Re-think

In my last piece, I mistakenly portrayed the symptom as discursive entity. Instead, although the symptom appears discursive, it is actually an effect of the real. However, does this symptom have political potential discursively, or is it only the real that creates the potential for radical change? This essay reviews the work of Ernesto Laclau and Slavoj Zizek in relation to their differing conceptions of optimum political strategy for the real. While both theorists share similar terminology and an analogous notion of the real, they differ greatly in their political approaches. Whereas Laclau investigates the possibility of developing a broad form of political program, Zizek suggests that the very process of such a method between the universal and the particular subverts the radical potential of the real. Instead, Zizek contends that the Left should focus its attention on capitalism, rather than pure politics, and in particular within the capitalism universal itself, in terms of its constitutive excess.

In this essay it is considered that the complex, extimate relationship between the real and symbolic is the key to the debate, particularly the definition of what is real and the conception of an outside to the symbolic, both in the ‘Other’ and in the disavowed foundations of the system. Thus while we cannot proscribe a progressive position for psychoanalytic politics, this does not mean that from a psychoanalytic point of view there should not be such a program. Indeed, in the case of anti-capitalism, the creation of a new economic prospectus could come under the category of a political Act.

Laclau and Zizek come from a very similar theoretical positions, combining the insights of Psychoanalysis, Marxism and Post-structuralism, although both disavowal the continued influence of the latter (Zizek & Daly, 2004:46). Laclau and Zizek each agree on the fundamental importance of the radically negative essence of society, which effectively means that ‘society does not exist’, it can never be full, neutral nor natural. This formulation has led both to rejecting the prospect of utopian theorising. However the shape of these advances differs, leading to political positions which are in many ways different, although they share many of the same characteristics. Ultimately I believe that while Laclau’s Radical Democracy is of great value for politics, it is Zizek’s work which provides most productive political method for change, which is the most valuable strategy for the Left at this point in time. This is not the vulgar conception of Zizek found in the works of Homer (1996) or Robinson and Tormey (Robinson, 2004; Robinson & Tormey, 2003, 2005), but as we shall see, a more considered Zizek than that normally cited by critics.

Before entering into this discussion though, I believe that it is important to lay out the central concepts that Laclau and Zizek have in common. In particular after my last essay, I would like to focus on the distinction between the symbolic and real. These concepts are;
- Antagonism;
- Symptom; and
- Dislocation.

Antagonism is the experience of the limit of all objectivity within discursive formations (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985:122). Thus there is no content to antagonism; it is simply the effect of the real upon the symbolic. As such antagonisms institute a radical negativity into discourse It is at the point of antagonism that hegemonic battles for meaning are contested (Howarth & Stavrakakis, 2000:9). Thus antagonisms are vital for politics as they are the point at which meanings can be changed by forces outside of the discourse. However, although Laclau and Zizek notionally agree with the concept of antagonism, Laclau’s political position does not extend beyond the role of antagonism in altering meanings. For Laclau it is these battles that produce political change. However, Zizek takes a much more radical position than Laclau. In order to understand it, we must re-introduce the notion of the symptom.

The symptom is a concept that I have covered widely and as such I will not dwell long on it. However, I believe that it is valuable to alter it slightly in light on the concept of antagonism. The symptom is evidence of the antagonism. Antagonism reveals the limits of discourse and the symptom fills the place of antagonism. This is not to suggest that the symptom subverts the effect of antagonism. On the contrary the symptom is the necessarily sedimentation of the process of antagonism. Thus if we feel the effect of the real in antagonism, the on going effect is the symptom; the symptom holds the place of antagonism.

Antagonisms and symptoms are created because of the discursive movement of attempting to conceal the negativity of the social. These attempts at ‘hegemony’, in Laclauian terms, produce a false universalising discourse which is abstracted from a particular notion; there is no chance of a ‘true’ universal occurring. Therefore, because of the negativity (the real) that is constitutive of the system, the abstract universal always fails. This failure occurs at the limit points of the discursive. Thus antagonism is the effect of the real. However, although this limit point shows itself only in effect and in performance, there is still a left over content that is evidence of this antagonism. This content is the symptom. However, the symptom is still an effect of the real. Indeed the difference between antagonism and symptom is only abstract, a symptom is an antagonism, however it is more entwined with the symbolic order;

‘ The symptom is, strictly speaking, a particular element which subverts its own universal, a species subverting its own genus’ (Zizek, 1989:21).

Therefore the symptom arises as the excess which is a necessary condition of the relationship between the symbolic and the real. Because the symbolic is always incomplete, there will necessarily be an element left out from any hegemonic, or universal abstraction. The symptom is this element and thus it is evidence of the gap between the universal and the particular caused by the real and showed in antagonism.

However, one has to be careful in describing a symbolic conception of antagonism. This position rides a fine line with the post-structuralist definition. Laclau used this version of antagonism in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, where it is the presence of the ‘Other’ which prevents the full identity of the subject or system; the existence of the capitalist is antagonistic for the worker (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985:125).

However, Laclau has since move beyond the Post-structuralism position, taking on Zizek’s critique of his work, particularly in Beyond Discourse Analysis (Zizek, 1990, 2005a). Here Zizek suggests that it is important to distinguish between antagonism as the limit of the social, the very impossibility around which the social is based, and antagonism as conflict between subject positions (Zizek, 2005:276). This ‘double’ of antagonism means that while the latter antagonism may very well be an actual antagonism for the subject, at the same time it is just a foil for the true, constitutive antagonism. Thus;

‘It is precisely in the moment when we achieve victory over the enemy in the antagonistic struggle that we experience antagonism in its most radical dimension’ (ibid, 274).

This is what Zizek refers to when he speaks of ‘the negation of the negation’. This notion of the negation of the negation differs from that I had discussed in previous pieces. The initial negation in both cases is the fundamental negativity of the social. However, I had previously seen the second negation as the covering up of this fundamental negativity in fantasy and ideology, such that the primary negation was not seen to exist. However, in the context of antagonism, a different economy is at work. Here antagonism is a necessary failure, much like that produced in ideology; indeed antagonism in the form of subject positions is the very stuff of ideology; the ‘Other’ has stolen my identity and thus I do not see that I never had it in the first place.

Thus the negation of the negation is the time when antagonism is most vividly experienced because it is then that the true negativity in the system is revealed in its naked form. Rather than hiding behind fantasy and ideology through desire, the lack inherent in the social is revealed. Therefore the subject/system requires the existence of antagonism in some form in order to maintain its stability. Politicians often need, and seek out, minor failure that they can fix in order to hide the major, universal, failings of their government. For example, George W. Bush has admitted to the problem of Guantanamo Bay prison camp, suggesting that it is a blight on the system that he would like to remove. By giving the appearance of fixing particular antagonistic problems, Bush is able to relieve the pressure on the more universal aspects of his government, such as the ‘war on terrorism’.

However, this is not to state that Zizek disagrees with Laclau’s basic conception of antagonism. Zizek believes that social antagonism as ‘perhaps the most radical breakthrough in modern social theory’ (Zizek, 2005a:271). Zizek describes social antagonism as the real; it is the point of fundamental impossibility around which the socio-symbolic field which is structured; a certain fissure that cannot be symbolised. The real is impossible, but it can always be felt by its effects. Zizek contends that in developing the concept of antagonism, Laclau and Mouffe have been able to incorporate the Lacanian real as a tool for social and ideological analysis through antagonism as a limit which is nothing in itself, but prevents the social from suture(Zizek, 1989:163)

Although Laclau claims to take on Zizek’ double conception of antagonism, he does not extend it fully and take on Zizek’s resulting conceptions of ideology and fantasy, also suggested in Beyond Discourse Analysis (1990, 2005). Zizek believes that these factors are extraordinarily important politically as they conceal the ‘negation of the negation’. The full political consequences of this will be further discussed below.

However, it is at the point of the negation of negation, the place of concrete universality, which dislocation can occur. According to Stavrakakis, dislocation is;

‘… the process by which the contingency of discursive structures is made visible’ (Howarth & Stavrakakis, 2000:13).

This is of course very similar to Zizek’s Hegelian concept of concrete universality. Although, because of Zizek’s addition of the symptom to social antagonism, concrete universality, because of its intimate link with the symptom, adds a different dimension to dislocation. Concrete universality is brought about by the gap that the symptom opens up through antagonism and occurs where the symptom is presented for what it is; the constitutive exception to the social. Where the symptom is the gap between the universal and the particular, concrete universality is the gap between the universal and its symptom (Zizek, 2006:30). As such it reveals the truth of the universal; the universal is failure. Thus, just as the effect of the real in antagonism is played out through the symptom, dislocation occurs when the truth of universal is revealed through the presentation of the symptom as a concrete universal.

However, although Laclau and Zizek agree about the basic ontological construction of the social, and the primary parameters of change, they do differ in the political consequences and potential strategies that led from this ontology. While both do not believe that one can prescribe an a priori political strategy for the left, Laclau believes that a contingent program, which he labels Radical Democracy, should be the site of politics for the Left; in contrasts Zizek contends that such a move subverts the possibility of radical change. While Zizek does not deny that politics must occur, his work does not theoretically enter this realm. Rather Zizek believes that the main focus of the Left should be the repoliticization of the economy.


Where Zizek seeks radical change, particularly in the economy, through the dislocatory effect of the real, Laclau believes that it is only through hegemony and chains of equivalence in a positive social imaginary that the Left can proceed. It is Laclau’s position that I shall turn to first. The central political premise of Laclau’s work is clearly democracy; what he labels Radical Democracy. Radical Democracy, first developed in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (1985), is based on spreading the influence the democratic ethos and the deepening of democracy. Radical Democracy operates by revealing the contingency of every foundation, which is possible because there is no unique privileged position upon which to place a foundation, any ‘foundation’ must be constantly renegotiated (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985:169).

However, this is not to suggest that Radical Democracy is an a priori normative foundation in itself. It is impossible to define a priori the surfaces upon which antagonism will be constituted; there is not one politics of the left which can determine the content of the movement. The imaginary of radical democracy is always in constant tension; this tension should be affirmed and not denied- it is what constitutes Radical Democracy. It is the moment of tension which gives the social its open character that every project for Radical Democracy should seek to institutionalise. As such, Radical Democracy seeks to operate between the extremes of utopian myth and positivistic reformism (ibid: 190).

Thus Laclau believes that Radical Democracy should be the current necessary face of the left in regard to the neo-liberal and conservative movements of the right. He does not declare that it is the only, or necessary, foundation for the left. However, Radical Democracy does hold a certain advantage in that it seeks to institutionalise the key elements of social antagonism, and thus does not produce ideological illusion to the same degree as utopian politics. Thus, Radical Democracy is compatible with the insights of Laclau’s Discourse theory, although it becomes incompatible when;

‘this space of equivalence ceases to be considered as one political space among others and comes to be seen as the centre, which subordinates and organises all other spaces’ (ibid:186);

Thus the foundations of Radical Democracy and Radical Democracy itself need to be constantly renegotiated as;

‘ A free society is not one where a social order has been established that is better adapted to human nature, but one which is more aware of the contingency and historicity of any order’ (Laclau, 1990:211)

Therefore democracy as a form should also be plural as it has to be adapted to the social spaces in question (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985:185). The form of Radical Democracy should also be institutionalised, as it requires a political space compatible with the democratic struggle. This includes state and economic organisations; governments need to be organised around the free exchange of ideas and debate (ibid: 186). However, Laclau does not state how this could be achieved, particularly in the difficult area of the economy.

Laclau seeks to establish a principle of democratic equivalence by the strengthening of specific democratic struggles linked by a chain of equivalence under hegemony of democracy (ibid: 182). This democratic equivalence cannot be based on the possessive individualism that characterises contemporary capitalism, in which the equality of one group prevents that of another, but rather on a new common sense which alters the identity of all groups to such a degree that the demands of each becomes equivalent to the demands of others. However, Laclau also states that the insistence on equality is not sufficient, but needs to be balanced by the demand for liberty; this is radical and plural democracy (ibid: 184). Therefore, Laclau does not seek to deconstruct liberalism, as we shall later see that Zizek does, rather;

‘It is not liberalism that should be called into question, for as an ethical principle which defends the liberty of the individual to fulfil his or her human capacities, it is more valid than ever’ (Ibid: 184)

The task of the Left therefore cannot be to renounce liberal-democratic ideology, but on the contrary to depend and expand it in the direction of a radical and plural democracy (ibid: 176). Laclau believes that the fundamental enemy of this process is essentialism of any kind; the conviction that the social is sutured at some point. However, it is clear from Laclau’s conception of Radical Democracy that the left cannot simply rely on the empty negativity of the social. Rather any political movement must produce a positive imaginary, a ‘strategy of construction of a new order’, as opposed to a ‘strategy of opposition’ (ibid: 189).

However, the notion of a positive imaginary appears to contradict much of Laclau’s work. On the other hand, Laclau does not seek to construct a natural, true universal imaginary. Rather, the new imaginary should be constructed on a different basis; hence the contingent notions of Radical Democracy. The logic of Radical Democracy is not a logic of the positivity of the social, and it is therefore incapable of founding a nodal point of any kind around which the social fabric can be reconstituted; the unity between hegemony and democracy is contingent, purely the result of articulation (ibid: 188-9).

Zizek does not totally reject Laclau’s notion of a positive imaginary as a necessary part of Left politics (Zizek, 2000b:325). However, Zizek does not believe that such an imaginary should be the fundamental site of struggle for the Left. Zizek believes that the social has already been hegemonised by capital (Zizek, 2000a:223; 2000b:319), which forms something of a ‘symbolic real’, a background to all discourse (Zizek, 2002:xii). Therefore, any notion of pure politics which does not take into account the hegemonic power of the economy is bound to failure (Zizek & Daly, 2004:144-5); indeed for Zizek it is a cynical discourse of failure. There instead of operating in the terms of the dominant universal, Zizek’s work suggests that the Left needs to evoke the dislocatory power of the real.

This distinction from Laclau stems from Zizek’s differing conception of the utility of the real. Where Laclau sees the real, through antagonism, as preventing the closure of the social and this providing the basis for Discourse theory and Radical Democracy, the latter still operates through the distorted logic of the symbolic. In contrast, Zizek’s political theorising seeks to utilise the dislocatory power of the real. Because of this Zizek can not, or rather refuses to produce a political program of any kind; a point that pushes many theorists to suggest that his work is politically impotent. However, while a refusal to operate while the terms of the symbolic may make Zizek impotent for politics, it makes his work particularly productive in the realm of the political. However, for Zizek, any attempt to symbolise the real with the relationship between the universal and particular domesticates its destructive effect.

We see this position in Zizek’s treatment of the symptom. The symptom is both real and symbolic, in that it is an effect of the real (through antagonism), but in being named as a symptom it becomes part of the symbolic order. However, for Zizek once the symptom has been named and taken symbolic form within the realm of the hegemonic universal, even if it is in opposition to this universal, than it is no longer real, it is pacified and takes a different role, that of maintaining the universal. This is because the failure inherent in the presence of the symptom is taken up by the particular, rather then the universal. This process, which is regulated by ideology and the super-ego, concedes failure, but projects it as fixable, thus maintaining the status of the universal. In this conception, change only occurs through the real; all symbolic attempts get sucked into this cycle.

However, to say that Zizek takes no position, and rejects anyone who take a position is a vulgar and inaccurate caricature of his work; it is clear that he takes a strong stand on many issues. Many theorists appear to misunderstand critique (e.g. of multi-culturalism) as a complete rejection. This is not the case, rather Zizek attempts to reveal the flip side to a discourse that may appear universal, tolerant or utopian e.g. The Obscenity of Human Rights (2005b).

Zizek’s main political demand is the repolicization of the economy; he rejects forms of politics which does not place the economy as the fundamental site of struggle. This is not to suggest that Zizek does see the value in the multi-culturalist post-modern politicisation/democratization of various spheres of society (Zizek, 1999:356). Indeed Zizek acknowledges the ‘great achievements of liberal capitalism’ in bringing freedom and an advanced material standard of living to the western world (Zizek, 2000b:322). However, Zizek does reject multi-cultural tolerance and liberal-capitalist democracy as the fundamental sites of struggle for the left (Zizek & Daly, 2004:144). Additionally, Zizek believes that these minor changes have given the illusion of change, at the demise of true radical change in the underlying foundation of our society- the economy;

‘The depolitized economy is the disavowed fundamental fantasy of post-modern politics- a properly political act would necessarily entail the repoliticalization of the economy’ (Zizek, 1999:355).

Neither does Zizek reject the idea of taking a stand, indeed he believes that it is academically dishonest and arrogant to refuse to do so (Zizek & Daly, 2004:45). This is in direct opposition to the views of Robinson and Tormey (2005:2) who contend that;

‘Whilst Zizek’s work is intellectually ‘radical’, this is not, despite appearances, a radicalism that left politics can draw sustenance and hope from’

Or Laclau;

‘What is the alternative model of society that he (Zizek) is postulating? Without at least the beginning of an answer to these questions, his anti-capitalism is mere empty talk’ (2000:206).

The latter statement is particularly unusual for a theorist, who, as I noted earlier, does not believe that an a priori foundation for left politics can be found. What Zizek does suggest is an alternative political strategy for change. Zizek does not reject the idea of a new left imaginary, indeed he states that this is required for politics, but not for the political (Zizek, 2000b:325). Nor does he believe that politics exists outside of the order of signification, between the universal and the particular, in Laclau’s terms (Zizek, 1999:177).

However, this kind of politics is outside of the direct scope of psychoanalysis, but the political is not. The distinction between politics and the political is made by Stavrakakis (1999). Politics is defined as a separated bounded system, that of the maintenance of the political. The political is inexhaustible realm of contingent social relations (ibid: 71). Thus Zizek seeks not to operate politically between the universal and the particular, as Laclau does, but in the realm of the political within the universal. This gap is between the universal and its exceptions. Therefore while Laclau seeks to occupy and hegemonise the dominant position, Zizek wants to stand outside of this ground and the refuse the very terms in which the universal operates (Zizek, 2000b:326).

As such, Zizek wants to work with the excess of capitalism, its symptoms. In doing this Zizek seeks to invoke the real, the disavowed foundations of capitalism, such as global climate change and absolute poverty. However, he believes that these symptoms can be easily subverted through the relationship between the universal and the particular. When the particular, the symbolic field of the dominant position, takes on the demands of the symptom, they get caught up in the field of ideology and the super-ego and as such become a problem to be fixed, rather than constitutive and dislocatory. Here we must remember the aforementioned role of ideology in not revealing the ‘negation of the negation’ and thus showing the failure of the universal. Instead, as much as is possible Zizek seeks to maintain the status of these symptoms in the real, rather than having them caught up in the relationship between the universal and the particular.

To maintain a symptom as real for political purposes appears to be an oxymoronic task. If the real is the unsymbolisable, the impossible, how can it be dealt with symbolically? To answer this question we must rexamine the nature of the real. The real is revealed in the symbolic through its effects and performance only- this is antagonism, the naming of such effects. Additionally, antagonism itself is named in the symptom. The process of naming the real is never complete, something is always missed, but it is politically vital. A symptom can be interpreted as part of the relationship between the universal and the particular, especially on the side of the particular. In doing so it is unable to challenge the dominant universal. It may produce small alterations, but not major change.

However, if the symptom is named in a different manner, as something that is outside of the dominant order, which cannot be symbolised within it, it takes on a different potential. In this case the symptom becomes part of the disavowed foundation of the dominant order. The real, with the symptom as part of it, is what is impossible to symbolise from a certain perspective, not what cannot be symbolised at all. Just because something cannot be symbolised from one perspective, does not mean that it cannot be from another (Fink, 1995:28). This is not the same as discursive antagonism, where the presence of the ‘Other’ blocks the full identity of the subject position. Rather it is the notion of a symbolisable symptom that is outside of the realm of the dominant order coming to impact on the system. Here the symptom refuses to be pacified by the terms of the dominant universal and domesticated into a particular; the innocent victims of war refuse to be ‘collateral damage’ or the victims of absolute poverty do not take on the position of ‘developing nation’, but rather refuse to get caught up in the capitalist economy itself. In this the symptom is able to become a concrete universal.

However, does that mean that we liberal intellectuals cannot help develop the concrete universal of the capitalist economy? No, and this is where I break from Zizek. Where Zizek states that;

‘Today , in the face of this Leftist knavery, it is more important than ever to HOLD THIS UTOPIAN PLACE OF THE GLOBAL ALTERNATIVE OPEN, even if it remains empty, living on borrowed time, awaiting the content to fill it in’ (Zizek, 2000b:325, emphasis in original).

In complete contrast, I believe that the true anti-capitalist act is not the formless and radical break with the system, but rather the act of actually creating a post-capitalist program. It is taken that the any attempt to create a program beyond the act subverts the act itself. Thus, psychoanalysts who take an anti-capitalist position leave their critique at anti-capitalism; they are unable, or unwilling, to engage with an alternative programme. Instead they employ cynical and fantasmatic posturing about the need to break with capitalism. However, does not this critique simply help to maintain the stability of capitalism by resigning ourselves to the idea that there are no available alternatives?

Therefore I suggest that the role of the Left should be to develop a new economic foundation in opposition to capitalism. This need not come from psychoanalysis, indeed it seems unlikely that it could. However, as Laclau suggests in Radical Democracy, this program does not to be complicit with the principles of psychoanalytic politics, particularly the notions of antagonism and contingency. Thus I believe that a position can be found between and within the work of Ernesto Laclau and Slavoj Zizek. This position seeks to utilise the dislocatory power of the real and develop a position political program. Thus while Laclau’s approach is appropriate for politics, it is Zizek who provides the most productive approach in terms of political change, especially given the complete domination of the global capitalist economy.

References

Fink, B. (1995). The Lacanian Subject: Between Language and Jouissance. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Homer, S. (1996). Psychoanalysis, Representation, Politics: On the (im)possibility of a psychoanalytic theory of ideology? Paper presented at the Third Annual Conference of the Universities Association for Psychoanalytic Studies, The Three Impossible Professions, LSB College.
Howarth, D., & Stavrakakis, Y. (2000). Introducing discourse theory and political analysis. In D. Howarth, A. J. Norval & Y. Stavrakakis (Eds.), Discourse theory and Political analysis: Identities, Hegemonies and Social Change. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Laclau, E. (1990). New Reflections on the Revolutions of Our Time. London: Verso.
Laclau, E. (2000). Structure, History and the Political. In J. Bulter, E. Laclau & S. Zizek (Eds.), Contingency, Hegemony, Universality; Contemporary Dialogues on the Left. London: Verso.
Laclau, E., & Mouffe, C. (1985). Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a radical democratic politics. London: Verso.
Robinson, A. (2004). The Politics of Lack. BJPIR, 6.
Robinson, A., & Tormey, S. (2003). What is not to be done! Everything you wanted to know about Lennin, and (sadly) weren't afraid to ask Zizek. Retrieved 22/06/2006, from http://homepage.ntlworld.com/simon.tormey/articles/Zizeklenin.pdf
Robinson, A., & Tormey, S. (2005). A Ticklish Subject? Zizek and the Future of Left Radicalism. Thesis Eleven, 80.
Stavrakakis, Y. (1999). Lacan & the Political. London: Routledge.
Zizek, S. (1989). The Sublime Object of Ideology. London: Verso.
Zizek, S. (1990). Beyond Discourse-Analysis. In E. Laclau (Ed.), New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time. London: Verso.
Zizek, S. (1999). The Ticklish Subject. London: Verso.
Zizek, S. (2000a). Da Capo senza Fine. In J. Bulter, E. Laclau & S. Zizek (Eds.), Contingency, Hegemony and Universality. London: Verso.
Zizek, S. (2000b). Holding the Place. In J. Bulter, E. Laclau & S. Zizek (Eds.), Contingency, Hegemony, Universality. London: Verso.
Zizek, S. (2002). For they know not what they do: Enjoyment as a political factor (2nd ed.). London: Verso.
Zizek, S. (2005a). Interrogating the Real. New York: Continuum.
Zizek, S. (2005b). The Obscenity of Human Rights: Violence as a Symptom. Retrieved 22/06, 2006, from http://www.lacan.com/zizviol.htm
Zizek, S. (2006). The Parallex View. London: Verso.
Zizek, S., & Daly, G. (2004). Conversations with Zizek. Cambridge: Polity.

Environmental Hypothesis: Cold has frozen my brain

As global concern for the environment appears to be growing strongly, the environmental movement has become one of the strongest components of left-wing politics. However, in psychoanalytic terms this concern takes the form of ideological fantasy and super-ego demand. Therefore rather than achieving a radical transformation of the capitalist economy in the name of environmentalism, the more common outcome is ecological modernism and its associations with positivist science and the capitalist free-market. While these efforts may make minor changes within the dominant imaginary, they entrench the hegemonic (universal) fantasy of the environment as under mans’ control. Rather, greater potential lies in an alternative strategy. Compared to other areas of anti-capitalist critique, environmentalism has a much stronger relationship with the real. The real in this sense is not the constitutive exclusion but more importantly the biological real. In this essay I promote a distinction between the natural and nature, the discursive rendering of the natural; the biological real. The interactions of symptoms of nature and the natural is what provides the potential for a dislocation of the existing order, achieved by elevating these symptoms to the status of concrete universal. However, because of the potential for dislocation, the efforts of ideology and super-ego to maintain the status quo are strengthened. Thus, although there is greater potential for dislocation through the natural if the fantasmatic hold is able to be broken, these system bonds are particularly resilient.

Politically, change can occur through two different spheres of the environment. I shall refer to these spheres as nature and the natural. Nature is the discursive representation of the natural. In contrast, natural is the real in itself. However, this is not the real in the sense of an exclusion from the symbolic. Rather it is the biological real; the realm of matter and its interactions. Because we do not have access to this biological real, in itself, it is meaningfully represented in the symbolic and imaginary. This representation is nature. Therefore we never know whether our representations of the natural are accurate, but when nature is exposed to the natural, as the real, nature is left open to dislocation. Therefore nature, as a discourse, is much more open to dislocation than other, symbolic, discourses. This is not to suggest that nature is not symbolic; as we know matter can only be meaningful in terms of the symbolic, but rather its unique position in terms of its referent creates a greater opportunity for materialist influence. As such a firm distinction should not be made between nature and the natural (outside of an abstract distinction). Rather the two have a complex, extimate relationship, much like reality and the real; the natural cannot be simply thought to be outside of nature.

Nature, as a discursive formation, takes the form of any other discourse. It is formed by the dynamic contradiction between the abstract universal and the particular. The particular in this sense is the full range of symbolis discourse relating to the natural (and because of the nature of language, beyond) and the universal is the hegemonic representation of this particular and the associated chains of equivalence that fill the universal and its representative; the empty signifier. In contemporary New Zealand political discourse, this may be the image of the environment as robust and controllable.

However, because the universal is always abstract and false, something must necessarily be excluded for it to be constituted. This excluded element, the excess of the universal, is known as the symptom. The symptom is evidence of the failure of the universal; it is the effect of the real upon the symbolic and as such provides a potential for symbolic dislocation. If the universal is nature as robust, then the symptom would be the evidence against this, where it is evident that nature is not robust. As an example, a 2004 National Institute of Water and Atmospheric Research (NIWA) study showed that 95% of New Zealand’s lowland rivers and streams were too polluted for people to swim in or drink from (Larned, Scarsbrook, Snelder, Norton, & Biggs, 2004). This is a symptom of the hegemonic universal; that the universal is false.

However, the presence of the symptom does not provide a dislocation. Rather the symptom is normally subverted by the effect of ideological fantasy and the super-ego in support of the abstract universal. Ideological fantasy works by presenting the social as a sutured and positive entity; therefore the presence of the symptom has to be externalised to another cause, or a solution to come. In terms of nature, the strongest hegemonic ideology is based around scientific knowledge, an approach known as ecological modernism. This ideology suggests that rather than radical change, what is required is increasing technology to deal with the symptoms. Ultimately the ideology contends that we should not worry about the natural; science and technology will prevent all problems in the future.

Super-ego demand works in a similar fashion to ideology in attempting to present the social as full by domesticating the effect of the symptom. In the Lacanian conception, the super-ego is the obscene supplement to the symbolic law; it is the guilt/surplus enjoyment which presses the subject to believe in the fullness of the social and thus the universal. The super-ego helps to maintain the possibility of symbolic fullness. It presses‘guilt’ upon the subject when gaps in the social appear if the subject does not follow the symbolic law. In this sense the super-ego forms an obscene underlying law which operates, and supports, the public law. This operation is seen most vividly at the point of failure of the law (Zizek, 1994:54). In terms of environmentalism the super-ego presses upon the subject the need to follow the notions of ecological modernism; to recycle and conserve energy. Although these actions are not a bad thing in themselves, they do help to maintain the fantasy that the universal is still full, that the environment is not a fundamental problem because the capitalist system is sustainable.

Therefore both ideology and super-ego work to avoid the horror of exposure to the real, or in this case, the natural. Rather than viewing the symptom for what it is, it is subverted in the name of the universal and the jouissance available in the possibility of fullness. If this were not to occur, if the symptom was to be revealed and presented as a constitutive element of the system, then it has reached the status of concrete universality. Concrete universality is brought about by the gap that the symptom opens up. Where the symptom is the gap between the universal and the particular, concrete universality is the gap between the universal and its symptom (Zizek, 2006:30). As such it reveals the truth of the universal; the universal is failure. In environmentalism, this would be the act of seeing that the universal conception of nature as robust and under the control of man as false and instead deeming the capitalist system unsustainable.

The natural, although of course intimately and extimately related to nature, operates according to a different logic from the symbolic and imaginary orders. This operation is similar to that of the real. As with the real, our understanding of the natural can only come through nature; the external limits of the system can only be revealed through the internal failings of the discourse; we can never map the real, only encircle it.

By the natural I am referring to the realm of matter, that which operates independently (although not isolated from the effects of) the symbolic. The natural can thus be termed the biological real. The natural interacts and changes often outside of the influence of the symbolic, but it is not mutually exclusive from nature. The effect of the symbolic, particularly its symptoms, interacts with the symptoms of the natural.

Symptoms of the natural take the form of medical symptoms; the manifestation of an underlying illness; the distinction here is between surface and depth, between phenomena and the hidden causes of those phenomena which cannot be experienced but must be inferred. The main dissimilarity between this conception and that of the psychoanalytic symptom is the variance between surface and depth, a distinction that does not exist in the symbolic. Also, in the biological notion of the symptom, the key is to battle to cause of which the symptom is a manifestation; in psychoanalysis the symptom is the cause and is thus to be dealt with in its own right.

The important factor in environmental discourse (in terms of potential dislocation) is the interaction of the two types of symptoms; biological and symbolic. This occurs at the border of the real and the symbolic. However, it is not just the influence of the real upon the symbolic, but also the other way round. As Fink states

‘True understanding… is actually a process which goes beyond the automatic functioning of the symbolic order and involves an incursion of the symbolic into the real: the signifier brings forth something new in the real or drains off more of the real into the symbolic’(Fink, 1995:71).

The relationship between the symbolic and the real described above by Fink is the same as the relationship between nature and the natural. The symptoms of nature have an affect on the natural and likewise the natural intrudes into nature. An example is illustrative. If we carry on from the example given earlier, the abstract universal view of nature is that of a robust system under the control of made, supported by the ideology of ecological modernism. The symptoms of this position are numerous and not all symptomatic. However, for the sake of simplicity one of the most prominent and dangerous symptoms can be selected; global pollution.

This symptom is a creation of the discursive, of course in interaction with the natural; we cannot forget that the natural is always at the same time symbolic, it just also interacts outside of the symbolic. Therefore, through a hegemonic conception of the environment guiding the actions of those who identify with the universal, a symptom is produced which affects the natural world; we believe that our production and consumption is unlimited, but because this does not correspond to the natural world, it is produced as a symptom. This symptom reveals the relationship between nature and the natural. If natural could take unlimited production, global pollution would not be a symptom, such pollution would not be created. It is quite conceivable that another universal could be produced that represented the natural better- such is the benefit of super-ego dominated science in ecological modernism- and this kind of symptom would not exist. This is not to suggest that a symptom would not exist, but just that it would not have the same effect on the natural world.

Thus a symptom of nature, when its interacts with the natural, becomes an active and powerful symptom. A symptom such as global pollution interacts with the natural, which is somewhat independent of symbolisation and produces global warming. In turn this symptom impresses on the symbolic order. This creates the possibility of the symptom coming to be viewed as a concrete universal. In the case of global warming, the universal of sustainable capitalism could produce the symptom of waste, which interaction at the intersection of the symbolic and real, producing a biological symptom of global warming and climate change. As such, global warming increases the pressure on the universal (showing it to be false) and creating the possibility that the symptom, global pollution, could become a concrete universal by being seen as constitutive of the universal of unlimited growth.

However, despite the promise evident in this example, such a case, although right before us, does not occur. Instead the efforts of the ideological and super-ego realms are redoubled. Although often the above case is treated with respect unlimited growth is impossible, it is not treated as a universal truth, but rather a contingent one; unlimited growth is not possible unless we begin to recycle or conserve energy. Worse still is the ideological idea that unlimited growth is possible, because the market will deal with the problem once it becomes starts to impact upon people with enough money to pay to do something about it e.g. once oil runs out, we will start selling electric cars.

The west also deals with the possibility of dislocation by rehearsing this trauma in fantasy, such as Hollywood cinema, such movies as The Day after Tomorrow, Dante’s Peak, and The Perfect Storm. This makes the prospect of such incursions of the real more palatable, as if they exist only in fantasy. Zizek makes a similar point about the impact of the 9/11 attacks on the United States public in Welcome to the Desert of the Real (2002).

Thus, despite the potential for dislocation of the symbolic and the elevation of symbolic symptoms to the status of concrete universal, I am not convinced that any real change can be achieved in this manner; such is the strength of ideology and super-ego in maintaining, or slightly altering the universal. Instead, it appears that only a dislocation, purely from the natural, in the form of a global disaster could truly change the global capitalist system. However, this conception is particularly politically impotent (although in line with Zizek’s conception of revealing the fantasy by taking the universal to its nth degree) and as such I believe it is worth investigating what a possible political position would take, from a Laclauian position, given that my review of the Zizekian/Lacanian standpoint.

Laclau would advocate a position of contingency, but also the institutionalisation of this contingency. This instutionalisation would take the form of a universal. I believe that this universal would look to take on as much from the natural, or the real as possible. Rather than being stuck in ideology, it would take the opposite view of the currently hegemonic universal (that of ecological modernism) and endorse the view that the natural knows best. Such a view is promoted in A Radical Green Political Theory (Carter, 1999). Here Carter suggests that the third law of ecology is that ‘Nature knows best’;

‘Any major human-made change in a natural system is likely to be detrimental to that system. The reason for this is that ecosystems, like watches, are extremely intricate and are unlikely to be improved by random tinkering’ (Carter, 1999:21-22).

This position is a fantasy in itself (that there is nothing lacking somewhere) and is in its fullest sense impractical; man is an intricate part of the natural system and can in no way withdraw itself. However, I wonder whether a limited version of this impossible position is possible. This could be an example of elevating the symptom to the universal. For example, in various places around the world predators have been removed from various eco-systems in order for them to become more comfortable for man. However, these systems often collapse as the predator played a vital role in regulating the system. On the other hand, it is impossible to simply follow the rule of nature as an ethic; part of being in nature is manipulating it. The problem is that humans have the ability to manipulate nature past the point of benefit. Perhaps it is simply a contingent ethic, rather than a guarantee, to follow the way of the natural.







Carter, A. (1999). A Radical Green Political Theory. Routledge: London.
Fink, B. (1995). The Lacanian Subject: Between Language and Jouissance. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Zizek, S. (1994). The Metastases of Enjoyment. London: Verso.
Zizek, S. (2002). Welcome to the Desert of the Real. London: Verso.
Zizek, S. (2006). The Parallex View. London: Verso.

This is what I think ?

Socio-political change occurs through the dynamic dialectic interactions of the universal and the excluded real. The universal, in its abstract form, is both impossible, in that it can never be fully constituted and necessary due to the need to avoid the naked anxiety of the real. It is this dynamic contradiction that drives the dialectic process and hence political change. This essay investigates two different approaches to political change and the paradoxical relationship between universalism and the real in order to develop a basic political/theoretical apparatus for this thesis. As well as this, the prospect of a psychoanalytic political position is discussed, particularly in relation to democracy.

The first approach, characterised by Ernesto Laclau, as well as Yannis Stavrakakis, investigates the relationship between universalism, particular demands and democracy. For Laclau, the universal is a mediation of the split particular and is revealed in the production of empty signifiers. This universalism is filled by ‘chains of equivalence’ that infuse the empty universal with meaning. However, because of the impossible nature of the universal, these attempts at universalism are doomed to fail. However, the inevitability of failure should not stop such attempts. Therefore the role of the political Left is to develop a universal imaginary upon which to place the now divergent particular demands of Leftist politics. For Laclau such a position is radical democracy. Radical democracy seeks to institutionalise the lack of the real and reign in the power of ideology.

Although Slavoj Zizek also endorses the radical democratic ethos, he has considerable more reservations than Laclau, particularly in regard to the power of the economy (Bulter, Laclau, & Zizek, 2000:4). However, democracy is not the main cite of Zizek’s theoretical and political focus. Instead Zizek maintains that the repoliticization of the economy should be the primary focus of the political ambitions for the Left. Zizek’s treatment of the universal and the real is also vitally different. Using Lacanian psychoanalysis and Hegelian dialectics, Zizek rejects Laclau’s use of the abstract universal and instead focuses on the concrete universal. The concrete universal develops through the presentation of the symptom, the effect of the real on the imaginary universal, as structurally constitutive.

This essay goes on to argue that it is the concrete universal that holds the most hope of political change through the Lacanian act. The act breaks up the underlying fantasy of the order and reveals the disavowed foundations of the universal. As such it redefines the conditions of possibility and produces change. An Act occurs from the inherent impossibility of the social. Thus the symptom has to become active to push from the possible of this impossibility to become a concrete universal. It is concrete universality, breaking through fantasy and becoming an act, which is most likely to produce change. However, although the act produces change, the aim of a political intervention is to produce progressive political change. Therefore I posit that the act needs to be quickly followed, or paired with, an alternative ideology from which the subject can gain stability.

A true and natural universal is impossible because of the negative ontology of the social. One cannot have access to things-in-themselves, all knowledge is mediated through the symbolic and therefore a gap, or lack, is introduced into the system. Therefore the signified only has a retroactive influence on the signifier. Rather it is the play of signifiers that creates meanings. However, through ideological closure, these meaning are made to retroactively appear organic, as if they have developed naturally from the signified. This same process is seen with the universal. Because a universal cannot objectively and fully develop, any universal is necessarily false. However, the universal is not presented in this manner. Instead a false, or abstract universal, is created and made to appear to be both natural and universal.

Consequently the negative ontology of the social is the key focus for Lacanian psychoanalytic thought on universality. For Lacan it means that universality can never be fully constituted in itself. Instead any form of identity has to be abstracted from a particular, and as such must exclude some element to successfully achieve this abstraction (Zizek, 1999:180). Therefore because the social is partial, the generation and presentation of the universal is highly political as the universal creates an ‘objective’ formation out of previously particular elements(Howarth & Stavrakakis, 2000:14). This universal, or in Laclauian terms, hegemonic, formation hides the very limit of discourse which threatens the identity which it has constructed, to the extent that Laclau states;

‘every relation of representation is founded on a fiction: that of the presence at a certain level of something which, strictly speaking, is absent from it’ (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985:119).

In contrast to this false universality, a positive ontology would create a natural universal, producing logical laws, such as the neo-liberal view of the market. If such an objective universal did exist, the play of the social would cease. As Laclau suggests, it is the impossibility of society which creates the possibility of hegemony and politics(Laclau & Mouffe, 1985).

Therefore our political battles are ultimately efforts to deal with the anxiety of the real (Stavrakakis, 1999:72). This occurs because ultimately reality can only be posited as natural if the real outside of reality is ascribed to the other who took it from us (ibid:80). The positive externalisation of lack is called ideology, or more accurately ideological fantasy. Ideological fantasy, the symbolic component of the imaginary, has the role of presenting the symbolic as full. This occurs through a hegemonic abstraction, both in presenting a particular as full and externalising the symptom.

Given the role of the real, and the impossibility of universality, two options are left for politics and political change. One can battle against the effects of the real and operate in fantasy. Alternatively, lack can be institutionalised and taken on as a constitutive element of the social.

The first such approach is characterised by the work of Sean Homer. Homer suggests that the power of ideological discourse is too strong and as such because psychoanalytic political theory does not engage in ideology, it is impotent. The power of fascist movements in creating change is witness to such a position. However, this would be a politics without the influence of psychoanalysis. Homer suggests that the role of psychoanalysis, playing the cynic, would be to direct the universal, knowing its flexibility, to the most politically ‘ethical’ position (cited in Stavrakakis, 1999:112).

However, Homer’s position contradicts the basic focus of (political) Lacanian psychoanalysis. Lacan’s psychoanalytic process attempts to reveal the lack in the other. By doing the opposite and entering the realm of phantasmatic politics, psychoanalysis is impotent. We must not overlook that any attempt at utopia produces its opposite and then focuses its politics on its removable (Stavrakakis, 1999:100). The consequences of such actions should not be easily forgotten.

Because of this, the role of psychoanalysis is to emphasise the inherent gap in the social. Yannis Stavrakakis takes this a step further and suggests that the structural lack in the social needs to be institutionalised in a program of radical democracy (ibid). The main proponents of this form of democracy are (as well as Stavrakakis) Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. Radical democracy differs from traditional phantasmatic democracy in that the ethics of harmony/consensus in democracy is replaced by an ethics of the real, of accepting conflict and antagonism rather than seeking remove it from the political process.

However, the role of the real is somewhat muted in Laclau’s theoretical work, Discourse theory. The core of Discourse theory entails the investigation of the manner in which contingent and historical meanings are articulated to appear to be objective. Laclau’s main political concern is the construction of a contingent universalism in order to provide a new social imaginary for the Left. In this sense, Laclau’s political concern is twofold. Laclau recognises that there is no natural or objective universal, indeed he states that;

‘the only democratic society is one that continually shows the contingency of its own origins’(Laclau, 2000b:87).

However, because democracy becomes the battle for ‘empty signifiers (terms filled with meaning by chains of equivalence), Laclau advocates that the Left also produce empty signifiers, which structure the abstract universal. Although the empty signifier is empty by itself, it takes on a universal function. This universal function is filled with meaning by what is referred to as the ‘logic of equivalence’. This logic is a chain of signs which seek to fill the universal emptiness of the empty signifier. This logic is crucial for liberal democracy, as political representatives compete to fill the chain of equivalence.

Because the empty signifier is by definition empty, no ontic content necessarily stems from the system limit that produces empty signifiers. Instead the type of signifiers that fill an empty signifier are entirely reliant on the context in which they are created, and thus the unevenness of the social (Laclau, 2000c:192). Therefore Laclau suggests that there is nothing preventing empty signifiers representing the impossibility of the social itself, as in the universalism of contingency which is an the core of radical democracy (ibid:199)

In this sense Laclau’s position is has some similarity to Homer, accept Laclau suggests that the Left should enter the ideological game, but with an ideology of contingency. Thus where the two theorists differ is that Laclau believes that it is only radical democracy that can reign in the power of phantasmatic (or in his terms, hegemonic) political positions by recognising that no one position can hold the place of power (Laclau, 2000b:54). The ultimate place of power stays necessarily empty.

However, in doing this Laclau focuses only on the relationship between the universal and the particular; in Lacanian terms, the imaginary and the symbolic. Laclau hints at the real, but allows it no specific political significance. As well as this, Laclau ignores the role of jouissance and fantasy in the imaginary (see Glynos & Stavrakakis, 2003), although Laclau argues, unconvincingly, that he does include these factors in his work (Laclau, 2003). Thus Laclau’s twofold theory of the social lacks the depth provided by the work of Slavoj Zizek.

I believe it is Zizek who is best placed to understand the dialectics and dynamics of change. Zizek, taking a more Hegelian/Lacanian perspective, contrasts with Laclau’s position whilst endorsing many of the key features of his argument. Where Laclau examines the interplay between the abstract universal and the particular, Zizek adds a third and fourth to this formula. These elements are the singular/symptom and concrete universality. This Hegelian turn reveals a much greater potential for dislocation of the social.

The singular and symptom are very similar, if not abstractly the same. Despite the similarity between the singular and symptom, the singular is not a term often used by Zizek. The singular is most often used in The Ticklish Subject (Zizek, 1999), and is examined in Sarah Kay’s introduction to Zizek’s work (Kay, 2003). Indeed in The Ticklish Subject, Zizek sometimes substitutes the term ‘individual’ for singular, to describe the remainder of the universalising process;

‘We should therefore consider three, not just two, levels: the empty UNIVERSAL, the PARTICULAR content which hegemonizes the empty Universal, and the INDIVIDUAL, the symptomatic excess which undermines this hegemonic content… One can see immediately in what sense the individual is the dialectical unity of Universal and Particular: the individual bears witness to the gap between the Universal and Particular’ (Zizek, 1999:181, emphasis in orginal).

This definition of the singular/individual is very similar to that of the symptom;

‘ The symptom is, strictly speaking, a particular element which subverts its own universal, a species subverting its own genus’ (Zizek, 1989:21).

Therefore the singular/symptom arises as the excess which is a necessary condition of the universal; the symptom reveals the presence of the real (Zerilli, 1998). Because the universal is always false, it is always a hegemonic abstraction from a particular, there will necessarily be an element left out. The singular/symptom is this element and thus it reveals the gap between the universal and the particular. The symptom is that while reveals the presence of the real. Of course the real is outside of the symbolic and can only be seen in its effects. As such it is an effect without (known) cause. This effect- of showing the limits of the discursive- is the symptom/singular of universality. Where Laclau is simply aware of this effect he places no political significance on. The closest Laclau comes to the symptom is social antagonism. Laclau places social antagonism at the point where discourses collide, thus, similar to the symptom, antagonism reveals the system limit of the social. It is through antagonism that meanings are considered to be destabilised in Discourse theory, through those elements in the discursive that have been excluded (Howarth & Stavrakakis, 2000:9-14). Yet, despite the deconstructive presence of the excluded being noted by Laclau, his focus is on the empty signifier and universalism. In contrast for Zizek it is the symptom should be the focus of politics.

The difference between the singular and symptom is abstract. When discussing the symptom, compared to the singular/individual, Zizek considers a greater attachment to jouissance; the role of enjoyment in the constitutive exception of universality. Therefore the symptom appears to be a more complete term than the singular.

The symptom is also more enigmatic. The symptom appears as a coded object (Lacan originally thought symptoms were produced with an eye to interpretation), not necessarily the straight opposite of the abstract universal, as with the singular (Milovanovic, 2004:373). As an illustration, with the universal capitalist market, the singular may be market failure, but the symptom is more likely to be harder to decipher. It is for this reason that the first stage of the psychoanalytic cure is the interpretation of symptoms. A recent example of a symptom of the capitalist market is the failure of the North Shore City Council to protect the Long-Bay Okura Great Park, despite overwhelming support for the concept. Here, the market is seen to fail to meet the needs of the people, but this failure is not interpreted by most as a market failure; the cause is attributed to another factor, in this circumstance, the council.

Thus we see the intimate relationship between the symptom and ideology. As the symptom is the coded failure of the universal and ideological fantasy is that which protect the subject from that failure. Ideology operates by presenting the social as a positive entity, devoid of symptoms. In order to do this, any symptom that reveals itself is externalised; the symptom is presented as an impediment caused by an uncontrollable external factor, or a fixable internal impediment. The key to ideology is to avoid presenting the symptom for what it is; the return of the real, of what has to be repressed for the (false) universal to constitute itself as a universal (Zizek, 2002:160-1).

However, concrete universality should not be seen as the natural process for the symptom. Generally this symptom is swept up in fantasy and ideology; it is attributed as a fault of the other who has stolen fullness and thus Jouissance from the subject. Zizek suggests that for change to occur, we need to break with the fantasy which holds the symptom at bay and come to view the symptom as the true universal; concrete universality.

However, there is another factor at work in muting in the effect of the symptom. That factor is the super-ego. The super-ego, in Lacanian terms differs from Freud’s original conception. Freud maintained that the super-ego helped to keep the id in check and maintain a balanced ego. In contrast Lacan considered that the super-ego is not only the subject’s ‘moral’ or normative conscience, but more productively an unconscious site of enjoyment/perversion. Thus where Freud fundamentally conceived the unconscious to be an area of resistance to law, Lacan regards the unconscious, through the super-ego, to be the very place of compliance; one does not battle to follow the law, instead the subject enjoys the submission to the normative through the surplus enjoyment of the super-ego.

In the Lacanian conception, the super-ego is the obscene supplement to the symbolic law; it is the guilt/surplus enjoyment which presses the subject to believe. In the process of subjectification, the subject has made the (forced) choice away from Jouissance and into language. Although pure Jouissance is not attainable after subjectification, this impossibility is forgotten. The subject represses the initial negation, the impossibility of achieving fullness; that we never had the thing in the first place. However, the super-ego helps to maintain the possibility of symbolic fullness. It presses a ‘guilt’ upon the subject when gaps in the social appear if the subject does not follow the symbolic law. In this sense the super-ego forms an obsence underlying law which operates, and supports, the public law. This operation is seen most vividly at the point of failure of the law (Zizek, 1994:54).

Because we have given up pure Jouissance, the subject receives compensatory surplus enjoyment (jouissance) from the super-ego. However, every time we give in to the demands of the super-ego and social (naturally) is not sutured, we feel even guiltier. The more we submit, the more we need to submit. This is of course very similar to the Marxist notion of surplus-value; the more you have the more you need.

The link between the super-ego and the symptom is best considered through the complementary influence of ideological fantasy in maintaining the consistency of the social. Both the super-ego and ideological fantasy act to attempt to construct the positivity of the social. The super-ego pushes the subject towards the prospect of wholeness, a reminder of Jouissance in the form of jouissance. Ideological fantasy (fantasy, the symbolic form of the imaginary, provides a backdrop for ideology) does not conceal the true, positive nature of the social, but rather presents the social as positive, a constitutive illusion that maintains the consistency of the symbolic order.

Thus both ideology and the super-ego work to domesticate the threat of the symptom. The symptom is evidence of the false relationship between the universal and the particular, the inescapable bar between the signifier and the signified. The super-ego demands that the symptom be tended to and repaired. This demand prevents the subject from uncovering the constitutive nature of the symptom. The super-ego makes the subject want to domesticate the symptom, to convince ourselves and others that it is fixable, a temporary aberration, rather than a concrete universal.

The operation of the super-ego is such that the demand of the symptom is be enjoyed; it suggests the prospect of suture, but also keeps a distance from this (impossible) fullness and hence the prospect of revealing concrete universality. Thus instead of viewing absolute poverty as the constitutive symptom of capitalist economics, we give to charity to delay our guilt. However, this is not a productive strategy for the subject or the symptom. The subject can not escape from the super-ego; the more they submit the more demands are taken on.

Herein lays the crucial link between ideological fantasy and the super-ego. Rather than taking on the demands of the super-ego to suture the social, the subject can turn to ideology and in particular, ideological fantasy. Ideological fantasy operates by externalising the cause of the symptom. The more the super-ego demands, the greater the need for ideological fantasy; however the demands of the super-ego can be avoided by transferring them into the realm of ideology.

Thus the super-ego and ideological fantasy work together to domesticate the destructive consequences of the symptom. Both show that the nature of belief is not rational, but rather belief is constructed through meanings which resonate with a particular economy of pleasure, be it from the super-ego or ideology. Thus how does one reveal the concrete universal and the true nature of the symptom? Is it possible to produce evidence that reveals the constitutive nature of the symptom? E.g. economic evidence that absolute poverty is required for western wealth. No. Rather it is at this time, as Zizek suggests in the Sublime Object of Ideology (p.49), that we will see that an ideology really has its hold.

Ideology only really has a grip when we see no distance between it and reality; ideology is reality. Thus when evidence comes up which is counter-intuitive that is when we see ideology at play. This cycle rarely leads to true action being taken. The super-ego sacrifice symbolises the fetishist nature of belief; I know this will not fix it, but all the same I believe it will.

Although the super-ego demand is more beneficial for a cause in the short-term (at least here attention is paid to the symptom), ultimately both the super-ego and ideology fail to invoke change. The super-ego prevents the subject from acting against the symptom. What is required for social change is for the phantasmatic system to be broken that presents the symptom as an impediment (using the systematic properties super-ego/ideology) and reveals it as a condition of the system.

Thus, given the forces lining up against the presented of the symptom as the concrete universal, it is difficult to conceive of the concrete universal occurs at all. However, were the symptom to be presented for what it is, the constitutive exception to the social, we would have entered the realm of concrete universality. Concrete universality is brought about by the gap that the symptom opens up. Where the symptom is the gap between the universal and the particular, concrete universality is the gap between the universal and its symptom (Zizek, 2006:30). As such it reveals the truth of the universal; the universal is failure.

The distinction here between the symptom and concrete universality is a subtle one. Where the symptom reveals the failure of the abstract universal, concrete universality takes on this failure as the true universal, providing a kind of negative suture. The ideas of a fourth element providing a suture or tying a knot is usually associated with the sinthome. Concrete universality thus shows that the failure of the universal is not an obstacle to its construction, but more accurately the very condition of its formation; it is the outside which allows the inside to form.

If we apply this theorem to capitalism, the false (abstract) universal would be the idea of capitalism as ‘natural’ and ‘objective’, the particular would be capitalism as an economic system, the symptom would be the extreme poverty it creates, and the concrete universal is the point at which capitalism encounters itself as its opposite and discovers that this poverty is not an impediment to its formation, but rather the truth of capitalism itself. As such the concrete universal allows remains as a stain on the abstract universal; it always threatens to break through and reveal itself.

Therefore, if one accepts-as is suggested in the psychoanalytic process- that this symptom is not an impediment to the fullness of the social/abstract universality, but rather a condition of its existence, then we have entered the realm of concrete universality. Thus concrete universality provides a fourth which, in a dialectically negative manner, provides a suture to the social (Zizek, 2000b:235). Thus politically, it is the element that should be identified with. Witness the recent pro-immigrations protests in America. The main banner held by the immigrant protesters was ‘We are America’. Here the protesters appeal has taken the form of concrete universality. The immigration (alien) workers have been under attack in the United States as an impediment to the fullness of the social- as a source of crime, taking jobs etc. However, what the workers are trying to suggest is that they are a necessary condition of U.S society, and should be treated as such. The workers perform a major role in taking the underclass jobs that maintain the American economy; without them the economy would fall. Therefore the immigrants are a condition, not impediment to the system. Hence the appeal ‘We are America’.

Democracy, and the democratic revolution, is a good example of concrete universality. Here the symptom of feudal societies, the problem with dealing with a multitude of demands under a single banner, was elevated from an obstacle to the fundamental principle of society (Zizek, 2000a:93-4). However, democracy has since turned into an empty signifier in itself; an abstract universal filled with meaning which are not necessarily concurrent with the democratic theme. Ultimately it is the economy which produces this distortion. Therefore it should be the economic while is the primary arena for democratic intervention. However, I do not believe that this can occur in the manner in which Laclau suggests, through chains of equivalence, even if Laclau desired anti-capitalist change, which he does not (Laclau, 2000c:206); the power of the economy is simply too strong.

Given the power of the economy, as well as ideological fantasy and the super-ego, efforts to present the symptom as such require a much radical approach; the act. Identification with concrete universality is similar to the political act, in that it suspends the symbolic law and reopens the abyss of the social. This suspension can only come from the place of the impossibility of the social; the real.

In this case I suggest that we should not view the symptom as a passive effect of hegemonic attempts at universalism, but rather a productive/destructive social force in its own right. It is only when the symptom becomes active, universal in its own right, that it is likely to become a concrete universal and pass to the act, provided that it can break up the fantasy which holds the universal to its place.

I suggest this rather that the randomness of Zizek’s political act. I believe that while such an act may be successful in a clinical sense, in the political world modifications are required. This is not to suggest that the basic formula of the act is different (to re-reveal the gap in the social; the negation of the negation of the negation), but that it need not be necessarily violent and directionless as Zizek suggests.

Yes, for political change to occur the underlying fantasy of the universal must be broken up through the act, but I believe that a post-act ideology is also required. The effectiveness of the act lies with its ability to break fantasy. Without this, the naked effect of the symptom through the trauma of the real is more likely to entrench fantasy; this entrenchment occurred in the 9/11 attacks; here the anxiety of the real did not produce a dislocatory change, but rather a repression deeper into fantasy. I believe the crucial point, is whether an alternative ideology is available onto which to transfer the anxiety of the real. The subject cannot exist in a state of trauma or dislocation; a supporting ideology, or ideologies while always be sort. This is where I believe Laclau’s work can be most productively combined with Zizek’s.

One of Laclau’s strongest, and most pertinent, criticisms of Zizek is that he holds no specific new imaginary for the Left; he simply states that he is anti-capitalist. In contrast Laclau contends that he is a pragmatist; he is not anti-capitalist, he would be happy to see the advent of a new Leftist universalism to counter the currently hegemonic right-wing ideology. This universalism would be orientated around the absorption of various Left-orientated particular demands and an ideology of contingency based around the premises of radical democracy.

Instead, Laclau emphasises the need to present a positive social imaginary for the reconstruction of society, rather than just negative demands which contrast to the existing order (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985:189). Laclau terms this the difference between a ‘strategy of opposition’ and a ‘strategy of construction of a new order’ (ibid: 189). In his opinion any strategy which takes the former route is ‘condemned to marginality’ (ibid: 189). It is this approach that Laclau attributes to Zizek, claiming that Zizek’s political critique without imaginary is simply empty talk. Laclau goes on to say that because of this emptiness, Zizek’s;

‘ thought is not organised around a truly political reflection but is, rather, a psychoanalytic discourse which draws its examples from the politico-ideological field’ (Laclau, 2000a:289)

Zizek of course rejects Laclau’s presentation of his work as politically impotent and reverses the allegation to Laclau’s resignation to partial changes within the predominant system. Zizek wants to risk the impossible, to go the act without guarantee. While this might be the most productive strategy for achieving the act (rather than being held back by fantasy), I believe that the act itself is politically ineffective if there is no alternative imaginary following it. This imaginary is not a new utopian universal, but it is a better alternative that before the act. In this case I suggest that before attempting to break up capitalism, an alternative needs to be found, an alternative that is not utopian, but rather better fits in with the democratic ethos of Laclau’s attempted universalism.

Therefore, while it is only the work of Zizek, through the identification with the symptom, concrete universality and ultimately the act that can bring the radical change required to restore the democratic ethos to the economy, the value of Laclau’s radical democratic ideology cannot be ignored. As a result, the act cannot be seen as a stand alone solution to political change. Although it is the most powerful tool in producing political change, the act is rather lacking when it comes to producing progressive change. Consequently, as well as the act, the Left does need to develop a new universal; one that fully takes integrates the economy. Although I believe that Laclau is headed in the right direction in seeking to develop this new Leftist universal, he fails to fully integrate the economy and is thus limited to accepting capitalism and making compensatory changes within the order. As well as this political limitation, theoretically, Laclau’s failure to integrate the full Lacanian apparatus, leaves his work limited, compared to Zizek’s, in understanding the fixity of the social order and the process required to dislocate it. Thus, through an integration of Laclau and Zizek, I believe a viable overall political strategy can be found. This strategy requires the Left to break up and move on from capitalism not only through the presentation of various symptoms of capitalism as concrete universals in order to produce an act, but also the Left needs to position itself as a viable ideological alternative on which society can steady itself after the trauma of the real. Without such an alternative I fear that the Left risks becoming politically impotent.

References

Bulter, J., Laclau, E., & Zizek, S. (2000). Contingency, Hegemony, Universality. London: Verso.
Glynos, J., & Stavrakakis, Y. (2003). Encounters of the Real Kind: Sussing Out the Limits of Laclau's Embrace of Lacan. Journal for Lacanian Studies, 1(1), 110-128.
Howarth, D., & Stavrakakis, Y. (2000). Introducing discourse theory and political analysis. In D. Howarth, A. J. Norval & Y. Stavrakakis (Eds.), Discourse theory and Political analysis: Identities, Hegemonies and Social Change. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Kay, S. (2003). Zizek: A Critical Introduction. Cambridge: Polity.
Laclau, E. (2000a). Constructing Universality. In J. Bulter, E. Laclau & S. Zizek (Eds.), Contingency, Hegemony, Universality; Contemporary Dialogues on the Left. London: Verso.
Laclau, E. (2000b). Identity and Hegemony: The Role of Universality in the Consitution of Political Logics. In J. Bulter, E. Laclau & S. Zizek (Eds.), Contingency, Hegemony, University. London: Verso.
Laclau, E. (2000c). Structure, History and the Political. In J. Bulter, E. Laclau & S. Zizek (Eds.), Contingency, Hegemony, Universality; Contemporary Dialogues on the Left. London: Verso.
Laclau, E. (2003). Discourse and Jouissance: A reply to Glynos and Stavrakakis. Journal for Lacanian Studies, 1(2), 278-285.
Laclau, E., & Mouffe, C. (1985). Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a radical democratic politics. London: Verso.
Milovanovic, D. (2004). Borromean Knots, Le Sinthome, and Sense Production in Law. In E. Ragland & D. Milovanovic (Eds.), Lacan: Topologically Speaking. New York: Other Press.
Stavrakakis, Y. (1999). Lacan & the Political. London: Routledge.
Zerilli, L. M. G. (1998). This Universalism Which Is Not One. Diacritics, 28(2), 3-20.
Zizek, S. (1989). The Sublime Object of Ideology. London: Verso.
Zizek, S. (1994). The Metastases of Enjoyment. London: Verso.
Zizek, S. (1999). The Ticklish Subject. London: Verso.
Zizek, S. (2000a). Class Struggle or Postmodernism Yes, Please! In J. Bulter, E. Laclau & S. Zizek (Eds.), Contingency, Hegemony, Universality: Contemporary Dialogues on the Left. London: Verso.
Zizek, S. (2000b). Da Capo senza Fine. In J. Bulter, E. Laclau & S. Zizek (Eds.), Contingency, Hegemony and Universality. London: Verso.
Zizek, S. (2002). For they know not what they do: Enjoyment as a political factor (2nd ed.). London: Verso.
Zizek, S. (2006). The Parallex View. London: Verso.

Environmentalism and The symptom

The environment, or better put, nature performs a dual role in a discursive formation. Nature is, naturally enough, represented discursively. The representation of nature, from a wild, untamed romantic force in pre-modernism to the modernist scientific approach, is of vital political importance. It is in this sense that we can talk of nature as universal. But nature also acts a real force; the hegemonic presentation of nature, the representation of the natural, is one of the modalities in which we encounter the real. This is because of the gap between nature and the natural, much like reality and the real, every attempted representation of nature will never be able to fully represent the natural.

Symptoms of nature occur as the necessary exception caused by the gap between nature and the natural; if- in our modernist era- nature is under man’s control than natural disasters are symptomatic. However, this is a different kind of symptom from that which I have previously discussed. The twist is that nature operates, as the real- or more accurately the real real- as a whole system independent of signification. Therefore the symptom does not necessarily develop as a result of the exclusion necessary to constitute the universality of the system. This is not to suggest that such a symptomatic process does not exist; natural disasters would not necessarily be a symptom under an alternative conception of nature. Likewise, the current conception of nature as a passive part of human society produces the symptom of production related climate change. However, a natural symptom can develop, taking the role of an exception to the universal, without being constitutive. In this sense a natural symptom is performed rather than symbolised; this performance is a dislocation of the real.

Of course, this dislocation can only exist in discourse, but more than this nature has the potential to change the very parameters of the discursive environment. Not only can there be changes in nature, but also in the natural. For example, while global production pollution did not reach levels that changed the natural, climate change was not a symptom of capitalism; nature was not affected. However, as climate change occurred (and so did the natural), then a symptom was produced, both of capitalism and nature.

Thus while capitalism’s greatest strength is it’s ability to internalise its symptoms, to commodify the constitutive exception, in this case concrete universality is real and active; the truth is out there and it cannot be avoided. However, it can be put off. Again this takes familiar form; repression, ideological externalisation, or super-ego enjoyment. Even if acid rain is all that falls and the polar ice-caps melt, this is no guarantee that the discursive conditions will change. Most likely though is that these conditions will produce a dislocation as the real breaks through fantasy. Thus, perhaps more than any other driver nature has the potential to break up capitalism.

The symptom and Poverty

My despair (or super-ego enjoyment, at least originally) at global poverty has been the driving force ethical force behind my study. Poverty, absolute poverty that is, is a symptom of capitalism. Its main benefit in terms of provoking anti-capitalist change is that it cannot be commodified, particularly if one takes into account environmentalist critique. Although it is in the best interests of capital on one level to have more wealthy consumers, on the other it is necessary that the workers, and the reserve army of unemployed, stay poor; too poor to live. This is not to say that some will not get richer; just that inequality is a natural and necessary part of this system. The commodification of poverty is also an environmental impossibility- the earth is very unlikely to be able to support an affluent global population.

Yes, this is true, but it is not impossible to commodify the image of poverty, and that is what is happening; charity bracelets, the hole RED and Make Poverty History campaigns and fair-trade; these are capitalism’s responses to poverty. Poverty, thanks to the celebrity appeal is beginning to infiltrate the realm of the super-ego. But, as I noted in The Symptom and the Super-ego, the enjoyment of super-ego is not a productive force in producing change.

Capitalism is by far the dominant global system. As such, it is a multi-faceted system operating in infinite modalities. Thus it is difficult to identify a single dominant universal of capital, or a single symptom, or even to categorize what is symptomatic in capitalism and what is simply arbitrary failure. Perhaps the most hegemonic universal image of capitalism is the market. The market- the invisible hand which directs the self-interested activities of individuals to the benefit of the collective- is presented as the ultimate natural, neutral and objective force. Even those who do not submit to the economics of the pure market do not debate the naturality of the market, the simply question the ethics of its effect; ‘Should we tame the market?’

The market as the capitalist universal is not to suggest that it is the abstract universal of capitalism. Likewise, to suggest a single symptom to capitalism is not to make it the only symptom. However, I believe that the most ethically demanding symptom of capitalism is poverty. Poverty is a symptom of the market; it is presented as the failure of the market, but its true function is as a constitutive condition of the markets’ success. But it is also a symptom of the general ethos of capitalism; death and hunger contrast with wealth and opulence.

However, it is wrong to classify poverty as a passive symptom. As a have suggested in The Symptom and the Superego, the symptom is not simply a passive effect, but rather a force of the repressed Real. Thus a symptom has the potential to form its own Universal. This takes our argumentation to in a new direction. Although Zizek suggests that there is nothing particular in the content of the symptom that is of political importance (it is the gap that the symptom opens up-concrete universality- that is of political importance), the symptom becomes more powerful and active once if it is unified. This is not to suggest that the symptom should take the place of the previous universal, that it would be any better, that its fantasy would be benign.

Rather, my argument is that the symptom is much more likely to dislocate the universal if it is active, instead of simply a passive effect. In this way the symptom is much more likely to break up ideology than forces within the ideology itself.

The symptom, the super-ego and ideological fantasy

Last week I had an interesting discussion with my fellow psychoanalytic scholar Wendy, which has prompted me to believe that I have missed an important piece of the theoretical puzzle in my writings thus far. That piece is the super-ego. In this short essay I seek to discuss the relationship between the super-ego and the symptom. Of particular interest is the manner in which ideological fantasy works in conjunction with the super-ego to conceal the true nature of the symptom.

Firstly, what is the super-ego? It is important to note that Lacan’s definition of the term differs from Freud’s original conception. Freud maintained that the super-ego helped to keep the id in check and maintain a balanced ego. In contrast Lacan considered that the super-ego is not only the subject’s ‘moral’ or normative conscience, but more productively an unconscious site of enjoyment/perversion. Thus where Freud fundamentally conceived the unconscious to be an area of resistance to law, Lacan regards the unconscious, through the super-ego, to be the very place of compliance; one does not battle to follow the law, instead the subject enjoys the submission to the normative through the surplus enjoyment of the super-ego.

In the Lacanian conception, the super-ego is the obscene supplement to the symbolic law; it is the guilt/surplus enjoyment which allows the subject to believe. In the process of subjectification, the subject has made the (forced) choice away from Jouissance and into language. Although pure Jouissance is not attainable after subjectification, this impossibility is forgotten. The subject represses the initial negation, the impossibility of achieving fullness; that we never had the thing in the first place. However, the super-ego helps to maintain the possibility of symbolic fullness. It presses a ‘guilt’ upon the subject when gaps in the social appear if the subject does not follow the symbolic law.

Because we have given up pure Jouissance, the subject receives compensatory surplus enjoyment (jouissance) from the super-ego. However, every time we give in to the demands of the super-ego and social (naturally) is not sutured, we feel even guiltier. The more we submit, the more we need to submit. This is of course very similar to the Marxist notion of surplus-value; the more you have the more you need.

The link between the super-ego and the symptom is best considered through the complementary influence of ideological fantasy in maintaining the consistency of the social. Both the super-ego and ideological fantasy act to attempt to construct the positivity of the social. The super-ego pushes the subject towards the prospect of wholeness, a reminder of Jouissance in the form of jouissance. Ideological fantasy (fantasy, the symbolic form of the imaginary, provides a backdrop for ideology) does not conceal the true, positive nature of the social, but rather presents the social as positive, a constitutive illusion that maintains the consistency of the symbolic order.

Thus both ideology and the super-ego work to domesticate the threat of the symptom. The symptom is evidence of the false relationship between the universal and the particular, the inescapable bar between the signifier and the signified. The super-ego demands that the symptom be tended to and repaired. This demand prevents the subject from uncovering the constitutive nature of the symptom. The super-ego makes the subject want to domesticate the symptom, to convince ourselves and others that it is fixable, a temporary aberration, rather than a concrete universal.

The operation of the super-ego is such that the demand of the symptom is be enjoyed; it suggests the prospect of suture, but also keeps a distance from this (impossible) fullness and hence the prospect of revealing concrete universality. Thus instead of viewing absolute poverty as the constitutive symptom of capitalist economics, we give to charity to delay our guilt. However, this is not a productive strategy for the subject or the symptom. The subject can not escape from the super-ego; the more they submit the more demands are taken on.

Herein lays the crucial link between ideological fantasy and the super-ego. Rather than taking on the demands of the super-ego to suture the social, the subject can turn to ideology and in particular, ideological fantasy. Ideological fantasy operates by externalising the cause of the symptom. The more the super-ego demands, the greater the need for ideological fantasy; however the demands of the super-ego can be avoided by transferring them into the realm of ideology.

Like the super-ego, ideology also keeps a distance from suture. A common ideological response to absolute global poverty is to externalise the cause; a frequent site for such transference is ‘corrupt’ foreign governments. Another familiar approach is to give in to the power of the system; ‘How will anything I do make a difference?’ The influence of ideology does not mean that the super-ego demand is avoided; often it is just softened; hence the compatible super-ego driven response ‘I just do what I can within the given constraints’.

Thus the super-ego and ideological fantasy work together to domesticate the destructive consequences of the symptom. Both show that the nature of belief is not rational, but rather belief is constructed through meanings which resonate with a particular economy of pleasure, be it from the super-ego or ideology. Thus how does one reveal the concrete universal and the true nature of the symptom? Is it possible to produce evidence that reveals the constitutive nature of the symptom? E.g. economic evidence that absolute poverty is required for western wealth. No. Rather it is at this time, as Zizek suggests in the Sublime Object of Ideology (p.49), that we will see that an ideology really has its hold.

Ideology only really has a grip when we see no distance between it and reality; ideology is reality. Thus when evidence comes up which is counter-intuitive that is when we see ideology at play. Thus, even if evidence strongly suggested that poverty was constitutive of capitalism, the classic ideological response would be to suggest, ‘Yes, but that is okay because we have worked hard for our success’, or ‘That is only because we didn’t start equally, if only we could go back…’. The latter approach is often combined with super-ego guilt; giving to charity, buying fair-trade coffee. However, this cycle rarely leads to true action being taken. The super-ego sacrifice symbolises the fetishist nature of belief; I know this will not fix it, but all the same I believe it will.

Although the super-ego demand is more beneficial for a cause in the short-term (at least here attention is paid to the symptom), ultimately both the super-ego and ideology fail to invoke change. The super-ego prevents the subject from acting against the symptom. What is required for social change is for the fantasmatic system to be broken that presents the symptom as an impediment (using the systematic properties super-ego/ideology) and reveals it as a condition of the system.

The identification with concrete universality is similar to the political act, in that it suspends the symbolic law and reopens the abyss of the social. This suspension can only come from the real. However, the effect of the real is felt only through the symbolic e.g. the symptom, or other forms of dislocation. In this case I suggest that we should not view the symptom as a passive effect of hegemonic attempts at universalism, but rather a productive/destructive social force in its own right. I am thinking here of those who experience or have fought out of absolute poverty fighting back against the universal (e.g. Islam), or the power of nature in the form of climate change. Should these symptoms not be seen as active returns of the repressed real, of that which have been excluded for the universal to be constituted?

I suggest this rather that the randomness of Zizek’s political act. I believe that while such an act may be successful in a clinical sense, in the political world, a distinction need to be made. This is not to suggest that the basic formula of the act is different (to re-reveal the gap in the social; the negation of the negation of the negation), but that it need not be necessarily violent and directionless as Zizek suggests. Yes, it must traverse the fantasy, but I believe that it can have a coherent vision. This vision very well may not be able to come from within the current hegemonic universal, but instead lies with the constitutive exception of the social. It is only if the symptom comes to life and traverses the fantasy of its construction that a productive political act can be achieved.

A reply?

The sinthome is not a positive identity that can be located, but is rather a performance of itself. Therefore although the sinthome has an undoubted influence on symbolisation, it cannot be symbolised itself. Rather, it ‘appears’ every time an identity performs. The big question here for me revolves around the relationship between the three registers; imaginary, symbolic and real (with the sinthome as a fourth), and universality (abstract universal, particular, singular and concrete universality as a fourth). With my recent work on universality, I tend to forget that it is R, S, I that constitutes the basic Lacanian form of the social. In a basic sense, in this formation it is the imaginary that makes the symbolic appear full, even though it can necessarily never be so, as the presence of the real reveals.

I believe that this concept can be translated onto universality. Universality is the process of making the social appear full; hence the intimate relationship between universality, fantasy and jouissance. Therefore, the symbolic is the particular. In the symbolic, no identity is constituted in-itself. Rather identities are formed by reference to something outside of them; they can never be full. This negativity is the driving force of the social. Ideological fantasy, the symbolic component of the imaginary, has the role of presenting the symbolic as full. This occurs through a hegemonic abstraction, both in presenting a particular as full and externalising the symptom to an external cause.

The symptom is that while reveals the presence of the real. Of course the real is outside of the symbolic and can only be seen in its effects. As such it is an effect without (known) cause. This effect- of showing the limits of the discursive- is the symptom/singular of universality. If one accepts-as is suggested in the psychoanalytic process- that this symptom is not an impediment to the fullness of the social/abstract universality, but rather a condition of its existence, we enter the realm of concrete universality. Thus concrete universality provides a fourth which, in a dialectically negative manner, provides a suture to the social. Thus politically, it is thus element that should be identified with. Witness the recent pro-immigrations protests in America. The main banner held by the immigrant protesters was ‘We are America’. Here the protesters appeal has taken the form of concrete universality. The immigration (alien) workers have been under attack in the United States as an impediment to the fullness of the social- as a source of crime, taking jobs etc. However, what the workers are trying to suggest is that they are a necessary condition of U.S society, and should be treated as such. The workers perform a major role in taking the underclass jobs that maintain the American economy; without them the economy would fall. Therefore the immigrants are a condition, not impediment to the system. Hence the appeal ‘We are America’.

Having developed this link between universality and the registers, I have rather lost my way on the final link; between concrete universality and the sinthome. My basic point is that both provides a suturing role, but in a radically different way. I am still trying to get my head around the idea of the topological approach. I do have some readings stacked up which I can hopefully get through by tomorrow (Thursday).


Again I am left with the thought, What are the political implications of the sinthome? This mainly relates back to the problem of the limits to discourse. As Laclau notes, dislocations ( the external limit) can only show themselves through internal failings. Does this suggest that it is the discursive itself which is responsible for the failure of a discourse. Therefore from this we could suggest that it is the failure of the universal, in the symptom that reveals the presence of the sinthome, or at least the performance of the sinthome, much like the real. But unlike the real, which is fully implicit in the failure of the discursive, the sinthome reveals the structure itself. Thus we come very close to concrete universality; it is through the failure of the universal that the truth of the universal is revealed. However, the concrete universal is well imbedded in the symbolic. The sinthome, instead is a structure, or at least a structuring effect that is only performed. Yet, importantly from a discursive point of view, it is the sinthome that also reveals the limits of our discourse. Again though, we must distinguish between the real and the sinthome. While the real reveals the limits of signification (in that every universality must necessarily excludes element to constitute itself; the symptom), the sinthome is implicit in the very structuring of this exclusion.

So, from the alternative perspective could we say that it is the sinthome that it structuring the discursive and introducing limits? I am not sure how this would work, given that the sinthome is outside of signification. The question I am driven to ask is ‘Where would the sinthome come from then?’ But, as you note, this kind of question suggests an impossible positive positioning to the sinthome, and I believe I am roughly back where I started!

What is the sinthome? (and where is it?)

In my last piece of work, I was a little unsure of the distinction between the sinthome, singular, symptom and concrete universality. In this essay, I seek to further my definitions of these concepts, and the distinctions between them. I would also like to expand on the political connotations of dialectical materialism, from which the aforementioned concepts stem. In particular I believe the sinthome- as the furthest stage of dialectical materialism- is of political interest. While the sinthome is undoubtedly of political interest, I am still not sure whether the concept leads itself to progressive politics, in particular anti-capitalist change.

The singular and symptom are very similar, if not abstractly the same. There is a greater conceptual difference between the symptom and sinthome, but they are part of the same notion. Despite the similarity between the singular and symptom, the singular is not a term often used by Zizek. The singular is most often used in The Ticklish Subject (Zizek, 1999), and is examined in Sarah Kay’s introduction to Zizek’s work (Kay, 2003). Indeed in The Ticklish Subject, Zizek sometimes substitutes the term ‘individual’ for singular, to describe the remainder of the universalising process;

‘We should therefore consider three, not just two, levels: the empty UNIVERSAL, the PARTICULAR content which hegemonizes the empty Universal, and the INDIVIDUAL, the symptomatic excess which undermines this hegemonic content… One can see immediately in what sense the individual is the dialectical unity of Universal and Particular: the individual bears witness to the gap between the Universal and Particular’ (Zizek, 1999:181, emphasis in original).

This definition of the singular/individual is very similar to that of the symptom;

‘ The symptom is, strictly speaking, a particular element which subverts its own universal, a species subverting its own genus’ (Zizek, 1989:21).

Therefore the singular/symptom arises as the excess which is a necessary condition of the universal. Because the universal is always false, it is always a hegemonic abstraction from a particular, there will necessarily be an element left out. The singular/symptom is this element and thus it reveals the gap between the universal and the particular.

The difference between the singular and symptom is abstract. When discussing the symptom, compared to the singular/individual, Zizek considers a greater attachment to jouissance; the role of enjoyment in the constitutive exception of universality. Therefore the symptom appears to be a more complete term than the singular.

The symptom is also more enigmatic. The symptom appears as a coded object (Lacan originally thought symptoms were produced with an eye to interpretation), not necessarily the straight opposite of the abstract universal, as with the singular (Milovanovic, 2004:373). As an illustration, with the universal capitalist market, the singular may be market failure, but the symptom is more likely to be harder to decipher. It is for this reason that the first stage of the psychoanalytic cure is the interpretation of symptoms. A recent example of a symptom of the capitalist market is the failure of the North Shore City Council to protect the Long-Bay Okura Great Park, despite overwhelming support for the concept. Here, the market is seen to fail to meet the needs of the people, but this failure is not interpreted by most as a market failure; the cause is attributed to another factor, in this circumstance, the council.

Thus we see the intimate relationship between the symptom and ideology. As the symptom is the coded failure of the universal and ideological fantasy is that which protect the subject from that failure. Ideology operates by presenting the social as a positive entity, devoid of symptoms. In order to do this, any symptom that reveals itself is externalised; the symptom is presented as an impediment caused by an uncontrollable external factor, or a fixable internal impediment. The key to ideology is to avoid presenting the symptom for what it is; the return of the real, of what has to be repressed for the (false) universal to constitute itself as a universal (Zizek, 2002:160-1).

Concrete universality is brought about by the gap that the symptom opens up. Where the symptom is the gap between the universal and the particular, concrete universality is the gap between the universal and its symptom (Zizek, 2006:30). As such it reveals the truth of the universal; the universal is failure. Concrete universality can be seen as equivalent to the negation of the negation in dialectical materialism. Concrete universality thus shows that the failure of the universal is not an obstacle to its construction, but more accurately the very condition of its formation; it is the outside which allows the inside to form.

If we apply this theorem to capitalism, the false (abstract) universal would be the idea of capitalism as ‘natural’ and ‘objective’, the particular would be capitalism as an economic system, the symptom would be the extreme poverty it creates, and the concrete universal is the point at which capitalism encounters itself as its opposite and discovers that this poverty is not an impediment to its formation, but rather the truth of capitalism itself. As such the concrete universal allows remains as a stain on the abstract universal; like the symptom, it always threatens to break through and reveal itself.

The distinction here between the symptom and concrete universality is a subtle one. Where the symptom reveals the failure of the abstract universal, concrete universality takes on this failure as the true universal, providing a kind of negative suture. The ideas of a fourth element providing a suture or tying a knot is usually associated with the sinthome.

The sinthome is intimately related to the symptom and concrete universality, but for me it is a much more difficult concept to define. At times the sinthome is presented as an extension of the symptom and at others a much bigger concept, almost a mega-symptom that lies outside of language. The common definition is that of the sinthome as a knot that ties together Lacan’s topology of the three registers; imaginary, symbolic and real. However, these definitions tend to focus on the sinthome as an element unique to the subject. I would like to see if the concept of the sinthome, like the social symptom, can be socially extended to become a political concept, in as kind of a dialectical materialist equivalent of a social imaginary; that which structures most before it.

The sinthome was developed during Lacan’s move into topological theory. The sinthome comes from the same species as the symptom, the definition of which became increasingly divergent with Lacan’s development. Indeed, Ragland and Milovanovic, in their introduction to Lacan: Topologically Speaking (2004:xiv) suggest the symptom was respelled sinthome to recapture its French medieval particularity. Thus rather than the symptom and sinthome being different concepts, the sinthome is simply an extension of the symptom. The difference is their relationship to language. Lacan’s topological theory was an attempt to move beyond the symbolic, in a linguistic conception of the symptom, to an unconscious one; the symptom as sinthome. Thus Thurston defines the sinthome as;

‘ The sinthome thus designates a signifying formulation beyond analysis, a kernel of enjoyment immune to the efficacy of the symbolic’ (Thurston, 2005).

Likewise, Zizek considers;

‘ Symptom as sinthome is a certain signifying formation penetrated with enjoyment; it is a signifier as a bearer of jouissance…The symptom as sinthome is literally our only substance, the only positive support for our being, the only point that gives consistency to the subject’ (Zizek, 1989:75).

As such the sinthome provides the fourth ring to the Lacanian triadic formation; the symbolic, the real, the imaginary. It is the ring of the sinthome that ties a knot through these three rings and holds them together. Without the suture of the sinthome the subject is lack; it is nakedly exposed to the lack in the Other (Milovanovic, 2004:373). Therefore, if one is to break the sinthome, as the organisation of the subject’s jouissance, the subject itself is likely to fall apart.

However, at this point there are important distinctions between symptom and the sinthome. The symptom has much the same role in holding the subject together, in that the subject loves his symptom move than himself, but the symptom is still a symbolic phenomenon. The symptom organises the subjects’ enjoyment, and as such gets caught up in fantasy, a symbolic concept. However, the sinthome lies beyond the symbolic. Thus even when the subject has gone through the fantasy, the sinthome remains (Zizek, 1989:74). Thus we see that the sinthome is a stage removed from the symptom. In this sense, the symptom is the symbolic eruption of the sinthome, which lies outside of language. When one speaks of the symptom of the return of the repressed, this repressed is the sinthome.

Thus the passage from symptom to sinthome resembles the psychoanalytic process. First the symptom has to be interpreted, then the subject has to traverse the fantasy. However, the symptom still remains. Thus the final stage in the process is the identification with the sinthome. This is of course very similar to the identification with symptom described earlier, where the subject comes to realise that the symptom is not a barrier to the universal, but is the universal itself, in its concrete form. However, the question to be asked now is whether the symptom, in the form of the sinthome, can still be of political value, considering that it exists outside of the order of signification.

Because the sinthome is outside of language, it exists only in the unconscious, in jouissance, in the body, it creates a large issue with the transfer from the subject to the object. This movement, from meta-psychology to politics, is one must often taken on by critics of psychoanalysis (Johnston, 2004). Zizek of course rejects this dualism, discarding the notion of individual psychology (which is created in the universal order of language), and the collective (which exists only in as much as the subject treats it as it exists). For Zizek there is no interior without an exterior element and thus no exterior without interior. Therefore the libidinal economy and the social-political economy are intimately linked; one cannot be understood without the other (ibid).

However, the sinthome strains this dualism. The sinthome exists outside of language; it is not a metaphor ( like language), but rather structure itself (Ragland & Milovanovic, 2004). Language, the symbolic universal, is the link between the subject and the object and thus the sinthome, as the not which ties together the subject’s organisation of jouissance, appears to break with the subject/object dualism.

However, if we re-examine the psychoanalytic relationship between the materialism of jouissance/ sinthome and the idealism of the symbolic, we find that both terms are intertwined in each other; the form an identity. Thus, for our purposes it is the lack in the symbolic which creates the fault which the sinthome sutures, and the materialist jouissance which structures the symbolic and brings about this suturing.

Therefore the sinthome cannot be simply unique to the subject and independent of meaning. The jouissance of the sinthome runs through the symbolic system, even if it is largely unknown. The sinthome is thus the ultimate factor in dialectical materialism; it is what remains after all else has been worked through. Therefore the effects of the sinthome permeate throughout the symbolic system. These results are shown in the various symptoms. Thus we can start to think the political consequences of the sinthome.

This has major theoretical consequences. Instead of thinking of the universal signifying order excluding and repressing something that returns in the form of the symptom, it is the sinthome that is pressuring the symbolic and producing symptoms. So where does the sinthome come from? As noted, it is the knot which is holding together the three registers (Imaginary, symbolic and real). Here I have gone too far in suggesting that it is the registers of the real in which the sinthome resides. It is not. Instead the sinthome sutures the fault in any or all of the registers. As such it results from the interplay of all three. Again then, we have a dualism. The sinthome is impacting in on the universe of signification, but the particular interaction of the symbolic and imaginary in creating this universe (and the real exclusions that are necessary for any sense of signification and universality) creates the need for and form of the sinthome.

The sinthome, as the fundamental organiser of jouissance, is the essential political factor. Although it may not be a signifying system itself (the sinthome is outside of language, again, it is not a metaphor, it is structure), but it is what ultimately supports the system. The sinthome enables us to understand why it is so difficult to achieve change, even when the subject is aware of the need for it. This is the difficulty for the anti-capitalist movement. It appears to be impossible to even think outside of capitalism, or think the possibility of change; such is the power of the organisation of jouissance in the capitalist system. Indeed even Zizek believes that at the moment anti-capitalist change is impossible (Zizek, 1999:352).

What then would make change possible? I believe that Zizek would suggest that that grip of jouissance is too strong in capitalism to promote change through modes of signification. What of the psychoanalytic process? This suggests that it is not enough to interpret symptoms, or to get affective distance by traversing the fantasy, but rather the final step is to identify with the symptom/sinthome.

What would this entail politically? To identify with the symptom is not to suggest that it is the best way of life e.g. there is something particularly special about living in poverty, but rather that the very instance of this symptom reveals the truth of the failed universal. As such the subject should identify with this failure as that which gives consistency to the subject/system. Without the symptom/sinthome, the system would collapse. Without poverty, capitalism would collapse.

I however have doubt about the benefits of such identification. An optimistic view would suggest that humanity would be horrified by their collective responsibility in the capitalist symptom. But equally, is it not likely that the response would be, Oh, well, their loss our gain? However, this would require a radical reshuffling of the capitalist fantasy. Identification with the symptom would certainly produce change, but of what nature I am not sure.


References

Johnston, A. (2004). The cynic's fetish: Slavoj Zizek and the dynamics of belief. Journal for the Psychoanalysis of Culture and Society, 9(3), 259.
Kay, S. (2003). Zizek: A Critical Introduction. Cambridge: Polity.
Milovanovic, D. (2004). Borromean Knots, Le Sinthome, and Sense Production in Law. In E. Ragland & D. Milovanovic (Eds.), Lacan: Topologically Speaking. New York: Other Press.
Ragland, E., & Milovanovic, D. (2004). Introduction: Topolologically Speaking. In E. Ragland & D. Milovanovic (Eds.), Lacan: Topolologically Speaking. New York: Other Press.
Thurston, L. (2005). Sinthome. In D. Evans (Ed.), Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis.
Zizek, S. (1989). The Sublime Object of Ideology. London: Verso.
Zizek, S. (1999). The Ticklish Subject. London: Verso.
Zizek, S. (2002). For they know not what they do: Enjoyment as a political factor (2nd ed.). London: Verso.
Zizek, S. (2006). The Parallex View. London: Verso.