'These are my principles and if you don't like them...well, I have others' Groucho Marx

What is interesting me at the moment is the ideological production of capitalism. The signifier ‘Capitalism’ itself does not seem to be discursive articulated. Instead any number of discursive positions take its place, within a formal range. Few are brazen enough to speak of capital directly. Capital seems to operate like the human body- the body is never naked in public, rather it is the clothes which define its form. Despite this outward appearance, the body in its most basic form is our means of enjoyment and reproduction. The operation is the same with capitalism. Few would identify openly as capitalist, rather they identify with a mediating discourse which takes a place within the system of production and consumption.

In spite of history suggesting that America’s military interventions are dominated by a desire to maintain capitalism, one can only image the anxiety if George Bush declared that he invaded Iraq in the name of capitalism. Democracy is virtuous, global security is acceptable, national security controversial but widely acknowledged. Invasion in the name of capitalism would, I imagine, almost be the end of the Bush administration. Perhaps one could suggest that capitalism is the concrete universal of democracy. Furthermore, this example suggests two additional points. Firstly, it seems that capitalism is a formally empty signifying system (much like an empty signifier, but on a more complex scale). Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, we must ask why it is that capitalism operates only through its instantiation in ideological content which appears somewhat divorced from its ultimate form.

Capitalism, as the symbolic Real, has to take on a number of different demands which at a base level may be quite different from the essential aim of capitalism (profit). These demands, however, are able to be rearticulated as congruent with capitalism, in ideology at least. A quick glance at the McDonalds New Zealand website acts as an example. McDonalds New Zealand, it seems, is involved in community development, “delicious menu choices that cater to your individual tastes and dietary needs” sponsorship and ‘exciting careers’. One could be forgiven for mistaking McDonalds for as a community orientation association.

This ideology appears to create a distance from the hidden underside of production. Corporate ideology maintains the jouissance of consumption whilst taking on various super-ego demands. Profit, it seems, does not come into it. But production is hardly hidden. Most of us notice that ‘we’ go to work each day and that others do the same. So is production hidden at all, or is it that capitalist ideology simply promotes its more pleasurable element? Or is it that certain elements of production are hidden, that production is presented in terms of consumption, without open reference to the goals of production. Nonetheless, in the past capitalism was production orientated so obviously capitalism can operate under these conditions.

At this stage, as I am sure you can perceive, I am not quite sure what to do with these thoughts. They do appear important in some regard though. Specifically, I would like to know why it is that in content capitalist ideology is expressed in a manner so removed from what we can analytically decipher as the capitalist form.

Update

My question is ultimately a sociological one; I am investigating the production of shared social life (universality). Through the use of psychoanalytic theory, my research to date has focused on the exclusions which are necessary for the constitution and maintenance of an abstract capitalist universal imagery. So far my focus has been on the manner in which hegemony is maintained through ideological construction of exceptions. In particular I have considered the role of enjoyment in stabilising the relationship between identity and non-identity.

More specifically, in seeking to understand the maintenance of universality, I have theorised (without coming to a definite conclusion) around the opportunities that exist for producing political change. Change has been considered at two levels, political alterations which revise the hegemonic balance and more radical change which undermines the fundamental basis of the social.

The latter notion of change has been my predominant focus. Revisionist change is relatively common place. In contrast, radical change is literally an impossible task. This impossibility conditions are produced by the stabilising role of ideology in its treatment of exceptions. Within a universalising discourse there are always multiple points of difference/antagonism. These points can be defined as follows;
- Constitutive outside; that which is external. Excluded and re-produced as a threat.
- The non-operative inside; Discursive elements within a discourse that may contradict the central demands of the abstract universal, yet do not compete for the place of universality. These demands may be articulated in a reduced form within capitalism or more simply lie under the radar. If they attempt to battle for the place of universality they will most likely be represented as a threat and produced as a constitutive outside.
- Symptoms; points of anxiety within the universal. Symptoms are evidence of the necessary exclusions that are internal to the universal.
- The concrete universal; Necessary exclusion upon which the discourse is based, yet cannot be acknowledged within the universal.

The role of ideology is to maintain and stabilise these threats. Predominately this occurs by including the elements within the universalising discourse (reproduced as congruent within the abstract universal) or excluding and positivising the demand as a threat. Green ideology is an example of this process. Capitalism has dealt with Green ideology either by including it within the marketplace (‘sustainable development’) or externalising it as a threat (‘luddites’ and ‘watermelons’).

This interpretation is not at all new; it formed the basis for my Masterate research, where I went into more detail around the operation of ideology. Nevertheless, I find it important to remind myself of the fundamental direction of my research. This year I have attempted to extend this approach to a sustained analysis of capitalism, which in my opinion is lacking from the literature.

My primary task has been to consider the ontological status of capitalism. There are three predominant positions within the theoretical literature;
- Capitalism is a hegemonic discourse
- Capitalism is a ‘master’ hegemonic discourse
- Capitalism is the symbolic Real.

My research so far has suggested that capitalism is not just a hegemonic discourse, rather it grounds the very place of hegemony, for the reasons I have outlined above. That is capitalism has hegemonised the place of hegemony and appears to have a response prepared for every threat to the system. Following this, we should not focus on the contingent battle for hegemony, but rather the exclusions which have produced the very conditions of universalisation.

Whether capitalism is the symbolic Real or more simply a master form of hegemony is a more complex issue. Analytically, I am not sure that there is much difference between the positions. Both suggest that it is capital that dominated the symbolic realm. Capital as the symbolic Real suggests that there is nothing outside of capital. As I have noted earlier, this is not the case, the symbolic realm is riddled with various points of difference, antagonism and anxiety. This does not rule out capitalism as the Real. Rather it puts the focus on the relationship between the terms ‘symbolic’ and ‘Real’. The symbolic Real is that which provides the background for all symbolisation, whether that symbolisation strictly fits with the symbolic Real is not overly important. What is structurally significant is that each discourse inherits a position within the symbolic Real, which determines in the last instance. Additionally, labelling capital as the symbolic Real has a strong affective demand which emphasises its dominance.

As a consequence of the ontological status of capital, no alternative positive political position can be constructed to ‘complete’ with capital for the place of hegemony. Such positivisations will only serve to maintain the place of capital. Instead, what is required to produce the kind of fundamental change which would displace capital as the place of universalisation is a form of critique which changes the relationship between the universal and its exception. This occurs through two mechanisms, one stemming from the increasing salience of the exception (e.g. climate change) and the other from a destabilisation of the process of ideology which deals with these exceptions.

The form of critique can be labelled ‘ethical’. Such a critique requires a strong, concrete knowledge of the discourse at the centre of critique. In this thesis, I plan to both establish such knowledge of capitalism and extend my grasp of ethical critique, particularly in terms of identity and non-identity within capitalism and its relationship to enjoyment. The central tools I will use for this task are Psychoanalysis and Marxism. This will involve a through knowledge of both discourse as well as the various forms of articulation that have occurred between them.

Is Capital the Real?

“...in so far as we conceive of the polito-ideological resignification in terms of the struggle for hegemony, today’s Real which sets the limit to resignification is Capital: the smooth functioning of Capital is that which remains the same, that which ‘always’ returns to its place’, in the unconstrained struggle for hegemony” [i]

“According to Zizek, capitalism is the Real of present-day societies for it is that which always returns. Now he knows as well as I do what the Lacanian Real is; so he should also be aware that Capitalism cannot be the Lacanian Real. The Lacanian Real is that which resists symbolisation and shows itself only through its disruptive effects. But capitalism as a set of institutions, practices, and so on can operate only in so far as it is part of the symbolic order. And if, on top of that one thinks- as Zizek does- that capitalism is a self-generated framework proceeding out of an elementary conceptual matrix, it has to be-conceptually- fully graspable and, as a result, a symbolic totality without holes. In that case, capitalism as such is dislocated by the Real, and it is open to contingent hegemonic retotalisations. Ergo, it cannot be the fundamentum inconcussum, the framework within which hegemonic struggles take place, because- as a totality- it is itself only the result of partial hegemonic stabilisations”[ii]

These two quotes conceptualise perhaps the fundamental point of disagreement amongst those seeking to combine some degree of Psychoanalytic and Marxist theory in order to produce an anti-capitalist intervention. Zizek argues that capital is the Real and thus it has no outside. In contrast, Laclau contends that Capitalism is a hegemonic symbolic system like any other; as a form of the symbolic it has various holes and boundaries. The implications of this debate define the potential form of political intervention. Because Zizek rejects the potential for an outside from which to create an alternative positivisation to capital, Zizek’s politics takes the form of destructive radical ‘Acts’. In contrast, Laclau and likeminded Theorists such as Jason Glynos, Glyn Daly and Mark Devenney insist on the validity of ‘politics of contingency’, that is, to deconstruct the hegemony of capital, revealing its contingency and reconstructing alternative symbolic forms.

The truth, perhaps, lies between these two positions based on a more nuanced definition of the Real than that which Laclau sites. The question then, is if Capital is the Real as Zizek suggests, in what sense this can be correct. Some theorists, such as Scott Stephens and Rex Butler appear to have taken Zizek at his word, constructing Capital as the Real in a strict Lacanian sense in attempting to ‘think Capital theologically’. Such a position can easily be dismissed. Instead, a debate with such consequences deserves a more thorough and concrete analysis. Firstly, we must ask in what sense Zizek constructs capital as the Real. Such a construction relies on Zizek advanced development of the modalities of the Real in For They Know Not What They Do. Most saliently, Zizek consider Capital as the symbolic Real in the sense that it has hegemonised the very basis for the development of hegemony. In this paper, through an analysis of the operation of global capital we find that capital whilst not the Real in a strict Lacanian sense, can be considered a symbolic form of the Real, as long as both parts of the term (symbolic and Real) are given equal weight. That is, whilst there may be an outside to the structural logic of global capital, this outside is constructed only in terms of Capital. Thus Capital is Real in the sense that it is the point to which all symbolisation must return (it determines in the last instance?), but symbolic in that this dominance is never complete; there exists holes within Capital that offer opportunities for radical transformation. This paper therefore argues that by considering global capital as symbolic/Real (or perhaps a symbolic form of the Real) greater possibilities for political intervention open up then exist via the politics of contingency.

Zizek’s development of the capital as the Real has been a relatively sedate and contemporary occurrence. It was not until 1999 in the Ticklish Subject that Zizek begins to speak of Global Capital and the Real in the same terms when he states (in reference to global climate change and the El Nino effect) “This catastrophe thus gives body to the Real of our time: the thrust of Capital which ruthlessly disregards and destroys particular life-worlds, threatening the very survival of humanity”[iii]. Here though, Zizek is using the Real in a more conventional Lacanian sense, the Real as a horrific failure of the symbolic. Zizek more recent and considered conceptualisation of Capital as the Real occurred in his three-way collaboration with Judith Butler and Ernesto Laclau, Contingency, Hegemony and Universality. Here Zizek considers Capital as the background against which all symbolisations must relate, a ‘limit to resignification’.[iv]

Zizek’s definition of Capital as a symbolic form of the Real owes to his distinction (in the foreword to the 2nd edition of For they Know Not What They Do, written in 2002) between the triadic modalities of the Real. In response to his own criticism of his first book, The Sublime Object of Ideology (1989), that he endorsed a ‘quasi-transcendental reading of Lacan’ and the Real. That is, Zizek claims that he constructed the Real as a point of failure with the consequence that what is ethical is to except failure. Instead, Zizek wants to construct the Real not only as symbolic failure, but also as a positive point of excess. In order to do this, Zizek claims that the triadic Lacanian matrix Real-Imaginary-Symbolic is reproduced within itself. That is, we can have an Imaginary form of the Real and as well as a Symbolic form of the Imaginary. Of most interest to this argument is the Symbolic Real, which Zizek describes as ‘the Real as consistency’[v]. Zizek had previously presented this argument in Contingency, Hegemony and Universality, where he describes Capital as ‘structuring in advance the very terrain on which the multitude of particular contents fight for Hegemony’[vi]. Zizek is clear, however, to make a distinction between Capital as a limit to signification and hegemonic struggle and Capital as the positive condition that creates a background against which hegemonic struggle occurs.[vii]
This last point is vital. It is not that Capital prevents the production of non-capitalist discourse, but rather that these discourses occur on a background (if a somewhat passive one) that determines the parameters in which it operates. Therefore, it can appear that an outside to Capital exists. Clearly not all relations are capitalist relations. However, this outside is not an outside that is an alternative to capitalism. Before developing this point any further, it is important to consider more carefully the logic of capitalism. Such a consideration will allow us to understand the manner in which Capital is the symbolic Real and how this relates to the relations between exterior and interior within Capital.

Within the overall system of reproduction of Capital, we can define the operation of two separate logics that maintain the hegemonic hegemony of Capital. The first operates through the logic of desire and the operation of ideology. It produces a transcendental illusion, integrating all challenges to capital within its symbolic boundary. The second operates in complementary contrast to this logic and can be considered under Laclau’s label of a constitutive outside. Here threats that cannot be successfully integrated into the operation of Capital as re-presented as a threat to that order. A threat that acts to define the identity of the interior systematic operation of Capital. We shall deal with the former logic first before returning to the notion of the constitutive outside.

Capitalism is based on a paradoxical logic where its own failures provide the fuel for its continued expansion. This paradoxical logic is the logic of desire. Desire is ultimately impossible to satisfy; the more one has the more one wants. Capitalism is based, in terms of both consumption and production upon this logic. Such a process means that capitalism is destined to expand until it implodes. As we shall see, any discourse that seeks to slow the capitalist rate of production is ultimately impotent.

This feature of capitalism has consequences that are more radical when we consider its affect on the long-term stability of the system. Any negative excess to capitalism – the symptom- can be re-integrated back into the system. This integration occurs through ideological fantasy, which operates to create the illusion of wholeness; the transcendental illusion. In the transcendental illusion, ideology performs the impression that something exists (instead of nothing) between two objects. The objects to which we refer here are the abstract universal and the symptom. Desire, which acts to produce this illusion through ideology integrates the symptom (which as an epiphenomenon of the concrete universal has an incommensurable relationship with the abstract universal) back into the system. The effect is that symptoms of capital, which are ultimately threats to the system, are taken up into capital. Environmentalism is an example of this process par excellence. Initially, environmental thought, in its various forms (deep Green, ecology etc) posed a strong threat to capitalism. Now, however, environmentalism is just another market from which to produce profit. This kind of analysis suggests that capitalist structural logic is all-consuming; there is no outside to capital. However, further analysis of Green ideology shows that this is not the case and leads us to our next point, that of the constitutive outside.

A discourse that has been positioned as a ‘constitutive outside’ can also be a symptoms of the current order, as in our Green ideology example, or it can be genuine (as opposed to dialectical) opposite, such as Islamic Fundamentalism. Whatever the case, the manner in which a constitutive outside is re-presented is the opposite of the transcendental illusion. Here, instead of producing the illusion that two objects are linked, a parallax occurs, presenting the objects as incommensurable. This may well be empirically correct (say with opposing religions) or it may be a discursive representation, but the effect is the same. By excluding a discursive position and presenting it as a threat the identity of the inside is affirmed. Following on with the Green ideology example, where many forms of this ideology are included within capitalism, those that cannot (because they pose a threat to capitalism, such as a radical Green critique of the consumption process) are excluded and produced as a threat. As such, they are a necessary outside to the system and are part of the dominant edifice.

We can see this operation (producing a symptom as an outside, a threat) in the recent gun Massacre at Virginia Tech. Despite the killer’s videotaped ‘confession threats’ attempting to portray himself as a symptom of the American college system, mass media outlets where quick to depict the shooter as an outsider, an exception in the conventional sense of the word. Terms such as ‘alien’ and ‘evil’ were often used. Likewise, the recent gang shooting in Wanganui has been represented in a similar fashion. Gangs are not constructed as in any way a product of the current order, but rather an unruly and threatening exterior. In doing so though, Gang violence reinforces the ‘civility’ of the hegemonic order.

The dual process- of integration and exclusion reveals that while elements can appear outside capitalism, it is capitalism that sets the terms for the symbolic order. Perhaps before discussing this point further in terms of the status of Capital as the Real and the opportunities this presents for political action, it is worth clarifying two exceptions to capitalism with no outside. One of these exceptions proves the rule, the other, as we shall see, offers the potential to break it. The former refers to areas which are non-capitalist, but do not pose any kind of threat to capitalism. Here I am referring to activities and discourses such as community based sport or even simpler activities such as conversations between individuals. These are not determined by capital in any strict sense. These areas are affected by capitalism, but do not affect it. They are effectively able to go on unchallenged because they do not threaten capitalism. Non-capitalism, therefore is not able to be used a springboard for an anti-capitalist movement, because if it establishes itself at a level of threat that threatens capitalism then it enters the realm of the logics aforementioned. Capitalism, in a Marxist interpretation, is determining in the last instance.

The second exception leads us into the climax of our argumentation, that being the opportunities presented by capitalism as the symbolic Real. This exception comes specifically from the symbolic status of capital as a modality of the Real. The symbolic, as Laclau points out in the quote that opened this essay, is full of kinks and holes. Capital as the symbolic Real is no exception. The important factor here is what has to be excluded for capitalism to continue to operate as it does. For Zizek this factor is class, perhaps better conceptualised as the concrete universal and constitutive exception (as opposed to constitutive outside). The concrete universal exists as necessary exclusion that allows the whole to operate. In capitalism, Zizek suggests that this factor is the proletariat, those we are required to use their bodies to produce while others consume the fruits of their labour.

As I have suggested, the symptom(s) of the concrete universal are dealt with either by including them within capitalism (e.g. environmentalism) or presenting them as an outside threat. However, the concrete universal remains as a necessary failure, a kink in the order of the Symbolic Real. Thus, while the status of Capital as the symbolic Real removes the possibility for creating an alternative positivisation to battle capitalism, it does not eliminate the possibility of a negatively charged ‘ethical’ critique. This possibility again brings us back to the differences between the Zizekian and Laclauian positions. If what is required is an ethical critique, deconstructing capitalism and revealing it as a hegemonic, yet ultimately contingent order, then what is the different between the two theorists? Is the status of Capital relative to Real simply an isolated question of epistemology? Perhaps we are getting ahead of ourselves. First, it is important to consider exactly what contingent and ethical critiques are. In doing so, we shall find that they are very different political forms, a difference resulting from Capital as a modality of the Real.

A ‘contingent’ critique (not a contingent form of critique, although this is debatable, but rather a critique which reveals the contingency of the hegemonic order) seeks to deconstruct the symbolic, the reveal the nature of its construct and show how it could have been otherwise. An ethical critique (in the psychoanalytic sense) takes on the opposite task in seeking to unveil the stability of the system via its necessary exclusions. In doing so, it is hoped to destabilise that which has repressed the presence of the concrete universal. The distinction between the two forms of critique, in terms of interventions into capitalism, is that the former cannot adequately come to grips with the inherent, jouissantic, stability of capitalism. In particular, contingency-based critiques fail because capitalism is already a contingent form of symbolic structure; nothing radical can come by producing capitalism as a contingent edifice.

What are the main problems with this draft (other than a lack of a conclusion and the general incoherent writing)?
- Thinking capital telelogically- who are the agents of capital
- Need more stringent (Lacanian) definitions of the Real
- A few points need to be better supported, with expanded examples. In particular I have named a number of theorised without touching on or referencing their work.
- Need to further construct the different between contingent and ethical critique
- Further investigation and support for the discussion on the logics of capitalism, in particular its relationship to the concrete universal (proletariat?)

[i] Zizek, 2000, p.223
[ii] Laclau, 2000,p.291
[iii] Zizek, 1999, p.4
[iv] See Butler, Laclau and Zizek, 2000, p.223 and p.319.
[v] Zizek, 2002, p.xii
[vi] Zizek, 2000, p.320
[vii] Zizek, 2000, p.319

Psychoanalysis; Comedy or Tragedy?

While in the middle of a psychoanalytically inspired rant the other day, I was accused of political pessimism. Psychoanalytic political theory (at least of the Zizekian variety) with its emphasis on ontological negativity is easily accused of this fault. Certainly psychoanalysis places more emphasis on negativity and its resulting effects than more traditional political ideologies, such as liberalism or conservatism. But emphasising the negative is not naturally pessimistic. Rather it can open up the possibility of much more radical results. Perhaps the difference is analogous to that between comedy and tragedy. Is it tragic that we will never find ‘it’, or rather is the joke that it was never to be lost?

Many political theorists consider psychoanalysis to be a tragic discourse; focusing on negative ontology can only lead to conservative politics. Conservative in the sense that society can never find what it is missing. It is destined to remain incomplete, with all the connotations of exclusions, violence and injustice. Indeed there is congruence between conservative and psychoanalytic thought because both consider social exclusions to be a natural occurrence. The critical difference is that where conservative thought considers these exclusions ‘natural’ and therefore fixed, radical thought always holds open the possibility of structural change, of reconfiguring socially produced symptoms. It is therefore the comedic and radical side of psychoanalysis which provides the best response to the allegation of pessimism. Comedic, in the sense that that which we have supposed to have lost was never ours to lose. Radical, because the comedic ontological interpretation opens up the possibility of change beyond reform, beyond conservatism and ultimately, ‘conservative’ liberalism.

I say conservative liberalism, because in the end it is liberalism that cannot envisage the possibility of a radically better world. Liberal ideology is shaken by the presence of exclusions; the exclusions operate as a point of anxiety. The inclusion of these points of anxiety becomes the key to justice within liberalism. Liberal ideology therefore becomes an ultimately futile process of inclusion. This process matches that of the logic of desire; one can never have enough. Perhaps this explains the synergetic association between liberalism and capitalism, but working on the infinite logic of desire. The tragedy with liberal-capitalism is that it will never find what it is looking for, but will create all kinds of carnage on the way- just ask the Third World.

By contrast, radical (psychoanalytic) thought has more in common with the logic of drive and comedy. Jouissance is not received by obtaining an object that will fill lack (or the fantasy of this process), but rather through a circulation of this lack. Drive, in this sense, has much in common with comedy, in that both acknowledge the ultimate failure of the social, not in the sense that we will never find fulfilment, but that we never had it in the first place. By acknowledging primal lack, the possibility of radical structural change is reopened.

Radical thought may appear pessimistic in the face of the liberal order- it denies the satisfaction of desire- but this negativity pushes past the boundaries of the current order to the possibility of a better one. That is why I would rather be a radical pessimism than a liberal optimism.