Is Capital the Real?

“...in so far as we conceive of the polito-ideological resignification in terms of the struggle for hegemony, today’s Real which sets the limit to resignification is Capital: the smooth functioning of Capital is that which remains the same, that which ‘always’ returns to its place’, in the unconstrained struggle for hegemony” [i]

“According to Zizek, capitalism is the Real of present-day societies for it is that which always returns. Now he knows as well as I do what the Lacanian Real is; so he should also be aware that Capitalism cannot be the Lacanian Real. The Lacanian Real is that which resists symbolisation and shows itself only through its disruptive effects. But capitalism as a set of institutions, practices, and so on can operate only in so far as it is part of the symbolic order. And if, on top of that one thinks- as Zizek does- that capitalism is a self-generated framework proceeding out of an elementary conceptual matrix, it has to be-conceptually- fully graspable and, as a result, a symbolic totality without holes. In that case, capitalism as such is dislocated by the Real, and it is open to contingent hegemonic retotalisations. Ergo, it cannot be the fundamentum inconcussum, the framework within which hegemonic struggles take place, because- as a totality- it is itself only the result of partial hegemonic stabilisations”[ii]

These two quotes conceptualise perhaps the fundamental point of disagreement amongst those seeking to combine some degree of Psychoanalytic and Marxist theory in order to produce an anti-capitalist intervention. Zizek argues that capital is the Real and thus it has no outside. In contrast, Laclau contends that Capitalism is a hegemonic symbolic system like any other; as a form of the symbolic it has various holes and boundaries. The implications of this debate define the potential form of political intervention. Because Zizek rejects the potential for an outside from which to create an alternative positivisation to capital, Zizek’s politics takes the form of destructive radical ‘Acts’. In contrast, Laclau and likeminded Theorists such as Jason Glynos, Glyn Daly and Mark Devenney insist on the validity of ‘politics of contingency’, that is, to deconstruct the hegemony of capital, revealing its contingency and reconstructing alternative symbolic forms.

The truth, perhaps, lies between these two positions based on a more nuanced definition of the Real than that which Laclau sites. The question then, is if Capital is the Real as Zizek suggests, in what sense this can be correct. Some theorists, such as Scott Stephens and Rex Butler appear to have taken Zizek at his word, constructing Capital as the Real in a strict Lacanian sense in attempting to ‘think Capital theologically’. Such a position can easily be dismissed. Instead, a debate with such consequences deserves a more thorough and concrete analysis. Firstly, we must ask in what sense Zizek constructs capital as the Real. Such a construction relies on Zizek advanced development of the modalities of the Real in For They Know Not What They Do. Most saliently, Zizek consider Capital as the symbolic Real in the sense that it has hegemonised the very basis for the development of hegemony. In this paper, through an analysis of the operation of global capital we find that capital whilst not the Real in a strict Lacanian sense, can be considered a symbolic form of the Real, as long as both parts of the term (symbolic and Real) are given equal weight. That is, whilst there may be an outside to the structural logic of global capital, this outside is constructed only in terms of Capital. Thus Capital is Real in the sense that it is the point to which all symbolisation must return (it determines in the last instance?), but symbolic in that this dominance is never complete; there exists holes within Capital that offer opportunities for radical transformation. This paper therefore argues that by considering global capital as symbolic/Real (or perhaps a symbolic form of the Real) greater possibilities for political intervention open up then exist via the politics of contingency.

Zizek’s development of the capital as the Real has been a relatively sedate and contemporary occurrence. It was not until 1999 in the Ticklish Subject that Zizek begins to speak of Global Capital and the Real in the same terms when he states (in reference to global climate change and the El Nino effect) “This catastrophe thus gives body to the Real of our time: the thrust of Capital which ruthlessly disregards and destroys particular life-worlds, threatening the very survival of humanity”[iii]. Here though, Zizek is using the Real in a more conventional Lacanian sense, the Real as a horrific failure of the symbolic. Zizek more recent and considered conceptualisation of Capital as the Real occurred in his three-way collaboration with Judith Butler and Ernesto Laclau, Contingency, Hegemony and Universality. Here Zizek considers Capital as the background against which all symbolisations must relate, a ‘limit to resignification’.[iv]

Zizek’s definition of Capital as a symbolic form of the Real owes to his distinction (in the foreword to the 2nd edition of For they Know Not What They Do, written in 2002) between the triadic modalities of the Real. In response to his own criticism of his first book, The Sublime Object of Ideology (1989), that he endorsed a ‘quasi-transcendental reading of Lacan’ and the Real. That is, Zizek claims that he constructed the Real as a point of failure with the consequence that what is ethical is to except failure. Instead, Zizek wants to construct the Real not only as symbolic failure, but also as a positive point of excess. In order to do this, Zizek claims that the triadic Lacanian matrix Real-Imaginary-Symbolic is reproduced within itself. That is, we can have an Imaginary form of the Real and as well as a Symbolic form of the Imaginary. Of most interest to this argument is the Symbolic Real, which Zizek describes as ‘the Real as consistency’[v]. Zizek had previously presented this argument in Contingency, Hegemony and Universality, where he describes Capital as ‘structuring in advance the very terrain on which the multitude of particular contents fight for Hegemony’[vi]. Zizek is clear, however, to make a distinction between Capital as a limit to signification and hegemonic struggle and Capital as the positive condition that creates a background against which hegemonic struggle occurs.[vii]
This last point is vital. It is not that Capital prevents the production of non-capitalist discourse, but rather that these discourses occur on a background (if a somewhat passive one) that determines the parameters in which it operates. Therefore, it can appear that an outside to Capital exists. Clearly not all relations are capitalist relations. However, this outside is not an outside that is an alternative to capitalism. Before developing this point any further, it is important to consider more carefully the logic of capitalism. Such a consideration will allow us to understand the manner in which Capital is the symbolic Real and how this relates to the relations between exterior and interior within Capital.

Within the overall system of reproduction of Capital, we can define the operation of two separate logics that maintain the hegemonic hegemony of Capital. The first operates through the logic of desire and the operation of ideology. It produces a transcendental illusion, integrating all challenges to capital within its symbolic boundary. The second operates in complementary contrast to this logic and can be considered under Laclau’s label of a constitutive outside. Here threats that cannot be successfully integrated into the operation of Capital as re-presented as a threat to that order. A threat that acts to define the identity of the interior systematic operation of Capital. We shall deal with the former logic first before returning to the notion of the constitutive outside.

Capitalism is based on a paradoxical logic where its own failures provide the fuel for its continued expansion. This paradoxical logic is the logic of desire. Desire is ultimately impossible to satisfy; the more one has the more one wants. Capitalism is based, in terms of both consumption and production upon this logic. Such a process means that capitalism is destined to expand until it implodes. As we shall see, any discourse that seeks to slow the capitalist rate of production is ultimately impotent.

This feature of capitalism has consequences that are more radical when we consider its affect on the long-term stability of the system. Any negative excess to capitalism – the symptom- can be re-integrated back into the system. This integration occurs through ideological fantasy, which operates to create the illusion of wholeness; the transcendental illusion. In the transcendental illusion, ideology performs the impression that something exists (instead of nothing) between two objects. The objects to which we refer here are the abstract universal and the symptom. Desire, which acts to produce this illusion through ideology integrates the symptom (which as an epiphenomenon of the concrete universal has an incommensurable relationship with the abstract universal) back into the system. The effect is that symptoms of capital, which are ultimately threats to the system, are taken up into capital. Environmentalism is an example of this process par excellence. Initially, environmental thought, in its various forms (deep Green, ecology etc) posed a strong threat to capitalism. Now, however, environmentalism is just another market from which to produce profit. This kind of analysis suggests that capitalist structural logic is all-consuming; there is no outside to capital. However, further analysis of Green ideology shows that this is not the case and leads us to our next point, that of the constitutive outside.

A discourse that has been positioned as a ‘constitutive outside’ can also be a symptoms of the current order, as in our Green ideology example, or it can be genuine (as opposed to dialectical) opposite, such as Islamic Fundamentalism. Whatever the case, the manner in which a constitutive outside is re-presented is the opposite of the transcendental illusion. Here, instead of producing the illusion that two objects are linked, a parallax occurs, presenting the objects as incommensurable. This may well be empirically correct (say with opposing religions) or it may be a discursive representation, but the effect is the same. By excluding a discursive position and presenting it as a threat the identity of the inside is affirmed. Following on with the Green ideology example, where many forms of this ideology are included within capitalism, those that cannot (because they pose a threat to capitalism, such as a radical Green critique of the consumption process) are excluded and produced as a threat. As such, they are a necessary outside to the system and are part of the dominant edifice.

We can see this operation (producing a symptom as an outside, a threat) in the recent gun Massacre at Virginia Tech. Despite the killer’s videotaped ‘confession threats’ attempting to portray himself as a symptom of the American college system, mass media outlets where quick to depict the shooter as an outsider, an exception in the conventional sense of the word. Terms such as ‘alien’ and ‘evil’ were often used. Likewise, the recent gang shooting in Wanganui has been represented in a similar fashion. Gangs are not constructed as in any way a product of the current order, but rather an unruly and threatening exterior. In doing so though, Gang violence reinforces the ‘civility’ of the hegemonic order.

The dual process- of integration and exclusion reveals that while elements can appear outside capitalism, it is capitalism that sets the terms for the symbolic order. Perhaps before discussing this point further in terms of the status of Capital as the Real and the opportunities this presents for political action, it is worth clarifying two exceptions to capitalism with no outside. One of these exceptions proves the rule, the other, as we shall see, offers the potential to break it. The former refers to areas which are non-capitalist, but do not pose any kind of threat to capitalism. Here I am referring to activities and discourses such as community based sport or even simpler activities such as conversations between individuals. These are not determined by capital in any strict sense. These areas are affected by capitalism, but do not affect it. They are effectively able to go on unchallenged because they do not threaten capitalism. Non-capitalism, therefore is not able to be used a springboard for an anti-capitalist movement, because if it establishes itself at a level of threat that threatens capitalism then it enters the realm of the logics aforementioned. Capitalism, in a Marxist interpretation, is determining in the last instance.

The second exception leads us into the climax of our argumentation, that being the opportunities presented by capitalism as the symbolic Real. This exception comes specifically from the symbolic status of capital as a modality of the Real. The symbolic, as Laclau points out in the quote that opened this essay, is full of kinks and holes. Capital as the symbolic Real is no exception. The important factor here is what has to be excluded for capitalism to continue to operate as it does. For Zizek this factor is class, perhaps better conceptualised as the concrete universal and constitutive exception (as opposed to constitutive outside). The concrete universal exists as necessary exclusion that allows the whole to operate. In capitalism, Zizek suggests that this factor is the proletariat, those we are required to use their bodies to produce while others consume the fruits of their labour.

As I have suggested, the symptom(s) of the concrete universal are dealt with either by including them within capitalism (e.g. environmentalism) or presenting them as an outside threat. However, the concrete universal remains as a necessary failure, a kink in the order of the Symbolic Real. Thus, while the status of Capital as the symbolic Real removes the possibility for creating an alternative positivisation to battle capitalism, it does not eliminate the possibility of a negatively charged ‘ethical’ critique. This possibility again brings us back to the differences between the Zizekian and Laclauian positions. If what is required is an ethical critique, deconstructing capitalism and revealing it as a hegemonic, yet ultimately contingent order, then what is the different between the two theorists? Is the status of Capital relative to Real simply an isolated question of epistemology? Perhaps we are getting ahead of ourselves. First, it is important to consider exactly what contingent and ethical critiques are. In doing so, we shall find that they are very different political forms, a difference resulting from Capital as a modality of the Real.

A ‘contingent’ critique (not a contingent form of critique, although this is debatable, but rather a critique which reveals the contingency of the hegemonic order) seeks to deconstruct the symbolic, the reveal the nature of its construct and show how it could have been otherwise. An ethical critique (in the psychoanalytic sense) takes on the opposite task in seeking to unveil the stability of the system via its necessary exclusions. In doing so, it is hoped to destabilise that which has repressed the presence of the concrete universal. The distinction between the two forms of critique, in terms of interventions into capitalism, is that the former cannot adequately come to grips with the inherent, jouissantic, stability of capitalism. In particular, contingency-based critiques fail because capitalism is already a contingent form of symbolic structure; nothing radical can come by producing capitalism as a contingent edifice.

What are the main problems with this draft (other than a lack of a conclusion and the general incoherent writing)?
- Thinking capital telelogically- who are the agents of capital
- Need more stringent (Lacanian) definitions of the Real
- A few points need to be better supported, with expanded examples. In particular I have named a number of theorised without touching on or referencing their work.
- Need to further construct the different between contingent and ethical critique
- Further investigation and support for the discussion on the logics of capitalism, in particular its relationship to the concrete universal (proletariat?)

[i] Zizek, 2000, p.223
[ii] Laclau, 2000,p.291
[iii] Zizek, 1999, p.4
[iv] See Butler, Laclau and Zizek, 2000, p.223 and p.319.
[v] Zizek, 2002, p.xii
[vi] Zizek, 2000, p.320
[vii] Zizek, 2000, p.319

Psychoanalysis; Comedy or Tragedy?

While in the middle of a psychoanalytically inspired rant the other day, I was accused of political pessimism. Psychoanalytic political theory (at least of the Zizekian variety) with its emphasis on ontological negativity is easily accused of this fault. Certainly psychoanalysis places more emphasis on negativity and its resulting effects than more traditional political ideologies, such as liberalism or conservatism. But emphasising the negative is not naturally pessimistic. Rather it can open up the possibility of much more radical results. Perhaps the difference is analogous to that between comedy and tragedy. Is it tragic that we will never find ‘it’, or rather is the joke that it was never to be lost?

Many political theorists consider psychoanalysis to be a tragic discourse; focusing on negative ontology can only lead to conservative politics. Conservative in the sense that society can never find what it is missing. It is destined to remain incomplete, with all the connotations of exclusions, violence and injustice. Indeed there is congruence between conservative and psychoanalytic thought because both consider social exclusions to be a natural occurrence. The critical difference is that where conservative thought considers these exclusions ‘natural’ and therefore fixed, radical thought always holds open the possibility of structural change, of reconfiguring socially produced symptoms. It is therefore the comedic and radical side of psychoanalysis which provides the best response to the allegation of pessimism. Comedic, in the sense that that which we have supposed to have lost was never ours to lose. Radical, because the comedic ontological interpretation opens up the possibility of change beyond reform, beyond conservatism and ultimately, ‘conservative’ liberalism.

I say conservative liberalism, because in the end it is liberalism that cannot envisage the possibility of a radically better world. Liberal ideology is shaken by the presence of exclusions; the exclusions operate as a point of anxiety. The inclusion of these points of anxiety becomes the key to justice within liberalism. Liberal ideology therefore becomes an ultimately futile process of inclusion. This process matches that of the logic of desire; one can never have enough. Perhaps this explains the synergetic association between liberalism and capitalism, but working on the infinite logic of desire. The tragedy with liberal-capitalism is that it will never find what it is looking for, but will create all kinds of carnage on the way- just ask the Third World.

By contrast, radical (psychoanalytic) thought has more in common with the logic of drive and comedy. Jouissance is not received by obtaining an object that will fill lack (or the fantasy of this process), but rather through a circulation of this lack. Drive, in this sense, has much in common with comedy, in that both acknowledge the ultimate failure of the social, not in the sense that we will never find fulfilment, but that we never had it in the first place. By acknowledging primal lack, the possibility of radical structural change is reopened.

Radical thought may appear pessimistic in the face of the liberal order- it denies the satisfaction of desire- but this negativity pushes past the boundaries of the current order to the possibility of a better one. That is why I would rather be a radical pessimism than a liberal optimism.

Phd, 2007; The Beginning

This post marks the beginning of my writings for the year. It may be 4 months late, but we all know that numbers lie. Having finished my Master's thesis almost 5 months ago, it has taken me a long time together in regards to what I would like to spend the next 3 years doing. A considerable degree of the delay was caused because I already had my ideas together, having just raced to a finishing line. It has been, fortunately, necessary to both deconstruct and reconstruct myself (at least as Chris the academic. Cook, Macca, Honey and Chris the son all remain intact. God forbid they ever meet). Having gone through this process (to some degree- the light at the end of the tunnel may infact be me getting used to the light which remains in the tunnel) I find myself roughly where I started. Perhaps with some parts reconfigured, full of ambition(?) for the journey ahead.

So what is it that I want to achieve in this thesis, I ask my loyal reader (who also happens to be the loyal writer) My concern lays (or is it lies, I continue to be unsure of the difference) with capitalism and Lacanian social theory/philosophy. Capitalism because of the massive injustices I perceive (although labelling something 'injust' contradicts any notion of an anti-normative approach). Lacan (read Zizek given that I still haven't actually read any Lacan) because of it's ability to illuminate the operation of ideology within the logic of liberal capitalism. In particular through notions of ideological fantasy, symptom and concrete universality. What I need to work out is the manner in which I wish to combine Lacanian theory for an analysis of capital.

Four questions (amongst others) strike me;
- How does the logic of capital operate?
- What opportunities for change does this logic present?
- What method best exploits these opportunities?
- Why do any of it at all? Why would we want to change capitalism?

The first question should provide an answer (or a more developed question) for the last, although the issue of normativity is the gap which (silently) drives this research.

My intitative response to these questions is two fold. Firstly the logic of capitalism is such that symptoms are both produced and integrated in a complex relation of excess and lack. This relation is operationalised in both objet a and the symptom and maintained by ideological fantasy.

The identification of this logic leads to a somewhat secondary idea that capitalist logic can only be interrupted by the performance of an 'ethical' critique that destablises its ideological support. Perhaps the main hole here is whether the ethical can, or should, move into the realm of the normative/moral. That is, What is the status of the ethical within psychoanalytic politics;
-amoral (not related to morality)
-anti-moral (against the idea of morality)
-unmoral (recognising the status of the moral, but not entering into the discourse).
-moral (the ethical as a form of morality).

I am particularly interested in how these ideas would be applied in terms of the economic. What would it mean to have an 'ethical' normative stance on political economy for the bodies involved in reproducing capital? Especially given the consequences of economic 'failure' for those bodies involved.

But why the ethical and not the normative? Or at least, why the distinction between the two? The key issue here is; Why produce an 'ethical' critique of capitalism instead of a alternative normative economic conception?

I have two (related) answers for this question. The first is that normative alternatives are too easily integrated into the logic of capitalist ideology. The second is that if they are not integrated, capitalist ideology produces the alternative as a threat to the system. As is developed by Lacan, and within other modes of social theory, the stability of a system relies on its ability to reproduce threats to the system. An example of a threat to the system is Islam. In contrast, Green ideology has largely been integrated into the system. Overall, alternatives cannot avoid the capitalist hegemony. In this sense, although outside alternatives exist, there is no alternative to capitalism. All that enters its ever expanding realm act to ultimately maintain it stability. So, to come up with one answer to my question, an alternative moral approach can only end up reproducing that which it seeks to reproduce (in this particular, universal circumstance).

So there is no outside? No. There are alternative nodes from which battles can be pitched, but ultimately these alternative act only as a constitutive outside for capital, a threat which maintains its stability. This has been the (failed) appeal of the anti-capitalist campaigners at the beginning of the millenium. Hence, we can see that the outside to capital is not truly outside, because it is only outside in so much as it is reproduced by capital.

With the movement from normative to ethical, however, that possibility of change occurs, but only from an outside which exists inside capitalist ideology. The possibility of an ethical critique lies in an internal incommensurability; the symptom. Whilst these threats produce anxiety, they are generally well integrated back into the system. The role of the ethical is to destablise the process of displacing, or perhaps replacing, anxiety through a breakdown in ideological logic.

I hope to develop these issues further in the next couple of days (weeks). In particular both the difference between normativity and ethics, and exisiting positions on the status of capitalism and political responses to that status e.g. Is there an outside to capitalism

Conclusion

Disrupting Capitalism

There is no symbolic space outside of global capital; an alternative to capital is impossible. Paradoxically, herein lays the precise possibility for moving beyond capital. From within the current hegemonic boundaries of capitalism, there is simply no prospect of an end to capitalism - those who practice ‘Third-Way’ politics are correct, there is no alternative. Capitalism has an all-pervasive grip upon the power centres of the world. The jouissance produced through the abstract universal imaginaries of capital and the various modalities of ideological fantasy that provide its unconscious supplement are too compelling. Although most of the capitalist world is aware of the potential threats to capital, particularly climate change and global poverty, these symptoms are easily disavowed; such is the effectiveness of capital in domesticating the threat posed by its symptoms. Nonetheless, through dialectical logic, specifically the dialectical materialist methodology suggested in this thesis, the potential strategies for disturbing the impossible grip of capitalism become apparent. The greatest potential lies in the very impossibility of moving beyond capitalism.

This impossibility is best understood through Žižek’s notion of the parallax view. It highlights the disruptive potential(s) of the concrete universal and of the Real within the totality that is capitalism. Again, no ‘beyond’ exits to capitalism, only the possibility of rupture within.

The potential for, and apparent impossibility of, moving beyond global capital is illustrated in the relationship that exists between the two areas of discourse that have been analysed in the previous two chapters, Green ideology and discourses on global poverty (developmentalism). These two areas represent the major areas of discursive investment for the political Left. They are, however, incommensurable forms of engagement with global capitalism; they form a political parallax centred around a social antagonism that is caused by global capital. It appears that the Left can either speak of environmentalism, of reducing pollution and carbon production, or global development– increasing the collective wealth of humanity – but not both positions at the same time. Those who focus on the goal of reducing poverty argue for increased levels of consumption and greater production. On the other side of the parallax, environmentalists and ecologists demand that limits be placed upon development. Such a limit radically interferes with the goal of eliminating poverty. The gap between these elements is sutured under the empty signifier ‘Left’, which supports the Kantian transcendental illusion that something exists between the two perspectives. However, as Kant’s notion of the illusion makes clear, no such position exists, only the presence of absence. This gap – the parallax Real – occurs because of a fundamental antagonism that exists between the two, caused by global capital in its manifestation as the symbolic Real. Only with the dissipation of capitalism can this parallax be dissolved, not with the suturing of the gap between the two (which is the current strategy for much of the political Left). In contrast, rather than attempting to provide a suturing-point for this impossibility, this thesis argues that the more productive political approach is instead to focus on the impossibility that is inherent to this parallax and also on the parallax of ontological difference that sits between the abstract and concrete universals of global capitalism. This position can be achieved by attempting to think both perspectives – and the gap – at once, through the dialectical concept of totality. In doing so, a psychoanalytic approach is not only able to reveal the contingency of capitalist social constructions of the abstract universal (of the social Good), but more importantly the capitalism’s disavowed materialist core , its concrete universal.


The methodology created in this thesis grounds Žižek’s abstract philosophical position. As its application to the two areas of discourse demonstrates, possibilities exist for disrupting the existing hegemonic matrix of global capital by evoking capitalism’s concrete universal, by ‘practicing’ the concrete universal as Žižek puts it.


Practicing Concrete Universality

A first possible means for practicing concrete universality comes by focusing on what I term ‘discourses of the concrete universal’. These discourses perhaps provide the greatest potential for producing a radical structural shift within/to capital. Discourses of the concrete universal are those discourses which lie outside of the abstract universal horizon that the idea of ‘global capitalism’ represents. In this sense, they are discourses of the Real, possessing no means for translating between the twin poles of the ontological parallax. Any movement of the concrete universal into the realm of the hegemonic imaginary will produce some degree of dislocation because of the ultimate incommensurability between the elements involved. The concrete universal, as both the excess which is generated by the abstract universal and the material substance upon which that universal horizon is constituted, cannot be translated into the terms of that horizon without a dislocation occurring to that same horizon, that is, to the idea of global capitalism.

We see this at work in the area of climate change. Although climate change is not simply a discursive construction, it still appears within the broad horizon of global capitalism as a discursive element, as the concrete universal of capitalism; it appears as ‘an effect of nature’, as ‘the natural’. This dislocates the universal capitalist imaginary. This process is currently occurring in relation to climate change. Reports continue to surface regarding the incommensurability between the capitalist economic system and the limits of the environment (PCE, 2005; Stern, 2006). Although symbolic resources currently exist to domesticate this symptom, such as through increased or targeted taxes, a dislocation of some degree is likely to occur if the concrete universal were to continue to assert pressure. Similarly, this might be possible if a unity could be formed between the peoples of the Third World, perhaps under a signifier such as ‘Majority World’. This unity could allow a position of concrete universality to emerge, evoking a degree of dislocation, providing that the fantasmatic resources which support the hegemony are unable to domesticate the symptoms. This proviso, however, perhaps underpins the prospects for both social change and stability.

Discourses of the concrete universal also identify the manner in which fantasy and jouissance sustain universal horizons over and above the words through which those horizons are symbolised. That is to say, subjects are enabled to identify with particular images of the universal because they enjoy the experience of doing so, such experiences grip them. The loosening of this grip does not occur simply though the production of rational arguments that reveal the irrationality of the universal horizon (such that the global production of wealth relies upon the exploitation of localised groups), but rather the provocation of experiences of abjection, such as anxiety and trauma. These occur to the subject through their exposure to the Real.

Anxiety and trauma occur when the concrete universal impacts upon the universal horizon, such as when one comes into face-to-face contact with extreme poverty, perhaps by bumping into a homeless person on a city street. This is what offers the prospect for change, as the subject seeks to find an alternative, more bearable discourse that can domesticate the unsettling effects of the Real.

An alternative field of discourse to that of ‘the concrete universal’ which can be mobilised to interrupt a structural formation, I have termed ‘discourses of the symptom’. This very thesis is itself such a discourse. These discourses use the terms that have been set by an abstract universal, such as capitalism or multiculturalism. Notwithstanding their location within abstract universals, discourses of the symptom are able to view in a dialectical manner both the abstract universal which frames them and their constitutive exception.

When viewed from the perspective of this form of discourse, the constitutive exception emerges as ’the symptom’ to the abstract universal. More specifically, the symptom refers to the disruptive impact which the concrete universal has upon the universal imaginary by virtue of its own location within that imaginary. To rephrase the point, discourses of the symptom reveal the limit point of the universal, the point of its failure.

Such a point is the Truth of the universal. This is not a meta-physical Truth which remains the same in all possible symbolisations. Rather it is the embodiment of Truth in a particular content. The core to a Žižekian-inspired political analysis is not to expose the contingency of a hegemonic social construction (although this is a useful political strategy) but rather to reveal the Truth as the central element of the universal totality. The Truth of any construction, its concrete universal, is not purely contingent, but rather the hard material core to that construction; this is the point which paradoxically holds together the abstract universal yet remains its constitutive exception.

That is, a Zizekian-styled political approach does not seek to deconstruct a contingent political position so that it can be reformulated in a more progressive manner, but rather to reveal the point against which all political constructions are combating, the concrete universal. Here, we are not talking about an ahistorical lack or Real against which all symbolisations battle, but rather a historical lack, R2, or the symbolic Real; in our times, that symbolic Real is, global capital.

Thus, in a mutually constituting manner, the form that Truth takes is always particular to its content and the particular content that is involved in this takes on a form that enables it to play a universalising role. Thereby, a symptom can embody the Truth of a particular edifice because it represents a universal form (that being the point of failure of the hegemonic imaginary) and the universal form only takes shape through the particular content in which it occurs (Brockelman, 2003, p.196). Discourses of the symptom reveal this point of Truth not by embodying the concrete universal, but rather, as Žižek states, by confronting a universal horizon with its ‘unbearable example’ (Zizek, 2006a, p.13), that is, by practicing concrete universality.

Discourses of the concrete universal, reviewed above, provide the more powerful force of the two kinds of discourse in terms of inducing radical political change. That said, discourses of the symptom supply a more viable kind of political strategy given that they operate from a position that is fully within the universal edifice. For those seeking to produce social change, the concrete universal – like the brute fact of climate change – forever remains outside of their control. Thus, as political strategies, neither the increasing degradation of the environment nor the unity of the disavowed ‘Majority World’ population can be relied upon for dislocating capitalism. Neither is under political influence. This is not to suggest that in another context discourses of the concrete universal should be ignored. Indeed, perhaps the most efficient strategy is a combination of the two.

The act of identifying with the symptom, of practicing concrete universality, opens up a space for the concrete universal itself to operate, for it to emerge as the unbearable example of the abstract universalising horizon. The method which has been created in this thesis is a grounded reflection of this abstracted strategy. By revealing the deadlock that is inherent to capital, its incommensurability within itself as a totality, one can practice concrete universality through a ‘short-circuit analysis’. It is this strategy which reveals the political potential of psychoanalysis. This thesis, as a short-circuit analysis – a discourse of the symptom – has the role of thinking both sides of the parallax at once. By doing so through the dialectical notion of totality, we see that the methodology suggested in this thesis offers an alternative strategy for anti-capitalist engagement. Specifically, rather than having to choose between alternative conceptions of capitalism, its abstract and concrete forms, dialectical logic allows an analyst the ability to think both options at once (for example, that global capital brings both great wealth and extreme poverty, that capitalist societies can become increasingly energy efficient yet be destroying the climate at the same time). This Žižekian style of analysis allows the symptoms of capital to be seen not as contingent failures but, rather, as disavowed elements of capital that constitute its very possibility. This thesis thereby suggests that the most constructive form of anti-capitalist engagement is to reveal the disavowed hard kernel upon which capital is based, but not as an element in itself, but rather as the concrete universal of capitalist totality. It is the ability to think both elements of the parallax at once, to contrast the concrete universal with the hegemonic imaginary, which brings the possibility of dislocation. Contemplation of, and intervention with, the concrete universal alone (of climate change or of poverty) is insufficient.

This conclusion reflects what has increasingly become Žižek’s core position. In an elaboration of this position, Žižek has come to interpret capitalism as a modality of the Real. By this he means that there is nothing outside of capital, it is the point to which all socio-political discourses ultimately return. Therefore, for Žižek, to act is to act only against the background of capital. There is no empty place from which to speak. Here Žižek argues that rather than involve oneself in local politics – to develop bold courses of action that do not threaten the universal edifice despite their apparent radicality – it is better not to act at all (Zizek, 2006b, p.212). These apparently radical transgressions ultimately allow capital to run smoothly, they allow for the construction of a constitutive outside to capitalism, against which the profit motive can pit itself and perhaps subsume. Therefore Žižek reverses Marx’s famous thesis 11, where Marx contends that while philosophers have interpreted the world in various ways, the point is to change it. Instead, Žižek suggests:


The first task today is precisely not to succumb to the temptation to act, to intervene directly and change things (which then inevitably ends in a cul-de-sac of debilitating impossibility: ‘What can one do against global capital?’), but to question the hegemonic ideological coordinates. (Žižek, 2006b, p. 238)


In its place, Žižek contends that critical analysis must rehabilitate the concept of the universal through a notion of totality in which totality is riven from within, that is, through dialectical analysis. This totality takes in both the abstract and concrete universal of capitalism, vitally allowing access to the gap that is inherent in every symbolic performance, that is, the Real. The key is not to focus exclusively on one side, such as suggesting that capitalism is nothing but poverty nor that capitalism is the best method for producing economic wealth. Neither is it particularly productive to try to find a mediating point, such as an empty signifier, to suture the gap inherent in capitalism, as Laclau suggests. Rather, Žižek asserts, the best position to take in attempting to disrupt capitalism is to think both alternatives at the same time. By taking on both perspectives, the disavowed foundations of capital, as well as the inherent gap within capital, are thus revealed.

Summary

The parallax view, as presented by Žižek, underpins the methodology being suggested by this thesis. This thesis draws upon just two of the modalities of the parallax that Žižek presents: the political and the ontological. An ontological parallax occurs between the abstract and concrete universal within a totality. Here the abstract universal is the hegemonic horizon, it provides the fundamental background against which all other discourses operate. In contrast the concrete universal is the singular exception to this universal horizon.

Conversely, the concrete universal is an exception that is necessary for the constitution of the universal imaginary; absolute poverty, as a concrete universal that sits against the wealth of capitalism, is a salient contemporary example. Therefore, while the concrete universal is an exception to the abstract universal, its singularity bypasses the particular and exceeds the abstract universal horizon. To reiterate this point, the concrete universal, as an exception to the universal imaginary is not simply one element amongst the many that make up that horizon, but rather – despite its status as an exception– it is the very element that constitutes the universal horizon. As such, the concrete universal is necessarily repressed by the hegemonic horizon. This repression returns through the symptom, which reveals the Truth of the abstract universal and the presence of the parallax gap.

The second modality of parallax upon which this thesis draws is the political parallax. Political parallaxes occur between two relatively symmetrical political formations, separated by a social antagonism. This social antagonism creates a condition of incommensurability between the discourses; there is no common language between them. The social antagonism thus reveals the limit point of the discursive formation. This gap is often filled by empty signifiers which offer the prospect of a suture. The impossibility of such a suture, however, is revealed by the emergence of symptoms within the political parallax. Such symptoms occur when the two positions attempt to translate into each other. An example is illustrative here.

As has been noted at the start of this chapter, a strong political parallax is in operation with contemporary capitalism between developmentalism and environmentalism. This occurs in New Zealand politics, particularly within Green discourse. The Green Party is unable to articulate an economic position because its ecological goals are incommensurable with the interests of capital, capital being the social antagonism that gets actualised here. Therefore any attempt at economic policy is fragmented at best, often contradicting its ecological claims; the symptom of this parallax occurs at this point in the discourse (Donald, 2005a, 2005b; Fitzsimons, 2006).

Empty signifiers such as ‘Sustainable Development’, which offer the prospect of a suture of a parallax, are associated with the production of jouissance. Jouissance, as an excess to the Real, is a vital element of Žižek’s rehabilitation of universality; it offers a materialist element to dialectical logic. The abstract universal itself provides subjects the experience of jouissance, of enjoyment, as it offers a possibility of staging a return to an absent state of fullness. These universal horizons are centred around an empty signifier, or the objet a, which have a suturing effect by offering an object for libidinal investment as a substitute for lack. At the same time, because of the impossibility of this suture, the universal horizon requires a certain degree of failure. That failure can not bring about total meltdown – a constitutive failure – as might occur when the concrete universal dislocates a horizon, but rather a displacement of the negativity that is inherent to the symbolic order.

There are two primary modalities of this displacement, external antagonisms and the symptom. External antagonisms are ‘straw enemies’ which are created to stand in for the impossibility of social fullness, of society. Every universal horizon sends out the message that the removal of these antagonisms will restore the lost fullness of society. Of course, this postulated fullness is always only an imaginary creation. Nonetheless, antagonisms are required by the abstract universal and as such they are enjoyed, they are a site of jouissance.

The operation of the symptom, in contrast, is split between its role as an antagonism and the links that exist between symptoms and the concrete universal. Ideological fantasies give the message that symptoms, too, are antagonisms that can be eliminated. Nonetheless, there is a difference between the external antagonisms noted above and symptoms. The former is a fantasmatic creation, whereas symptoms are the Real, material limit-points of universal, hegemonic imaginaries. The symptom carries with it an element of the Real, because it reveals the presence of the concrete universal, which embodies the failure of the universal imaginary. Through ideological fantasy, symptoms are generally represented in a more palpable form than the concrete universal, appearing as external antagonisms that can be removed. However, symptomatic antagonisms always suggest the possibility of a dislocation via their association with the Real.

Despite the necessary existence of symptoms, ideological fantasy manages to domesticate the effect of the Real that is inherent in symptoms. This domestication occurs through a number of techniques. Along with repression, ideological fantasy and external antagonism, super-ego demand is also common. We see the super-ego in operation within charity discourse, or Green/ethical consumerism. Perhaps the most effective device, however, is the operation of disavowal and fetishism. Disavowal occurs when the subject acknowledges the presence of the symptom, yet continues to act as if it does not exist. Disavowal is allowed to continue because of the existence of a fetished object. This object mediates the effect of the Real, via the subject, by acting as a point of jouissant investment for the subject. Thus the subject may know very well about the existence of poverty, poverty which is in stark contrast to the universal imaginary of capitalism in which they have affectively invested. Nevertheless, because of the existence of commodified objects, the subject is able to maintain this paradoxical state because the commodity substitutes for the gap that is opened up by the contradictory nature of these parallel beliefs.

Another common fetish which supports the disavowal of symptoms within capitalism is the idea that there is no alternative to capital. This allows the subject to unquestionably accept capital as a universal horizon: any failure is displaced as unavoidable or apolitical. Disavowal and fetishism are powerful forces because of the enjoyment inherent in them. The power of jouissance is such that the condition is not seen as a problem. The operation of disavowal and fetishism, along with that of the parallax view and the devices that are used to domesticate symptoms, reveal the necessity of a materialist analysis.

The issue of materialism, which jouissance raises, divides Žižek’s work from that of Ernesto Laclau. Laclau operates within much the same theoretical and political territory as Žižek, indeed his approach features a more grounded methodology for political analysis, an element that has been replicated in the methodology created in this thesis. As such, Laclau and Žižek’s works align. They both work roughly within the field of Lacanian political analysis, although each has a different take on what form this should take. In particular, Laclau has been influential in his development of the concepts of antagonism and empty signifiers. However, Laclau’s work is lacking because of the manner in which he interprets the Real.

In Laclau’s work, the Real is nothing more than a limit-point to the discursive. In contrast, Žižek takes the Real to be both a limit and an excess. By acknowledging the Real as a source of excess, the notions of jouissance and fantasy develop as vital tools for political analysis. These factors explain why social constructions that appear conditional and contingent, maintain such fixity. Nonetheless, Laclau is very critical of Žižek’s approach to the political. In their three way debate in Contingency, Hegemony and Universality (Judith Butler the other contributor), Laclau argues that Žižek is not a political commentator, but rather merely produces “a psychoanalytic discourse which draws its examples from the politico-ideological field” (Laclau, 2000a, p.289, Original emphasis). By this Laclau suggests that Žižek has nothing constructive to offer to politics, rather that Žižek’s is a purely deconstructive discourse. Indeed, in the paragraph previous to the one just cited, Laclau states (in relation to Žižek’s desire to overthrow capitalism without a ready-made alternative):

Only if that explanation is made available will we be able to start talking politics and abandon the theological terrain. Before that I cannot even know what Žižek is talking about and the more this exchange progresses, the more suspicious I become that Žižek himself does not know either (p.289).

Is the Realm of Politics beyond Psychoanalysis?

This disagreement revolves around what each of the theorist designates as a political approach. The Žižekian approach has already been laid out at the start of this chapter; it is the position taken in the thesis. To reiterate, it is theorised that psychoanalysis is inherently political because of the negative ontological status of the social. This negative ontology means that social constructions are contingent. Therefore any fixation is a political fixation. Žižek’s work is political because it operates by revealing both the contingency of a political formation, involving its symptoms and the unconscious supplement which supports the hegemonic discourse, as well the concrete universal, the hard material Truth of the discursive formation. This form of political analysis, which this thesis attempts to vehecularise in terms of a grounded methodology, is the political approach for a Žižekian perspective. For Laclau though, this is not far enough. Instead Laclau seeks to develop a positive form of politics. Here we rely on the distinction made by Stavrakakis between politics, as the day-to-day operation of the political, and the political itself (Stavrakakis, 1999, p.71). Laclau attempts to form a political model to be institutionalised: radical democracy. Radical democracy seeks to institutionalise the gap formed by the negative ontology, as revealed in Lacanian theory. This is very much a formal operation: radical democracy cannot prescribe its own content. Rather, Laclau suggests that a free society is one which is aware of the contingency of its own construction (Laclau, 1990, p.211). In this way the contingency of social constructions is to be constantly revealed and battled over; this is the ‘radical’ in radical democracy.

Stavrakakis goes further in suggesting that radical democracy must go beyond the ‘ethics of harmony’ that seeks to constitute an ideal society, a utopia (Stavrakakis, 1997, p.127). Instead Stavrakakis argues that psychoanalytic politics needs to develop an ‘ethics of the Real’ (in the limited Laclauian sense) that revolves around the constant contestation of meaning. The concept of psychoanalytic politics –in the sense of the application of a political approach in government policy and related areas – is a controversial one, indeed it signals one of the boundaries of this piece of work.

Many theorists within the Lacanian field believe that psychoanalysis and politics do not mix well, or at all. The argument revolves around what to do with the gap that is created by the negative ontological constitution of the symbolic. There are three significantly differing perspectives. The first, characterised by Elizabeth Bellamy (1993), Sean Homer (1996), Simon Tormey and Andrew Robinson (Robinson, 2004; Robinson & Tormey, 2003, 2005) seeks to construct a positive imaginary to fill this gap. In doing so, they query the possibility, and the desirability, of creating a psychoanalytic form of politics. It is argued, particularly by Homer, that because ideological fantasy, which sutures the gap, is so enjoyable, any political position that refuses to posit an ideological position is impotent. Because attempts at psychoanalytic politics, such as Laclau’s radical democracy, attempt to move away from any form of ideological suture, they are ineffective (Homer, 1996, p.106-8). Homer recognises the limitations of psychoanalysis in this regard and thus states that the task of creating a positive imaginary is beyond the limits of psychoanalysis.

There is some warrant to this approach, particularly as a strategy for thinking about politics within their existing form. There are, however, compelling reasons to surpass it. Firstly, as has been documented throughout this thesis, any political formation that operates through an imaginary position – as Homer suggests a political position must – needs to find a way of displacing the negativity that is inherent to the symbolic realm; as history shows, the positing of external antagonisms in order to explain the lack of fullness in a society can be disastrous e.g. Hitler’s marginalisation of the Jews. Psychoanalytic political analysis has the value of avoiding the kind of positive imaginary positions (or, more importantly the resulting displacement of lack) inherent to this kind of approach.

Secondly, politics of this form cannot move outside of the constraints that exist upon the symbolic realm. It can operate within the terms of the unconscious supplement which supports the symbolic, but it cannot bring any kind of radical shift. Only an intervention with the supplement can produce shifts of a radical magnitude.

This critique also applies to Laclau’s approach. In addition to the radical democratic project, Laclau generates a more general political strategy for the Left, involving the creation of a coalition of new social movements under the unity of an empty signifier. The success of that signifier turns upon its ability to fill the gap between the diverging perspectives and projects of those social movements. Indeed, Laclau suggests that this new, combined movement such be under the guise of the radical democracy movement (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, p.176). Žižek is particularly critical of this approach because it cannot move outside of the conditions set by global capital.

In order to progress beyond this apparent impasse between the radical democratic project and political psychoanalysis, we should refer back to the distinction Stavrakakis makes between politics and the political. Žižek’s approach, with which this thesis associates, operates solely within the more general domain of the political. Thus, it offers a strategy for achieving radical political shifts and a method for critiquing everyday politics, but does not present a way forward for the operation of ‘regular’ politics. This is perhaps one of the weaknesses of the Žižek’s approach. Conceivably, here, Homer is correct; psychoanalytic politics are not relevant. Alternatively, it could be that Homer and Bellamy are looking for the wrong kind of outcome from psychoanalytic analyses. Neither Lacan nor Žižek argue that psychoanalytic ideas can be constituted for a utopian ethical/political order; this is simply outside of the bounds of psychoanalysis. I do not believe that many would (or should) be willing to support the ‘Lacanian Party’ in the 2008 New Zealand elections. But the impossibility of utopia does not rule out more ‘progressive’ political constructions.

The difference between utopian politics and simple societal improvement relies on a distinction between that lack which is ahistorical, as in the effect of the Real upon the symbolic order, and the lack which is historically conditioned, that is, capital. In a time when global capital has produced a condition in which humanity is paradoxically living both far beyond and beneath its material needs and the capacity of the planet to support those needs, it is this historical lack that deserves the political interest of psychoanalysis. Nonetheless, an unanswered question remains: What can psychoanalysis offer politics beyond ideological critique and dislocation? Is it that Lacanian theory can only offer a mode of understanding of the social, one that can be applied to political critique, but cannot offer a solution beyond dislocation? Here we again return to the vital distinction between politics and the political. Just as the Real sets the limits for the construction of reality, the political serves as the precondition for the operation of politics. Therefore, we may conclude by stating that, yes, psychoanalysis has no role in politics: its influence goes well beyond it, into the political.

7. Poverty

Global poverty is one of the major issues facing humanity. As such, along with climate change, it is one of the main areas of concern for the political Left. Like climate change, poverty is a symptom of capitalism; its existence reveals a point of failure within the global capitalist imaginary. Discursively, the major difference between the two symptoms is that where Green ideology is increasingly impacting upon global society, global poverty does not have the same ubiquitous influence. This is not to suggest that the existence of poverty is ignored or repressed; the statistical evidence is overwhelming. Rather, because those in the western world are divorced from the extremes of third world poverty, poverty is able to be constructed, and accessed, in a manner and time of our choosing. This means that instead of having to cope with the constant return of the symptom, discourses of global capital and development are able to effectively disavowal the presence of poverty as that upon which the capitalist production of wealth (and ‘freedom’) is produced.

7.1 Defining Poverty

Poverty is a term with multiple interpretations. The most common divide is between relative and absolute poverty. Relative poverty is a statistical definition, normally based on a nominal level below the median average income within an economy. Because of its political definition, relative poverty is a controversial measure. Indeed, the New Zealand Ministry of Social Development does not measure ‘poverty’, rather ‘low-incomes’ based on three-level scale; 40, 50 and 60% of median family income (The Social Report, 2005). However, those who are considered in poverty in New Zealand may have an income that would place them amongst the wealthy in a third world economy. Absolute poverty, on the other hand, is measured in relation to a total lack of resources to continue living and is still often symbolised in monetary terms. Less than US$1 a day is a regular measurement point for absolute poverty. Such measurements of poverty, however, are an attempt to name the Real, particularly in the case of absolute poverty. These arbitrary measurement points are in themselves political and contribute to the domestication of poverty as a symptom. Rather, it is better to let the meaning of poverty continue to be in a state of tension, never quite definitively conceptualised. In this way it continues to have a Real effect. For those who experience absolute poverty, definitions are fairly irrelevant, particularly to those who are facing the immediacy of death via poverty. It is this type of poverty that we shall be referring to within this chapter.

Following on from the analysis of Green ideology, this chapter seeks to examine the manner in which discourses within capitalism deal with the symptom of poverty. Because poverty, as a symptom, does not impact on the universal imaginary of capital as often as Green ideology, it is difficult to find a coherent body of thought that could be labelled ‘poverty ideology’. Rather, poverty exists as a symptom amongst numerous differing discourses, centring on the theme of global development. These discourses include global development itself, human rights, charity, health and trade, amongst others. Recently though strong discursive efforts to ‘eliminate’ poverty have developed. These efforts have reached the western world under the guise of the ‘Make Poverty History’ and ‘ONE’ campaigns. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) set by the United Nations as part of their Millennium Declaration are in the same category as these campaigns; indeed, the MDGs may be their precursor. The prominence of these discourses - which have also forced other responses, critical or otherwise - suggests the future possibility of an ideology of poverty developing- that is, a system of discourses around the term poverty.

At the moment, however, no such body of thought exists. Instead, in this chapter, we shall examine the discursive responses to the symptom of poverty, both as it is presented in the most recent campaigns against poverty, and as the result of the concrete universal which is absolute poverty. The most prominent theoretical text representing the recent campaigns to eliminate poverty is Jeffery Sach’s The End of Poverty (2005). Sachs both describes poverty through his notion of the global development ladder, and sets forward a prescription for end poverty ‘in our time’. Sach’s discourse is particularly interesting because it does not deny the existence of poverty to any extent. Rather, he proposes a ‘developmental ladder’ upon which all nations lie. Sach’s main interest is getting those in absolute poverty onto this ladder. As such, in terms of discursive strategy for the symptom, The End of Poverty is an ideological acknowledgement of the symptom, contending that poverty is not necessary, but rather ‘development’ is possible for all.

7.2 Absolute Poverty as the Concrete Universal

Here, Sachs falls into a parallax of ontological difference. He describes in specific terms the existence and experience of extreme poverty; indeed he produces a theory of the ‘poverty trap’ that keeps people in poverty. However, Sachs cannot link the actual existence of poverty with his notion of the global economy; there is no common ground between the concrete universal - absolute poverty- and the universal horizon of ‘global development’. This is an example of the operation of an ontological parallax par excellence. This parallax is often in operation within discourses of poverty. The World Bank series on the ‘voices’ of poverty also describes the experiences of the poor from the perspective of the poor through participative research (Narayan, Chambers, Shah, & Petesch, 2000; Narayan, Patel, Schafft, Rademacher, & Koch-Schulte, 2000; Narayan & Petesch, 2002). Yet, like The End of Poverty, this series does not, or cannot, make a link between these conditions of poverty and the global economy. On the other side of the parallax, the World Bank publishes, and makes regular interventions into the global economy. Yet it cannot seem to bring the two perspectives together, accept under suturing empty signifiers, such as development.

Development is at the centre of Sach’s discourse. Inequality is inherent to all notions of development, whether economic or otherwise. Classical economists such as Adam Smith and David Riccardo have long considered some degree of inequality as necessary in capitalism. Within the global economy, inequality is patently unjust; the life-chances of the poorest, to enter into capitalist discourse, are incomparable to that of the elite. Inequality was an excepted part of the discourse, because it had been assumed to be just; to each according to their efforts and merits. Because of the dislocating edge to global inequality, it is largely disavowed within contemporary capialist discourse. Thus, Sach’s work contrasts to horizons of other capitalist discourses, in that Sach’s restores inequality as a necessary factor within capitalism. Therefore, ‘sweatshops’ are largely considered a positive entity, although they are often considered a symptom of capitalist wealth (Sachs, 2005,p.11). This broadening of the universal horizon has the effect of domesticating this symptom, although it acts to further highlight poverty in its absolute form. As has been noted in previous chapters, the symptom is developed as an excess to the abstract universal, an excess which reveals the failure of that universal. Therefore the content of the symptom depends upon the discursive context in which it is formed; the symptoms of Sach’s development ladder are vitally different to a pure free-market approach to global economics. In the latter sweatshops can be considered a symptom, particularly in contrast to the highly symbolic consumption-orientated capitalism of the west, as highlighted by Naomi Klein in No Logo (2001).

In contrast, the symptoms of Sach’s approach to development lie in two separate areas. The first is the symptom that Sachs acknowledges (although not as a symptom), those who are ‘caught in a poverty trap’ and cannot make it onto the global development ladder. Secondly, there are symptoms of the parallax by which Sach’s work is inflicted; the incommensurability between global economics and the ground level analysis of poverty. This chapter examines both the manner in which symptoms have been constructed by Sachs and others amongst the ‘make poverty history’ discourses, as well as the discursive strategies that contain the symptoms produced by the ontological parallax of these constructions of poverty. Certainly there is a strong link between the construction of symptoms and their discursive domestication, which we shall turn to shortly. However, what is not subject only to symbolic construction is the concrete universal, from which the symptom stems.

The concrete universal is the constitutive necessity of the symptom; the concrete universal takes on the singular exception to the abstract universal, in this case poverty, and exceeds the universal apparatus; that poverty is necessary for the continued existence of capitalism. For Jeffery Sachs the symptom is those who are not on the ladder, the 1/6th of the world population who live on less than $1 a day (Sachs, 2005, p.18-9). In this thesis it is argued that this symptom is a constitutive element of capital; the concrete universal. That is, the occurrence of this absolute poverty is necessary for the continued progress of global capitalism. The basic logic of capitalism is the need to continously produce profits. Profit, in its rawest form is produced through the gap between production costs and selling price. This gap has been maintained through an over supply of raw materials, both human and natural. The excess of supply has kept the price of these production costs down. When it comes to natural inputs such as primary commodities, this process is increasingly complex, dealing with subsidies and tariffs. With labour though, the situation is less complicated. The excess supply of labour keeps labour prices at a minimum. In Sach’s developmental ladder this is acceptable. What Sachs ignores, however, is that for labour prices to be kept at this price, there has to be a reserve army of workers willing to work for that price. When wages are already dangerously low, for those who remain in reserve, unemployment often means death.

Thus death via poverty is both an exception to the capitalist imaginary and a requirement of the system; a concrete universal. The ultimate reserves are those outside of the manufacturing sector, who live on subsistence existence, within, but essentially outside the capitalist economy. Arguments of this sort enter into the Marxist territory of theories of miltary imperialism and the construction of economic empires (see Arrighi, 2005a, 2005b). Such a realm of argumentation is not the desired positioning of this thesis, although the insights of this area of Marxism are not denied. Instead, what I seek to establish is the necessary link between the capitalist production of extreme wealth and the equally capitalist production of extreme and absolute poverty.

Ultimately, the link between absolute poverty and capitalist wealth is repressed, or at least disavowed. This missing link is the key to the parallax in operation in the discursive construction of poverty. However, while the concrete universal cannot be accessed through the terms of the universal horizon, its symptoms do appear. This chapter will now move the analysis of the discursive strategies used to domesticate the Real effect of the symptom. The analysis will follow the methodology laid out in Chapter 5 and applied to Green ideology in the previous chapter. There are several similarities between the domestication of symptoms in Green ideology and in terms of poverty, although the nature of the symptoms is quite different. Poverty is easier to ignore than climate change or environmental degradation and as such is more often repressed, or at least disavowed. The most common strategy though is super-ego demand - we ought to eliminate poverty; the super-ego is the most common technique, used by charities such as World Vision, as well as the Make Poverty History campaign. However, there are also opportunities for disrupting capitalism through poverty as a symptom and the concrete universal. Unlike Green ideology, the concrete universal can exist in its own terms as a discourse. Through this discursive existence, the concrete universal can apply dislocating pressure to the universal horizon. Before we return to this possibility, however, we must first review the discursive strategies for the domestication of the symptom in order to maintain the capitalist universal horizon. We shall start with repression.

7. 3 Discursive Strategies; Repression

All hegemonic discourses operate with an element of repression; that of the concrete universal upon which they are based. Poverty is no exception. The link between an abstract universal within capitalism, especially those that emphasise capital’s ability to generate wealth, and the concrete universal of absolute poverty is an impossible one. This impossibility generates the operation of repression. Repression occurs so the subject avoids the horrific exposure to the Real. In this case, as well as the parallax Real, the concrete universal is linked to the real Real, the hard kernel of horror. However, as has been noted, true repression of symptoms generally only occurs when they cannot be included within the universal horizon without a dislocation. This may be the case if capitalist subjects were regularly exposed to the true horror of absolute poverty and the concrete universal. But this is not the case. Rather poverty is able to be constructed through fantasy so as to be domesticated. Therefore there are few discourses which actively repress poverty as a symptom; the statistical evidence is overwhelmingly strong.

What is more common is the disavowal of the symptom. Within disavowal, the subject acknowledges the existence of the symptom, but simultaneously ignores it. Indeed, absolute poverty provides the disavowed foundation of capitalism, certainly when one considers the impact of colonial empires and slavery. In terms of repression, it is not the content of the symptom that is repressed in the disavowal of poverty; rather it is the relationship between poverty and wealth that is repressed. Many repress the possibility that capitalism may cause poverty as well as wealth, again we see the limitations of formalist logic. This kind of repression is seen in the work of anarcho-capitalist economist, David Friedman (son of Nobel-prize winning economist Milton Freidman) who writes;“Few people believe that capitalism leads inexorably to the impoverishment of the masses; the evidence against this thesis is too overwhelming” (Friedman, 1978:26).

In terms of the discursive strategies used to domesticate absolute poverty, we shall include this particular type of disavowal in the category of repression. Disavowals are only able to operate because the existence of a fetish. The most powerful fetished object in these discourses is that capitalism is the only feasible economic option. It is theorised that because capital has brought strong economic growth and a correspondent increase in living standards to the western world, than there is no reason that this cannot be applied to the rest of the world. This is an argument often used by Jeffery Sachs (2005, p.18-9). Sachs, and others, often cite the example of South-East Asia, where many people have been brought out of extreme poverty through economic growth bought on by the rapid expansion of the manufacturing sector through cheap labour. As Don Brash contends in relation to global poverty; “we need to continue with further growth and development. I cannot see any solution to the problems of the many desperately poor people in the Asia Pacific region that does not require a continuation of sustained economic growth” (2006).

Very similar to the kind of solutions proposed by Friedman and Brash, Ken Shirley, a former MP for the neo-liberal ACT party in New Zealand states that to eliminate poverty, capitalism has to go further than it has, to be truer to itself and remove all trade barriers. Shirley argues that once trade barriers have been removed, and capital is enabled to move freely without government interference, wealth can finally be shared globally. Shirley asserts; “I am appalled at the hypocrisy of some parties who rail against global trade and free trade agreements on the one hand and yet simultaneously argue that a greater commitment is required for overseas development assistance” (Shirley, 2005).

This kind of discursive method could well be defined as acknowledgement of the symptom, mediated by the positing of an external antagonism, rather than repression. The most powerful device for the repression of poverty as a symptom is the assertion that capital is the only possible option, or alternatively the formalist logic that because capital has brought wealth to some, it can bring wealth to all. However, despite the growing wealth of the world, for at least 1/6th of the global population, poverty is still an extreme reality. Therefore it is becoming increasingly obvious to many that something ought to be done about this excess. This acknowledgement of the symptom occurs through several different devices, to which we shall now turn.

7. 4 Acknowledgement of the Symptom

An acknowledgement of the existence of poverty, outside of the realm of repression or disavowal, is a production of fantasy. That is, because poverty does not ‘naturally’ exist within the universal horizon of most discourses of global capital, the discourse is able to construct poverty in a manner which is non-disruptive and that still maintains the consistency of the social. However, once the symptom has been acknowledged, the sheer scale of it means that it cannot be contained in fantasy, there is always an excess that needs further taming. The construction of the symptom and the domestication of its excess are the function of several factors, introduced in chapter 5. The predominant element is ideological fantasy, which maintains the consistency of the social, or at least the prospect of such consistency. The driver of this process is jouissance, specifically the unconscious drive around the idea of a return to a time of Jouissance. Thus symptoms like poverty are required to be domesticated, but paradoxically they are essential for the smooth functioning of the abstract universal, such is the impossibility of Jouissance.

7.4.i Ideological Fantasy and Antagonisms

Therefore ideological fantasy operates by reproducing the encounter with the symptom, but in a manner that is more manageable for the universal imaginary. In reproducing the symptom via fantasy, the Real element of the symptom is removed. This Real element is removed because fantasy presents the symptom as divorced from the concrete universal; it is not a constitutive exception, but rather a contingent failure or an alien intruder. This domestication occurs in poverty discourse. The predominant discursive conception of poverty in contemporary society, outside of the techniques of repression and disavowal detailed above, is the Make Poverty History campaign or the United Nations MDGs. Here poverty is constructed as something that can be fixed, it is within our control. Not that poverty is considered to be caused by capital, in that poverty is required by capital to produce wealth. Rather, it is posited that mistakes have been made in the past because the wrong version of capital has been used. Therefore, rather than capitalism being at fault for poverty, the application of capitalism has been wrong (Sachs, 2005,p.81-2).

This kind of strategy invokes an external antagonism. External antagonisms are the ‘straw’ enemies generated by a universal horizon. The main purpose for the production of these antagonisms is that it gives a visible reason for the failure of the abstract universal. Therefore while the universal orientates itself towards the removal of the antagonism, antagonisms are actually required for the maintenance of the universal; they provide jouissance for the subject. There are two predominant types of antagonism that are in operation within poverty discourse. The first type is posited to have occurred in the past, as Žižek details as one of his seven veils of fantasy in The Plague of Fantasies (Žižek, 1997,p.13-6). It does not matter whether this antagonism has actually occurred or not, what is important is that it is discursively represented. This past failure is postulated as a cause of contemporary failure. This form of antagonism is a strong feature of Sach’s work, where he details the reasons why some nations are in poverty and some are not (Sachs, 2005,p.74,79.249, 300-14). These causes range from the development of colonial empires, geographic conditions and incorrect structural adjustments previously made in the name of global development. This past failure gives a cause for the failures of the present and future. Rather than seeing the fault within the current universal horizon, this fault is attributed to previous events. As such, these past events become a point of jouissance. These antagonisms tend to lie on the abstract universal side of the parallax view.

The second type of external antagonism lies on the concrete universal side of the parallax. As I have noted, the key distinguishing feature of the parallax in terms of poverty is that the actual occurrence of poverty (the concrete universal) cannot be linked to the global economy that causes it. These antagonisms, which occur in the present, give reason for poverty in terms of the concrete universal. As such, they generally relate to the circumstances of those in poverty themselves. These range from blaming the victims of poverty, such as the common positioning of poverty as an effect of corrupt government or lazy/ignorant workers, to Sach’s more generous ‘poverty trap’, which features factors such as physical geography and societal demographics (Sachs, 2005, p.56-66). The main effect of these antagonisms is that they suggest a possible alternative cause to the concrete universal outside of its relationship with the universal imaginary within the ontological parallax; poverty is not caused by the wealth produced in the global economy, but rather an effect of a variety of external antagonisms. As has been noted, the accuracy of these antagonisms is often unimportant. While deeming Third World workers to be ‘ignorant’ or uneducated seems overwhelmingly unfair, in terms of the maintenance of the fantasmatic supplement supporting the abstract universal, it has the same effect as Sach’s poverty trap. Both these modes of antagonism mediate between the subject and the true horror of absolute poverty; they alleviate responsibility from the capitalist subject.

The positing of antagonisms is a core element of ideological fantasy; it removes the Real effect from the symptom. Contemporary hegemonic discourses on poverty have rotated around the fantasmatic construction of poverty, which domesticates its dislocating potential. Indeed, the very construction of the United Nations MDGs is a domestication of the Real in poverty. The symptom exists both as the Real, in that it represents the failure of the abstract universal via the presence of the parallax gap and also as a symbolic entity. The effect of naming the symptom largely domesticates the presence of the Real, although an excess still remains. This is the case with the Millennium Development Goals. Through the construction of poverty in this manner (the elimination of poverty is one of the central goals), the symptom enters into the discourse, and unconscious supplement, of the authority of the United Nations. Therefore the symptom no longer presses on the abstract universal; it has been domesticated by entering into the fantasmatic core of the United Nations. In terms of the construction of poverty, the act of symbolising poverty removes poverty from view. It is no longer a Real force threatening the universal horizon, but rather part of the existing symbolic framework. It is for this reason that governments can appear so eager to establish frameworks like the MDGs, but have no motivation to carry them out. This effect allows poverty to be continually disavowed; the idea of fixing the symptom is sufficient to achieve the domestication of the symptom.
7.4.ii Super-ego

Conversely, this domestication is never complete. Once the symptom enters into the discursive arena, either as a symbolic entity or as an effect of the Real, any symbolisation leaves an excess. This excess can be dealt with through one of three separate strategies. The first has already been outlined external antagonisms. The failure of something like the MDG’s can be explained by citing antagonisms, like the failure of western governments to comply, or the mismanagement of funds by nations receiving the assistance. The second has also been noted, the disavowal of the symptom. We shall further expand on these discursive strategies shortly. However, perhaps the most common discursive method for dealing with the excess in the symptom of poverty is super-ego demand. The construction of poverty is a super-ego construction; we ‘ought’ to do something about poverty (Sachs, 2005; Shirley, 2005). As such super-ego demand pervades most discourses on poverty and has led to the establishment of strong super-ego discourses, such as those of charities like World Vision.

The super-ego establishes guilt in the subject about the failure of the symbolic fabric. This guilt presses the subject to act upon the content of the failure. However, such an action does not remove the effect of the super-ego. Instead, the more the subject submits, the guiltier they feel. This is the main appeal of charitable organisations that operate around poverty. Organisations like World Vision or Tear Fund use images of malnourished small children and slogans such as “A child is waiting” (World Vision: A Child is Waiting, 2006). As has been previously detailed, super-ego demand is not an effective strategy for achieving change. Rather, it leaves the existing fantasmatic core intact, although it may make some small changes along the way. Normally, the subject seeks to find a way out of the super-ego cycle. Often the mediating affect of paying money, like in the sponsorship of a third-world child, allows the subject to divorce themselves of the responsibility for poverty and into an ideological edifice, such as the MDG’s, or into a state of disavowal.

The Make Poverty History campaign appears to have been aware of this effect. Rather than ask for donations, the campaign instead posited demands that could not be solved by the individual. At the same time it developed the dislocatory effect of the symptom. This strategy had the effect of not enabling the subject to have any easy way out of the super-ego cycle. Additionally, white wrist bands were sold and worn as a constant reminder of the super-ego demand of poverty. The suggested way out of this cycle was for citzens to demand that their governments do something about the conditions of poverty. Unfortunately, while this demand did occur, governments have been able to domesticate the dislocatory pressure by simply promising to do something.

This kind of super-ego demand has an additionally harmful effect. Instead of placing poverty in its properly political realm, charitable organisations and campaigns tend to present poverty as a humanitarian problem, a failure of human rights rather than political economy. This discursive positioning takes away the responsibility from both the subject and the capitalist mode of production (Žižek, 2005). Therefore poverty as a humanitarian project, as it is presented by Sachs, again reveals the parallax that is in operation. The demand of the super-ego is not linked to reducing our wealth, or radically altering our economic system, but rather of providing funding and support for “On-the-ground solutions for ending poverty” (Sachs, 2005,p.226-243).

7.4.iii Disavowal

The final discursive strategy for acknowledging, but domesticating the symptom has already been covered within this chapter; disavowal. However, we shall briefly return to it because of its importance in the operation of poverty discourse. What allows the disavowal of poverty to operate so effectively - that is, the acknowledgement of the existence of poverty, but a general ignorance towards it - are two separate factors. The first, which has already been discussed, is that poverty, as a symptom, does not regularly impact on the abstract universal imaginary of capital. It is nowhere near as all-pervading as symptoms like climate change.

The second reason was also in operation in Green ideology; commodity fetishism. In commodity fetishism, a commodity stands in for objet a, as the fantasised object to fulfill the lack in the Other. Simply put, the subject receives too much jouissance from the fetishised commodity involved in consumption to be dislocated by poverty. They may know very well that the clothing being purchased was made in a sweatshop in Bangladesh, a fact to which the subject may be personally opposed. However, the jouissance involved in the consumption is too strong for the former ideal to become a salient factor. Conversely, there is often an excess involved in consumption, in that the symptom is never completely pacified. This excess has generated new initiatives, such as the growing popularity of ‘ethical’ or ‘fair-trade’ consumption. In most cases though, the fetishising of commodities through consumption based capitalism is too strong for the existence of poverty to have a dislocating effect on the western world as it currently stands. However, there are still possible opportunities for dislocation that exist through discourses of poverty. It is these possibilities which we shall now focus on.

7. 5 Discourses of the Symptom

The shift from discourses which acknowledge the symptom to discourses of the symptom, is accomplished via a short-circuit discursive reading. Through the short-circuit analysis, both sides of the parallax view become visible. Rather than constructing the symptom as a failure of the universal, in the short-circuit view the symptom becomes constitutive; evidence of the concrete universal and the parallax gap. However, the vital difference is not interpretative. Rather it comes from the detachment of the symptom from the fantasmatic jouissance in which it was previously constructed. Therefore, the short-circuit reading achieves a Žižekian ‘traversal of the fantasy’. The displacement of fantasy allows a reconstruction of the status of the symptom, a very powerful force for socio-political analysis. However, as has been noted previously, discourses of the symptom have a limited dislocatory effect as they are still articulated within the terms of the universal horizon, therefore they have only a partial Real effect. Conversely, by opening up a gap within the abstract universal, by denying the suture of the parallax view, discourses of the symptom become part of a strong dislocatory effect when combined with the concrete universal itself.

As with Green ideology, discourses of the symptom have to be carefully distinguished from external discourses. External discourses are outside of the parallax view and the moment of universality. As such they offer little prospect of producing radical change, but more of a chance of sedimenting the hegemonic universal imaginary. This sedimentation occurs because, as Laclau contends, discourses establish limits by excluding a radical otherness. Laclau terms this exclusion the ‘constitutive outside’, because it is only the definition of the outside which allows the formulation of an interior. In discourses of poverty, we see this operation between forms of Islam and the capitalist West, particularly the United States. Militant Islam groups, such as Al-Qaeda often attract the poor and powerless, although they are often controlled by a rich elite. Militant Islam gives the powerless an identity via an antagonism; the capitalist West. This strategy, although often damaging to capitalist interests, is very unlikely to cause the downfall of capitalism. As we have seen with the actions of the Bush administration of the United States, militant Islam has only entrenched the fantasmatic core of capitalism, resulting in military conflict.

Instead, discourses of the symptom challenge the unconscious fantasmatic support of the unconscious universal. In terms of poverty, Marxism is the discourse which presently fills this role. Marxism, as has been noted previously, has moved from a discourse of the concrete universal (to which we shall soon turn) to a discourse of the symptom. Where Marxism was once a discourse of the proletariat, it has increasingly become a dissident voice distant from the now global working class. This is not to suggest that Marxism only recognises the workers of the western world. Rather, as a discourse of the symptom, Marxist discourse is often able to view capitalism awry, taking in both the global capitalism and the poverty it produces. Indeed, many Marxists, such as Samir Amin declare the western workers and unions are the enemies of the global proletariat both because they draw attention away from global poverty and because they have implicitly submitted to the capitalist system.

By being able to conceptualise the parallax gap, discourses of the symptom like Marxism have a unique, but productive role. This role involves attempting to deconstruct the universal horizon by displacing the symptom from its fantasmatic bonds. To accomplish this task, Marxism does not have to take on a positive imaginary such as the fantasmatic postulating of an alternative economic system. Rather, its role is to play on the symptom, revealing the excess in the universalist fantasy. By doing so, it is theorized that a space can be opened up within the universal imaginary that can be exploited by a discourse of the concrete universal. This has proved, however, to be a particularly difficult task, such is the fantasmatic closure inherent in global capital. It is difficult, if not impossible, to find an example of this kind of discursive strategy in mainstream media, although these discourses do exist in the academic world (see Arn, 1994; Limqueco & McFarlane, 1983). Often Marxism falls victim to the same parallax as capitalist discourse, focusing only on exploitation within economic relations in the Third World (Ercel, 2006). However, this is the task to which Marxism must apply itself to help achieve a radical structural global economic shift.
7.6 Discourses of the Concrete Universal

In the case of poverty, discourses of the concrete universal are generated in the terms of those experiencing poverty. On the other hand, these discourses are not limited to the concrete universal side of the parallax. That is, they are not constructed purely in terms of the experience of poverty, such as the Voices of the Poor series produced by the World Bank. Rather, as in all concrete universals, these discourses take on the singular exception to the universal horizon, absolute poverty, yet exceed the existing hegemonic imaginary. By doing so absolute poverty is not presented as a singular experience, but rather as a constitutive feature of capitalism. As has been detailed previously, the relationship between the abstract universal and the concrete universal is an impossible one; there are no terms available to establish a link. Therefore the presence of the concrete universal in the abstract universal produces a radical dislocation of the hegemonic imaginary. Capitalism, for example, is constructed around a fundamental horizon of justice in the production of wealth through the invisible hand that guides the market. There is no room for exploitation or constitutive poverty, at least in the abstracted capitalist imaginary. Therefore the impossible combination of the concrete universal of absolute poverty with the capitalist imaginary should bring a dislocation of the latter.

But what are the possibilities for achieving this task via poverty? The primary advantage (in terms of discursive strategy) that poverty has over climate change is that in poverty the concrete universal can become a discursive force. The concrete universal still remains a Real element because of the parallax gap. The parallax gap prevents a translation of terms between the abstract and concrete universal. Because of this gap, the concrete universal goes unsymbolised amongst the hegemonic; it is the impossible Real. From the alternative perspective, however, the Real is symbolised. The advantage here is that the concrete universal can be controlled; it can reproduce various discursive strategies. In contrast, the natural, as the concrete universal within Green ideology, operates largely outside of the direct control of human symbolic intervention.

The potential therefore exists for a movement from the concrete universal. Such a movement would involve the people of poverty, disavowed by capital, coming together under a united discourse. We can perhaps see this process in the use of the term ‘Majority World’ rather than Third World, to refer the idea that those in poverty are not simply an excess of capitalism, but rather constitutive the core population of the world. The key is the form of this unity. It is not effective if the discourse becomes an alternative imaginary to the hegemonic horizon. This - Laclauian inspired - strategy risks becoming an external discourse, a constitute outside rather than concrete universal. Alternatively, the discourse could fight a ‘war of position’ for the empty signifier which attempts to suture the parallax gap. Examples of these empty signifiers include ‘development’ and ‘progress’.

Conversely, such a strategy is likely to simply be pacified by the dominant discourse because it enters, but does not disturb, the unconscious supplement of the abstract universal. Rather, the key position is the presentation of the unity of poverty as a concrete universal; that is, as the constitutive exception of capitalism, a necessary requirement. This is not to suggest that this concrete universal holds a better normative or economic position that capitalism, but it holds a high possibility of dislocating capital, provided that it is able to place enough pressure on the fantasmatic unconscious supplement that supports the capitalist imaginary. The central message here is to practice concrete universality; to evoke the anxiety that is caused by exposing that which is necessarily disavowed for the continued functioning of the universal horizon. We shall now turn to the concluding chapter of this thesis, which examines the possibilities for practicing concrete universality, particularly in regard to global capital. In addition, the viability of this strategy (as well as the methodological approach to understanding the symptom) as a political method is discussed in detail.