on, identification with the symptom and concrete universality. It is only when we are able identifying with the environmental symptom, the representation of the antagonism of the real, that we are able to break with the fantasy and achieve true radical change. But what would this symptom look like in environmental terms and how would such identification occur? Symptoms of global climate change are felt everyday, the naming of such symptoms is not overly important; within a given level of material occurrence, the science of climate change is simply a distraction from the real issues. As I have shown, scientific ideology too easily pacifies environmental antagonism. Nor is it Green ideology, which is also easily taken up through similar ideologies. The main ‘advantage’ with the environmental realm, in terms of change, is that we constantly feel the effects of the real in the environment (Zizek, 1999:4) and thus antagonisms are ever present. Unfortunately I believe that it will only be a radical environmental explosion of some kind which will prompt radical anti-capitalist change to come out of this domain. It is for this reason that I do not believe that environmental discourse holds much political hope for the anti-capitalist. Instead I agree with Zizek in that all we can do is be prepared when this explosion does occur (Osborne, 1996:44).


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[i] My history of environmentalism is limited at this stage. For the fuller chapter I will have to expand on this in more detail