The hole in the whole is the whole

The Universal is a vital concept in Slavoj Zizek’s theoretical and political apparatus. Zizek’s universality is neither a neutral place holder, nor positive and objective. The twin rejections of the traditional notions of universality give Zizek license to rehabilitate the concept of universality through the work of Jacques Lacan and Georg Hegel. These philosophers share a belief in the negativity of the social which prevents a full universal from occurring.

The key to Zizek’s notion of universality is the existence of an exception to the universal. This necessary exception- the singular or symptom- reveals the truth of the ‘abstract universal’. It is this side of the universal, known as the concrete universal, which can be identified with to achieve political change, similar to the psychoanalytic process of identifying with the symptom.

Although one cannot doubt that Lacan is the main influence on Zizek’s thought, Zizek has also re-read Hegel, après-coup to give a political edge to Lacan’s mostly apolitical thought. Likewise, Zizek has re-read Hegel through Lacan to make the former a philosopher of the real (Kay, 2003:17). This political edge is achieved through the Hegelian dialectic, which Zizek has renewed in the name of dialectical materialism.

The common bond between Hegel and Lacan is their belief in the radical negativity which reins at the heart of the social (Kay, 2003:17). This negative ontology occurs because of the nature of the symbolic universe. One cannot have access to things-in-themselves, all knowledge is mediated through the symbolic and therefore a gap, or lack, is introduced into the system. Therefore the signified only has a retroactive influence on the signifier. The play of signifiers creates meanings, however through ideological closure, these meaning are made, retroactively appear natural, as if they have developed naturally from the signifier. This same process is seen with the universal. Although a universal cannot objectively and fully develop, any universal is necessarily false. However, they are not posited this way. Instead a false, or abstract universal, appears to be both natural and universal. If is for this reason that focusing on the contingency and the necessary exclusion of and within the process of universality is politically advantageous.

Consequently the negative ontology of the social is the key focus for Zizek’s thought on universality. For Lacan it means that universality can never be fully constituted in itself. Instead any form of identity has to be abstracted from a particular, and as such must exclude to achieve this abstraction (Zizek, 1999:180). In contrast a positive ontology would create a natural universal, producing natural laws, such as the neo-liberal view of the market. Therefore, what is presented as a universal is an illusion; its truth lies in its exception. This exception is known as the universal singular (Kay, 2003:38-44; Zizek, 1999:188).

The universal singular leads to the concept of concrete universality, which is best exemplified through the Hegelian dialectic. The basic law of dialectics is to search for the exception to the series (Zizek, 2000:241). The dialectic has three stages to it;
- Reflection
- External reflection
- Determine reflection.

In terms of universality, in the first stage (reflection), an identity is posited in itself. We can describe this as abstract universality. Of course it is important to note that this universality is already negated in itself. It is this contradiction ( that the universal is never fully universal) which provides the main stimulus for the dialectical process (Zizek, 2002:42)

External reflection provides a negation of the first negation, in revealing that the universal is not universal, but rather a split particular. As an illustration, human rights maybe presented as a universal concept. However, this universal can never be fully universal; human rights always have to exclude something (Zizek, 1999:103). Therefore, through a negation of the negation, it can be revealed that human rights are not universal, but simply particular. In our current circumstance we could reveal that human rights are not universal, but rather particular to the propertied power elite.

However, it is determinate reflection which is the significant stage for universality. In determinate reflection it is revealed that the second negation, rather than being an impediment to the universal (e.g. we have not quite achieved a notion of universal human rights- but we are getting there), is rather the condition of the universal. Consequently the universal singular is the truth of the universal, of the gap between the universal and the particular (Zizek, 1999:180-1). As a result, it is important not to compare the universal with what it seeks to represent (e.g. Are these really universal human rights?), but rather with that which the abstract universal excludes to constitute itself; concrete universality (Zizek, 2002:160).
It is important to note that Zizek’s concrete universality is not the same as is usually cited from Hegel; that of unity with itself. Rather it is the exclusion within universality to which concrete universality refers, instead of the result of an absolute synthesis (Zizek, 2005:217). The exclusion that occurs within universality is thus the gap between abstract universality and concrete universality (Zizek, 2006:30).

Hence the concrete universal is not the singular in itself, or its gap, but rather the gap that the singular opens up, an inexplicable and uncanny gap between unity and excess; it is a constant stain on the abstract universal (Zizek, 1999:113; 2006:31). Therefore we see that the only possible identity contains a degree of non-identity (Kay, 2003:26).

In determinate reflection, the subject comes to recognise that the element of non-identity, the exclusion within universality which does not correspond with itself and identify with it; take responsibility for it. Therefore determinate reflection gives positive value to external reflection and it is in this sense that political change can be achieved (ibid: 37).

As such, concrete universality can be compared with the symptom (Zizek, 1989:180). Zizek defines as ‘… strictly speaking, a particular element which subverts its own universality’ (ibid :21). However, the symptom does not exist predominantly at the level of meaning. Rather, the symptom is also a real root of enjoyment that returns; the return of the repressed (ibid: 69). Accordingly, the symptom is psychoanalysis’ answer to idealism and Post-structuralism; the real jouissance adds the materialism to dialectical materialism. It is because of the symptom and its associated enjoyment that meanings stick, and universality grips the subject (ibid: 72).

It is through fantasy that we learn to control jouissance and structure our desire (Zizek, 1989:118). Fantasy masks the antagonistic fissure of the social, but is never in itself complete, it always takes its own failure into account. We see this with ideology. Although ideology helps to maintain a sense of ontological consistency, critically it provides a certain distance from the horror of that consistency. In this sense we get jouissance from ideological fantasy, both in the manner in which it provides the subject with fullness and prevents the subject from ever achieving that fullness.

Universality operates in much the same fashion as ideology. Universality exists at both the level of meaning and the level of enjoyment. The fantasmatic background of the level of enjoyment holds together the universal. While it is the empty/master signifier structures the symbolic, the flip side of the symbolic is its structuring of jouissance and desire. Therefore the obscene underside of the master signifier is objet a, which operates as both the cause and logic of desire. It is the cause since it acts to fill the lack in the symbolic, and the logic because objet a becomes the objet of desire. As a result, it is vital to search beyond the symbolic role of the universal, and understand the hidden fantasmatic process which ensures that certain notion’s of universality grip the subject and are thus difficult to dislodge. It is the role of psychoanalytic politics to reveal these hidden process that maintain the universal and political orders (Zizek, 1999:191). Political battles cannot be fought purely at the level of discourse, over the ‘facts’, but must deal with the fantasies that provide the conditions of possibility for these facts (Torfing, 1999:114).

This effect is in operation in the universality of the market in the capitalist system. The market is presented as a universal; it is a natural, objective device that brings maximum wealth and well-being to all. When the market fails to achieve this task, this failure is fantasised as an impediment to the market. The failure, which represents the singular of the universal and shows its contingency, is not considered a condition of the market, but rather something to be fixed; a solution-in-coming. It is fantasy which hides the true, universal (concrete) nature of the market, and prevents the disavowed violence which founds the creation of any universal (Zizek, 2002:33-4).

This constant failure, and thus the constant need for minor alteration in the name of universality provides jouissance in the same manner as ideology. The goal of universality is both necessarily and impossible. But this does not mean that it cannot be suspended, that we have to continue to operate within the rules of hegemony (Zizek, 1999:187). Indeed, the very suspension of hegemony, and the progression from the possible to the impossible (by altering the grounds upon which politics is fought) can be counted as the very foundation of authentic politics.

The fundamental failure of the market and the absolute poverty that marks it is the sinthome of capitalism. A sinthome is a system of meaning permeated with jouissance; it is the ultimate combination of jouissance and signification. As such the sinthome is fundamentally the only source of support for the being and consistency of the subject (Zizek, 1989:75). The sinthome, connected to a drive, is not an exception to the universal (in the sense of being outside of the universal), but the universal which is an exception in itself (Butler, 2006:64).
For Zizek, it is class which is the sinthome of the social as it currently stands. Class is the underlying antagonism of society and as such the impossibility within the social (ibid: 62). Similarly Zizek extends the concept of the real, in terms of the symbolic real, to capital; it is that which always returns to its place. Hence there is nothing outside of capital (or the social); it is its own exception (ibid: 64). We see this in the manner in which capitalism turns crisis into opportunity.

Given this ‘quality’ to capitalism, how can the notion of universality produce anti-capitalist change? This Zizek’s core question;
‘ how we are to reformulate a leftist, anti-capitalist political project in an era of global capitalism and its ideological supplement, liberal democratic multiculturalism’ (Zizek, 1989:4).

Perhaps the simplest project is to reveal that the singular of capitalism (as absolute poverty or environmental degradation) is not an impediment to be worked on, but rather the condition of the capitalist system. This would require a traversal of the fundamental fantasy of capitalism and thus an authentic political act (perhaps without the violence?)- it would be able to escape commoditification- that would change the conditions of possibility and repoliticise the economy.

The act is a fundamental force in Zizek’s political program. An authentic political act is a gesture which disturbs the fundamental fantasy of the system, and brings forward the full force of negativity that underlies it (Zizek, 1999:377). The act traverses the fantasy and thus disturbs the passionate attachment of the subject with the object (Zizek, 2000:220). A political act changes the very conditions of possibility of the system, and therefore the results of which can necessarily not be known in advance. The necessarily unknown future of the act is controversial. One must wonder whether such a project is morally and politically too risky.

However, this is not to dismiss the basic thesis of the act- to change the conditions of possible, to invoke the impossible; to repoliticise the economy. I believe this can best occur through identification with concrete universality/singular and an attempt to break up the sinthome. If we were to identify with the symptom (as a condition, not impediment) and traverse the fantasy (which would require an act- politics of the impossible) we would breakdown the sinthome and hence the system as a whole.















References

Butler, R. (2006). Live Theory. Continuum: London.
Kay, S. (2003). Zizek: A Critical Introduction. Cambridge: Polity.
Torfing, J. (1999). New Theories of Discourse; Laclau, Mouffe and Zizek. Oxford: Blackwell.
Zizek, S. (1989). The Sublime Object of Ideology. London: Verso.
Zizek, S. (1999). The Ticklish Subject. London: Verso.
Zizek, S. (2000). Da Capo senza Fine. In J. Bulter, E. Laclau & S. Zizek (Eds.), Contingency, Hegemony and Universality. London: Verso.
Zizek, S. (2002). For they know not what they do: Enjoyment as a political factor (2nd ed.). London: Verso.
Zizek, S. (2005). Interrogating the Real. New York: Continuum.
Zizek, S. (2006). The Parallex View. London: Verso.

The economic stages a comeback

I have had a bit of a change of heart since my last post. I think that I have moved too far away from my original project. I started out with a psychoanalytic critique on the possibilities of achieving anti-capitalist change. I have now ended up stuck in an ally with psychoanalytic ethics and the pure politics of radical democracy. This is not to say that these issues are not important, indeed they are vital to my thesis. However, I do not believe that they form the core of my thought. Rather, I would like to refocus the thesis towards the economy, rather than politics. Ultimately, the two are unavoidably linked, but I think we must acknowledge that the economy should be the fundamental site of struggle for the left.

This position is much more Zizekian than I had previously been writing from. In fact, my redirection in thought was driven by re-reading Conversations with Zizek, an excellent book. This is not to say that I have abandoned Laclau, but rather that at this stage I believe that Zizek will provide the core insights into my main argument. As I see it now, my thesis would take the following shape;

Introduction
- Fundamentals of psychoanalysis/ Discourse theory
- Capitalism from a psychoanalytic point of view

Critiques of capitalism
- Radical democracy/pure politics; Laclau, Mouffe and Stavrakakis
- Islam
- Ecologism
- Zizekian: Internal problems of capitalism. Traversing the fantasy, the act and the singular

What is to be done?
- Problems/Solutions/Alternatives
- Ethics?

Conclusion

I forsee the main difficulty will be running in psychoanalytic theory with political critique. There are two major theories at work, discourse theory and Zizek’s Lacanian. Both are ontological theories as well as normative political programs/critiques, although they are intimately linked. Therefore I may end up using Islam and ecologism as examples, rather than sections in their own right. It will largely depend on the outcome of my work on psychoanalytic theory.

At the moment what grips me the most is Zizek’s notion of universality produced through the interplay of the abstract universal, particular and singular. Laclau’s conception of universality is remarkably similar to Zizek’s as well. What interests me most with this form of universality is that it focuses on the constitutive exclusion that produces the universal. I believe that it is this exclusion in capitalism – in the form of the third world- that could provide the most traction for an anti-capitalist move.

However, with all this I have ignored the question of ethics that held me back previously. It is not that I do not think that ethics are important any more or that I have resolved the issue, but rather that I have come to peace with contingency. To me now contingency does not mean a lack in the ethical, but rather a need to be responsible for ethical decisions. Because there is no big Other to guarantee ethics, but ethical decisions cannot be avoided, we are responsible for the consequences of our ethical acts. We can try to be the best that we can be, and we have to be open to alternatives, but we still have to make decisions within a symbolic field that have both symbolic and real consequences.

I watched a snail crawl along the edge of a straight razor...

I watched a snail crawl along the edge of a straight razor. That's my dream. That's my nightmare. Crawling, slithering, along the edge of a straight razor, and surviving ( Apocalypse Now).

What I am ultimately trying to produce is a political/economic theory or program that is not simply deconstructive, but rather can be used in a political sense of making the space of the political ethical in itself. However, this is extremely problematic and in the most part goes against the work of Laclau and Zizek. Yet I am continuing with it because I believe that there has to be something wrong with the material despair and suffering in the world. However, I cannot find a direct route to the ethical through psychoanalysis, so I am searching for an opportunity to do so whilst staying within the theoretical confines of psychoanalysis. I believe that Laclau and Zizek do this themselves; they also just can’t justify it.

So, what is the problem? I have stated what I believe the issue to be, why isn’t this enough? The problem starts with contingency and necessity. We see that essentialism is rejected because we have no access to the real, to Truth; everything is mediated through the system of meaning which is the symbolic. Therefore nothing is necessary; it is simply contingent on the discursive and the sliding of signifiers. However, if something is simply contingent, then relativism is the danger; if anything goes than everything stays. This presents three problems- one ontological, one normative, and the third of the relationship between them.

Ontologically, if contingency is necessary doesn’t this contradict the very basis of contingency? This is Judith Butler’s criticism, which Laclau firmly rejects- if historicity is purely historical than in this case is it possible to have a society look like that was ahistorical? Rather Laclau argues that it is the relationship between the two which is important; contingency can only occur within the necessary (the symbolic), but the symbolic is at the same time contingent. Zizek makes a similar point in relation to the concrete universal, which occurs when we see the contingency in the necessary. This contingency is the necessary exclusion of a singular, which creates the space for the concrete universal. The concrete universal is the ethical moment of the social; it is the process that keeps power fluid, and the key moment for both Laclau and Zizek, if in different ways. As Laclau states in Reflections on the revolutions of our time (211);

‘ A free society is not one where a social order has been established that is better adapted to human nature, but one which is more aware of the contingency and historicity of any order’

Laclau’s point here is certainly theoretically consistent, yet it is insufficient in itself for what I am trying to achieve. For one it is necessarily unable to politically construct, nor does is it able to produce an adequate account (for me) of why we should care for the disavowed, whose material suffering, I’m sure they would not agree, is not contingent. Therefore I find myself trying to theoretically devise a scheme around what I intuitively feel, rather than cognitively consider. It is easy to get into a quasi-solipsistic introspective spiral about the affective dimensions of my attempts at theorising. But we have bigger fish to fry. Hopefully. Thus, I am left wondering if we extend this ethical approach further (of contingency), can it deal with the kind of material suffering I am feeling for?


‘Once we accept the necessity of the political and the impossibility of a world without antagonism, what needs to be envisaged is how it is possible under those conditions to create or maintain a pluralistic democratic order; we must not have enemies to be destroyed, but adversaries to be tolerated’


Thus Laclau contends that a normative approach does arise from the ontological (the ethics of the universal- radical democracy). However, he does deny that any particular substance can come from the empty universal. This is my difficulty. It leaves me stuck back at the point that I have to wonder whether this is simply the ethic of psychoanalysis and there is a possibility of something outside of it which could potentially be developed. Here I am thinking about whether an ethics, based on psychoanalysis e.g. contingency can provide the base for a political system. This is mainly because of my second exception, that of the normative.

If all is contingent, why do we favour some above others? If anything goes, doesn’t everything stay? This is an accusation that Laclau strongly rejects, although I can’t really say why and indeed Laclau certainly prefers the left wing politics to the right. Why is this?

In some works, such as Contingency, Hegemony and Universality Laclau appears to deny taking a strong political position. He states that he is simply interested in the universal gap of the ethical which stays the same (in form) in every possible symbolisation. If we exploit this gap we can see the contingency of the social which is our goal, not human nature, even though, as ontological theory of the social and the subject, contingency as a value is as close to mapping human nature as a postmodern social theorist would get.

This, it seems to be is a half-arsed effort at emancipation. Laclau and Zizek appear to be prepared to reject any form of positive universalism and are aware of global issues, yet are not able/prepared to suggest a way forward outside of pure theory. Neither use contemporary political example nor analysis, and Zizek often ends up petering off into the kind of cultural analysis he dislikes so much. It is through this that we can emancipate human kind? Now of course such an effort is necessarily impossible. But that does not mean that politics cannot be a source of improvement, of emancipation still to come, a political form which is aware of its own impossibility, yet is able to address the horrible disavowed foundations of our society.

Sure, Zizek is right in suggesting that there is no freedom, other than the Leninist freedom to question the very parameters of society. However I believe that we need to take a further step to say that yes, this kind of freedom is vital to avoid/contain the horrific externalisation of lack that comes with any attempt at universalism, but there are steps that need to be taken to achieve this status. For example, the 100,000 dying of hunger everyday (http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2005/051028_Ziegler_PC.doc.htm) or the 25 million displaced by conflict war (http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/chap1.htm) have less of an opportunity to enjoy contingency than others.

Now one may argue that these are the result of other not being aware of the contingent and arbitrary nature of their own goals, and singular proof of the failure of the abstract universal. However, to deal with these issues, I believe a political/ethical system (of kinds) is required.

So what is my solution? Is the global institutionisation of radical democracy enough? This is a difficult area, and will be the start of a new piece. For here it is enough to identify the difficulty of any universal construction, even if it is empty, or striving to maintain the place of the ethical universal. Therefore we must deal with objections from Laclau, and most polemically Zizek. However, I believe that such a construction is a possible, if a difficult task.

There is no Truth but this truth

Because of the fundamental negativity (and thus contingency) of the social, the social itself does not prescribe any particular ethical content. However, when one states that the social is necessarily contingent, a circular and paradoxical loop is created. If the contingent is necessary, then the contingent itself must logically be contingent. There has to be some base here and thus the ontological implications of psychoanalysis become normative, despite their very rejection of the normative itself.

This vicious cycle is deemed to be avoided because the ontological, despite prescribing a form which has ethical and normative implications, does not present a particular content. In this way there is not a psychoanalytic ethic as such, rather an orientation towards the ethical. However, this orientation has to have normative repercussions. The ethical (as an empty place) has no content itself, but because it itself is an ontological impossibility, any attempt at signifying it necessarily places it within the discursive, and thus fills it with content. Therefore the ethical is only retrospectively empty and neutral; we always experience it as a particular content.

This brings the problem identified by Zizek in the relationship between the universal, the particular and the singular. Any universality (because of the impossibility of any universal) has to be through a particular content, which takes the place of the impossible universal (e.g. the empty signifier). However, because the universal takes a particular form, it is necessarily exclusive; indeed it is constituted by this exclusion. It is this exclusion that Zizek labels the singular. For Zizek the ethical lies in identification with this singular, as constitutive of the universal.

This undermines the possible of radical democracy. In this perspective, the place of power is to be kept empty because of the undecidability of ethics. However, the institutions required to keep this place of power empty presuppose a Universalist ethical conception. This will be the subject of my next piece, but for here it is enough to say that if we identify with ethics as the identification and institutionalisation of contingency, this enters us into a debate about means and ends, e.g. Ensuring that each has the ability (freedom and equality) to debate the ethical, and as such a universalism of a particular content. However, this will always be based on an exclusion of kinds. For Zizek this exclusion ( from the democratic form) is capitalism, which democracy implicitly supports, despite it undermining the basic principles of the contingent ethic.

Therefore, by identifying with the singular, we acknowledge that any conception of the ethical, even if it is based on an impossible ethic, is up for debate. This leaves us with the contradictory position of trying to defend the normative assumptions of our anti-normative position. For insistence, what are the radical democrats to say if a fundamentalist movement, which rejects the radical ethical position, is to take power ?

It seems that it is necessary for radical democracy/ liberalism as a whole to associate more strongly with a normative ethical position, even if it is an empty one.

An optimisitic negative ethics

Psychoanalytic ethics are distinct from traditional conceptions of ethics in that psychoanalysis does not prescribe any positive content to the ethical. Rather such a prescription appears to be the ethical’s opposite. Traditional political ethics are based on a ‘positive’, or stand alone essence to the social, such as a ‘state of nature’, or ‘species being’ approach. These perspectives have been used in the work of Thomas Hobbes, Karl Marx, John Rawls and Terry Eagleton. Psychoanalytic theory has some similarity in this regard, however, it also has some crucial differences.

The core difference is that the former theories are stand alone, they are ethical on their own and as such require no further justification from any larger foundation- they are the Truth, with rational laws naturally stem from them. In the psychoanalytic point of view there is no positivity to social life. Indeed the social- both the subject and the object- are constituted by a lack. It is this lack; a fundamental impossibility of achieving Truth (and thus finding the final solution to ethics) which creates an opportunity for the ethical.

The concept of lack as inherent to the human condition stems from both psychoanalysis and the ‘turn to language’ in the 1960s and 70s. These have been combined most prominently, and fruitfully, in the work of Jacques Lacan and most recently, Slavoj Zizek and Ernesto Laclau.

Lack occurs in both the subject which is alienated from its image, and in the symbolic Other, where there is no correspondence between the signifier (the word) and the signified (the thing-in-itself). Instead meaning is created purely through the play of signifiers. It is this play, and the necessary attempts to achieve an impossible closure that form the basis of Laclau’s Discourse theory.

According to Discourse theory, particular content (e.g. signifiers) attempts to suture the social by filling the gap in the symbolic order. Any content which succeeds (although not permanently) in doing so has become an empty signifier, and generally a hegemonic discourse (a discourse which becomes the condition of possibility for any truth claim).

A hegemonic discourse conceals the lack in the social. A necessary condition of this lack is that there is no true universal, or Truth. Rather there is an ultimate undecidability, and therefore any order which is presented as universal is always based on exclusion. For Zizek, this fantasmatic exclusion is the role of ideology, in presenting the social as full, or at least potentially full, and externalising the necessary lack. We see this occurring most dramatically in Nazi Germany with its notion of the Jew.

Therefore for Psychoanalysis, rather than attempt to find a fullness which is impossible, and necessarily exclusive, the ethical is to show the radical contingency of any social construction, and the manner in which any universal is based on the elevation of a particular, and thus the exclusion what Zizek terms a singular.


As Ernesto Laclau states ‘ A free society is not one where a social order has been established that is better adapted to human nature, but one which is more aware of the contingency and historicity of any order’ . To show the contingency of any order, according to Slavoj Zizek, one has to either break through the fantasy (which provides jouissance to subject in the possibility of closure), or alternatively engage in a radical ethical act which changes the fundamental conditions of possibility.

However, this leaves upon questions, particulary in regards to what appears to be a logic contradiction in the necessity of contingency, and also in the political possibilities of such an ethic.

Dreaming the impossible of impossibility ?

At the moment I am at a crossroads in terms of the political possibilities of psychoanalysis. I believe that the psychoanalytic field itself is split between these positions, and again within the optimistic and pessimistic viewpoints. As I see it there are those like Judith Butler and Sean Homer who believe that the negative ontology of psychoanalysis commits the political to either a celebration of failure (Butler), or pure deconstruction (Homer). It is the latter which appeals to me most. However, I shall return to this latter.

However, generally psychoanalytic political theory seems to be rather optimistic about the consequences of the negative ontology of psychoanalysis, although it too is split between differing conceptions. From the basic Lacanian point of view, psychoanalysis is politically optimistic once one accepts the impossibility of a positive essence to the social. Such an essence would produce natural laws and stable social relations. In contrast psychoanalysis considers that change is always possible, and indeed immanent.

The optimism about this negative ontology is presented in two contrasting manners;
- Radical democracy, represented (with slight variation) by Ernesto Laclau, Yannis Stavrakakis and Chantal Mouffe. Mouffe and Stavrakakis seek to use democracy as an empty signifier representing lack itself. Rather than an ethics of harmony (which is currently hegemonic in liberal democracy) what is required is an acceptance of conflict, and the lack inherent in any universal conception.
- The contrasting viewpoint is characterised by Slavoj Zizek. Zizek started out in defence of liberal democracy against totalitarianism, taking a similar position to the radical democrats, although with a more Lacanian take than Laclau’s discourse theory. Of particular importance is the emphasis on the register of the imaginary (and fantasy) and the real/jouissance. Thus to reveal the contingency of fantasy is all important, hence ‘traversing the fantasy’. However, Zizek has since rejected liberal democracy because of its implicit links with capital. As such he asserts that liberal democracy itself provides a fantasy, and it can only be overthrown by a radical and often chance ‘ethical act’.


For me, Zizek objection to the formalism of democracy (as an empty place of power that is controlled by capital) are valid, although on his conclusions of the consequences of this move, I am not so convinced. The ethical act, at least in my vulgar conception of it, appears to be only a destructive/deconstructive method, one over which we have little control, and thus we could wind up with an ethically worse position then when we started. However, such an assertion takes a different definition of ethical. As I understand it, an ethical move in psychoanalysis takes the form of an act that reveals the contingency of meaning in any given circumstance. For my mind this is not a wholly satisfactory political position. It may be the ethic of psychoanalysis to constantly show the contingency of any social construction, but in doing so it seems that psychoanalytic thought is confined to a political deconstructive role. What does psychoanalysis say for any other conception of non- deconstructive ethics? Are they anti-ethical (e.g. the construction of a fantasy which is the anti-thesis of deconstructive), aethical/nonethical or is this method of ethics acceptable, but simply not the territory of psychoanalysis?

However at the same time, theorists within psychoanalysis do seem to take ethical (moral?) positions. Zizek is certainly anti-capitalist (even if he is not pro-socialist) and Laclau seeks to develop the enlightenment values of freedom and equality, without any explicit reason. To me it seems that there is some inherent ethical/moral reasoning going on, and as such it is one of my next tasks to see what this relationship is, particularly between psychoanalytic theorists and anti-capitalism/Marx.

I guess I am seeking a reason, or a base on which to plant my own political thought. No one defends pure relativism, and while I am not seeking a positive essence of the social- psychoanalytic thought clearly reveals this impossibility- I wonder whether a political ethic can be developed taking on the psychoanalytic insights into the human condition (and its implications for the social), without falling into a purely deconstructive mode. Is there a way that we can suggest a path forwards that could rid the world of at least some of the suffering inflicted by and on the world’s inhabitants?

Such a task may be impossible, and certainly does not appear popular in psychoanalytic theory. In any case it is way too big for a Master’s thesis, but at the moment it seems to be what is gripping me. It maybe that there is nothing there, but I want there to be and I can’t face the horror of the possibility that there isn’t, but that is just the human condition isn’t it?

Into the deep...

I have just spent the last week or so attempting to orientate myself to Slavoj Zizek work, with mixed results. I find Zizek's work fascinating, yet at times frustrating 'unreasonable'. His insights are always enlightening, particularly if one subscribes to the Lacanian foundation of his thought, however, his political solutions ( for want of a better word) leave me feeling somewhat flummoxed. Perhaps this is because his work is so counter-intuitive to virtually everything that I have been exposed to previously, even within sociology and social theory. To effectively suggest radical violence as a political solution goes against the grain of everything I have been taught politically, socially and academically.

Perhaps I should not feel so opposed to the radical ethical 'act' that evokes the disavowed foundations upon which this blog/thesis is based, given what is at stake for so many. However, without another programme, or at least a reasonable guarantee that things will get better, it appears unfeasible to me. Perhaps it is as I suspect Zizek would suggest; I get so much enjoyment from my peaceful, (relatively) rich lifestyle, that the thought of doing something radical to destroy it does not grip me. Instead, to deal with that little bit of the forgotten/disavowed real that gets through to me, I extend my fantasy that I am somehow a little better than that that I critique, because I don’t buy consumer products (often), and I sponsor a Nigerian child, without ever really doing anything radical.

However, I really do question whether such a radical act is the answer. I am supported in this by Laclau, and I suspect the earlier Zizek, who focused more on traversing fantasy and reconstructing reality than radical ‘ethical’ acts. The early Zizek, as I understand him, was interested in the rearticulation of desire and reinventing realities, as well as the hard kernel of the real. I look forward to fully encountering these works.

In this position, we can say that Zizek’s political approach is similar to Laclau, although they come at it from different angles. Politically, both are interested in the empty signifier, otherwise known (particularly to Zizek) as S1, or the master signifier. The empty signifier is the point around which the socio-symbolic field is founded. For Laclau empty signifiers are a response to the negative limit of the symbolic, the effect of the real. The negative limit is not another difference in the signifying system, but rather the very possibility of difference itself. Because the symbolic realm of signification is always off kilter, because we can never be sure whether signifiers match up to, or have matching signified, there will always be a left over signifier which is empty in content. This signifier is filled with content from other particulars, and takes on a universal function.

For Laclau the empty signifier is filled with meanings through the logic of equivalence, and this is the manner in which power is constructed in liberal democracies. Thus Laclau does not forget about the role of the real, but for him it is always sheathed beneath the symbolic realm. Laclau’s earlier position was largely without Lacanian influence. In Hegemony and Socialist Strategy Laclau took more of a post-structuralist line, suggesting that it was partial meanings and the infinite play of language that created a limit point in language and social change. However, with Zizek’s influence, Laclau took on a more Lacanian line, thinking of the limit point to language as ‘the Lacanian real’; although it is a term that I do not think he is comfortable with. On the other hand, in front of me now lie two articles on Lacan’s influence on Laclau, one by Laclau himself. I hope that these will help to extend my knowledge on this debate. I have to admit, I am feeling a little sketchy on my knowledge of Laclau, particularly his psychoanalytic influence, and look forward to re-reading him soon.

Now then, back to Zizek. Zizek too recognises the importance of the limit point of language; however his approach appears much more complex and developed than Laclau’s. Zizek’s base is the Lacanian conception of the human condition. I feel it is important for to give a brief sketch of this conception.

The human baby is born with a number of biological needs that only their nurturer can provide. In order to keep having these needs satisfied the baby attempts to find out what the nurturer needs; to be a fully satisfying (sex) object to them. To do this, the child develops language at a rapid rate. However, this is a poisoned chalice, as once the child develops language, they are castrated from direct satisfaction of this needs. From now on any satisfaction will be filtered through the big Other (symbolic law), and now becomes drive and desire.

However, the primary repression is itself repressed. This double negation is created and supported by a fundamental fantasy. In order to compensate for castration, the human gains enjoyment from not satisfying their needs, and instead following the symbolic order through the demands of the super-ego.

Therefore, the empty signifier, the core of the fundamental fantasy has what Zizek calls an ‘obscene underside’ of enjoyment through a glimpse of the real. This helps to explain why certain concepts grip us; it is the enjoyment we get from them.

I do agree with most of this, it certainly has an internal coherence to it. Having not been around infants, I don’t really have any grounds to query it. It does seem very essentialist, and I wonder what other factors can be at play here. If we take on an equally essentialist evolutionary paradigm, or at least some elements of it, does the Lacanian take still stand. Whilst maintaining a cynicism about science, I wonder what evidence can be provided to support the psychoanalytic conclusion.

However, given that this approach is accurate, and it is something that I am increasingly attracted to, the political consequences of this are fascinating. Does Laclau’s position hold up if with this Lacanian concept of subjectivity is added? It sometimes seems that theorists and critics feel that concepts can be taken and added to theory without regard for the factors driving the contrasting positions. I personally feel, although it is something that I have not put complex thought into, that Laclau does stand up in an altered state, something that is well worth investigating, and will probably form the basis of my study for the next few months.

However, the most difficult part is the political consequences. If Laclau’s critical method of Discourse theory can be supplemented successfully by the psychoanalytic approach, does this alteration in diagnosis bring a radical change in suggested cure?

The later Zizek suggests a much more radical position than his earlier work. In particular he returns to the Lacanian conception of ethics. The Lacanian conception of ethics lies in a return to drives, the closest expression of biological need available after the entry into the symbolic. However, to me this seems problematic, although within reason. The first point to make is that the Lacanian cure was created in response to individual subjects in a clinical; Lacan was generally apolitical and suggested no political strategy; that has been the work of Zizek. One must question whether at is feasible to create a political framework, or in my case a theory of political economy based on pure psychoanalytic thought. I would like to suggest at this stage that such a pure approach is not possible. Rather we must seek to use the insights of psychoanalysis, but not adapt it, après-coup to the political situation of the day.

However, my core concern with the ethical act is the return to drives itself. It is possible that I may be misinterpreting this, but for me the suggestion that it is ethical to return to the primordial, animal self is incorrect. Originally, I read this return to the drive as repression. But as has been suggested to me, we cannot live in the real of the drive, so this is not an option. Instead it is the destructive/productive effect of the drive that is ethical, that would remove the subject from ideology, even if for only the briefest moment, to reconfigure reality.

Still, this notion of the effect of drive troubles me. Sure, humans being are not wholly separate from animals, but there does still remain a core difference, that difference being the capacity for language and culture. Following Terry Eagleton’s line, I would like to suggest that it is language that is the natural, material state of the human condition. This is not to suggest that we are somehow born with language, but with are certainly born with the capacity for it. This position does not deny the Lacanian conception of the process of subjectivity. There are major implications to combining the approaches. If language is our core, yet it is forever split and infested with the intrusion of the real, what are the political consequences? I don’t think we can deny that it is these intrusions of real the evoke change, and help political position grip the symbolic realm. With these thoughts it seems that I have come a loop, and logically should suggest that we evoke the real to create change. However, I would like to suggest that this is a chicken and egg scenario. Is it the materialist real which punches holes in the symbolic realm and is thus the most important factor, or is it the idealist symbolic that covers the real, and provides our only possible access to it? The most viable solution is surely one that includes both, but I would like to maintain that the best political approach, the one that we maintain the most control over, is the latter.

However, the hole in my argument forms when I find no natural ethical position resulting from this. How would one develop a form of political economy from this? Is it to ignore psychoanalysis and revert back to rationalist political theory? Or is the solution found more in Laclau’s approach? I would like to tentatively suggest that Discourse theory, supplemented by psychoanalysis provides the most feasible option. How so? I look forward to thinking it out.

Starting at the end

Where to start then? At the start of course, which naturally enough comes at the end, with my last completed work. This piece ( my honours dissertation) still represents the location of my thought, particularly in the debate between Laclau and Zizek, although the context has ( or will) change.

So, here is the whole thing, including references;

Articulating Environmentalism; Laclau, Zizek and Environmental Discourse in New Zealand


Ernesto Laclau’s discourse theory provides a productive theoretical framework for the future of the political left. Discourse theory has been developed through Laclau’s work at the School of Ideology and Discourse Analysis at the University of Essex. Discourse theory builds on the insights provided by both Post-structuralism and Psychoanalysis in building a linguistic theory that focuses on both the play of language and the effects of the intrusion of the Lacanian ‘Real’.

Discourse theory rejects any possibility of an ethical or political universalism upon which to base society and thus discards the Marxist conception of proletarian universal emanicipatory power. Laclau suggests that the major political dilemma facing the contemporary left is the integration of the new particularities of resistance (such as anti-sexism, anti-racism, the anti-nuclear movement and environmentalism) without the notion of an universal social imaginary.

Discourse theory considers that no particularity is able to exist independently; rather to gain political traction it must necessarily be attached to a dominant (hegemonic) discourse. A hegemonic discourse provides the only possibility for universalism through the production of empty signifiers, which occur through a subversion of the process of signification which allows the empty signifier to represent the (negative) system limit of the discursive. Therefore, while there cannot be a true universal foundation, the political goal of discourse theory is to construct a contingent construction of a universalism to support the new particularities which have developed to fill the void left by the discredited Marxist notion of class.

Slavoj Zizek enhances Discourse theory by taking a Lacanian Psychoanalytic approach to Laclau’s insights. Whereas Laclau’s analysis is based predominately at the level of language, Zizek extends the analysis of the Real and importantly adds the role of the Lacanian conceptions of the imaginary/fantasy and ideology to political analysis. Zizek’s work has much in common with Laclau’s - Zizek accepts the basic premises of discourse theory - but there are important differences between the two with respect to the political positions they adopt. Laclau considers that political change occurs predominately through the play of language supplemented by the effects of the Real illustrated by empty signifiers and antagonisms. In contrast Zizek takes a greater interest in the role of the Real itself, and in particular its effect in producing fantasy and ideology and thus concealing the lack generated by the effects of the Real in the symbolic realm.

This paper examines the contrasting theoretical positions of Laclau and Zizek, particulary the political benefits and limitations of each position. This debate is analysed against a background of political environmental discourse in New Zealand. A sample of environmental discourse in New Zealand was gathered from the eight political parties represented in parliament before the 2005 election. The result of this examination is mixed. Although discourse theory is productively able to examine the manner in which environmental discourse is structured in New Zealand, Zizek’s position, particulary his notion’s of fantasy and ideology appear better constructed to explain the inability of environmental ideas to grip the social in a manner which would achieve a true change. However, Laclau’s critique of Zizek’s suggested Psychoanalytic solution of traversing the fantasy to feel the effects of the Real is also well founded. Thus we are left with a debate without resolution and produces only further questions.

Before proceeding further with this debate between Laclau and Zizek , it is important to note the methods by which the environmental discourse which provides the background for this debate has been gathered. Although discursive analysis is an established and productive method of empirical research, discourse theory does not have a particular set of methods associated with it. Laclau himself has performed no theoretical analysis, although his Essex School of Ideology and Discourse Analysis has produced/inspired much empirical work since its formation in 1982, e.g. Howarth, Norval & Stavrakakis (2000). Problematically, discourse theory is constructed at a highly abstract level, and thus it is difficult to apply to empirical data in an unmediated manner(Torfing, 1999:291).

Discourse theory can therefore be considered an analytical strategy rather than a method. An analytical strategy does not constitute a set of methodology conventions, rather it illustrates the manner in which epistemologicaly based research describes the position from which the researcher analyses and constructs observations out of the observations of the symbolic Other (Anderson, 2003:XIII). Niels Akerstrom Anderson describes discourse theory as epistemologically based because it is concerned with the conditions of possibility for truth, rather than ‘Truth’ itself. Thus Laclau does not ask, ‘Is this the Truth?’, but rather, ‘How has this object been produced as the truth?’.

This does not mean that discourse theory cannot be used for empirical analysis. Laclau considers that discourse theory is not inherently incompatible with a systematic programme of research, but is a system in the making (Laclau, 2000b:xi). Jacob Torfing (1999:292), in his analysis of Laclau’s method, considers that the discourse theorist must be a methodological bricoleur, developing the appropriate methods from the principles of discourse theory for every separate analysis; to do otherwise would be to create the possibility of repressing alternative forms of analysis and undermine the deconstructive purpose of discourse theory.

This paper could be better defined as a theoretical debate which makes reference to empirical data to inform it conclusions. The danger with this strategy is that the researcher can be selective and select the data that best fits the theoretical conclusions generated. As such it is vital that the theorist views the data from a critical perspective, and does not attempt to generate a framework and simply fill in the gaps. This would be to contradict the deontological aim of discourse theory. Therefore this paper does not seek legitimise discourse theory, or the work of Zizek, but rather to debate and analyse the strengths and weaknesses of both approaches in relation to environmental discourse in New Zealand.

Discourse theory is a development of a combination of Post-structuralism and Psychoanalysis. Post-structuralism had the biggest influence on the early development of discourse theory. Post-structuralism developed from the Structuralist position of language as a relational system of differences, where each difference can only be a negative because it cannot have value without relation to something else in the system of language. The Post-structuralist position developed as a reaction to the break with the isomorphic relationship between the signifier and the signified proposed in structuralism (Laclau, 2000c:69). Post-structuralism contends that there is no fixed relationship between the signified and the signifier, instead the relationship is contingent and arbitrary. For example the signifier ‘T-R-E-E’, has no natural relationship with the physical object to which it refers. Because there is no unifying centre to the sign (the combination of signifier and signified), the relationship between signifier and signified can never be stable (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985:93).

Discourse theory adopts this notion of the partial nature of language from Post-structuralism. Discourse theory also considers that no social object can have an identity outside of discourse. As Laclau states;

‘the basic hypothesis of a discursive approach is that the very possibility of perception, thought and action depends on the structuration of a certain meaningful field that pre-exists any factual immediacy’(Laclau, 1993:431).

Thus the identity of an object is based on a system of difference that is historically specific and contingent (Howarth & Stavrakakis, 2000:3). However, while one cannot doubt that human reality is a social construct, this can only be the starting point for the analysis of the human condition.(Glynos & Stavrakakis, 2003:113).

The complexity of the human condition is reflected in discourse theory, both through its emphasis on the negative limit of language, and the acknowledgement of the material constitution of discourse. This material emphasis does not suggest materialism, but rather that Laclau does not seek to reduce the social to a purely linguistic matter by denying the existence of objects outside of linguistic construction. For Laclau, discourse is made up of both linguistic and extra-linguistic elements. These elements are not juxtaposed, but form a totality. However, because the extra-linguistic object is meaningless outside the symbolic order which precedes it, it is the social construction of the object which is politically salient, rather than the material object or its raw physical effects (Laclau & Mouffe, 1990:100).

Although discourse lacks a material anchor at its center, this is not to suggest that for Laclau language exists in a state of chaotic flux. Discourse can still be systematic, even though true systematic properties are impossible because of the lack of a fixed centre. The development of structural regularities are driven by the need to fill the inherent lack in the symbolic Other of language (Glynos & Stavrakakis, 2003:117). It is this need for suture and fixation, constructed in hegemonic systematic regularity, that Laclau believes makes discourse appear fixed and solid (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985:106).

Sutures in the symbolic order can only ever by partial and temporary. These partial fixations come in the form of hegemony, the fixation of elements across discourses to the extent that they become the dominant form of social thought; the new ‘common sense’ of social life (Torfing, 1999:101). Because elements are partial, hegemonic practices are highly political as they form an ‘objective’ formation out of previously dislocated elements(Howarth & Stavrakakis, 2000:14). A hegemonic formation hides the very limit of discourse which threatens the identity which it has constructed, to the extent that Laclau states;

‘every relation of representation is founded on a fiction: that of the presence at a certain level of something which, strictly speaking, is absent from it’ (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985:119).

This fiction is similar to the Lacanian notion of the register of the imaginary (Kay, 2003:169), a notion this paper will later return to in a discussion of the political benefits of Zizek’s notion of fantasy.

Hegemonic formations therefore form the ground upon which political relations are formulated. Laclau considers that there are four dimensions to hegemony;

unevenness of power - The condition of the presentation of hegemony as a universality requires a radical exclusion. Because of the unevenness of power in the social, some elements are better positioned to take this role than others;
hegemony occurs only by superseding the notion of particularity and universality, a discourse can only become hegemonic by presenting particular elements as universal;
empty signifiers are at the core of hegemony - these signifiers are a reflection of the limit of the discursive and provide the only possibility for universality. This is a vital aspect of hegemony which will be expanded on later; and
the social ground on which hegemony exists is that of a generalisation of representation as a condition of social ordering (Laclau, 2000d:207).

While these are the conditions for hegemony, each hegemonic discourse has its own internal rules. These rules take the form of grammar, the rules governing the language game of the hegemonic formation and logic, the structural relation between entities to make grammar possible (Laclau, 2000a:283). Thus, any analysis of a hegemonic formation has to include both the conditions which lead to the development of a hegemonic formation and the interplay within the hegemony.

In New Zealand, the environmental movement has developed to a point where it can be labelled a hegemonic force. This is seen in the political discourse produced by the eight political parties represented in parliament prior to the 2005 election campaign;
- ACT New Zealand;
- Green Party;
- Jim Anderton’s Progressive;
- Labour Party;
- Maori Party;
- National Party;
- New Zealand First Party; and
- United Future New Zealand.

All eight parties make reference to the importance of conserving the New Zealand physical environment. Although this hegemony now appears to be common sense, environmentalism as a global phenomenon did not really develop into a discourse of its own until the later half of the 20th century and its first intrusion into mainstream political discourse did not occur until the 1970’s (Hansen, 1991:444) through a radical movement, part of which was a damming critique of capitalism. However, by the 1980’s this movement had been institutionalised and rearticulated with other hegemonic discourses, such as Margaret Thatcher’s conservatism (see Carvalho, 2005), or neo-liberal capitalist development (see Hartwick & Peet, 2003).

Similarly in New Zealand, environmentalism first developed as a radical discourse, notably during the protests against the Manapouri dam between 1969 and 1972. Following these protests environmentalism gained strength in New Zealand through its association with the populist movement against nuclear development and gained a nationalist edge (Belich, 2001). This articulation with nationalism is a current theme, the environment being seen as a ‘central to the New Zealand way of life’ (Hodgson, 2005), and a ‘unique birthright of all New Zealanders’ (N. Smith, 2005).

While environmentalism is hegemonic in New Zealand, this does not mean that it is the dominant discourse. Although it is articulated as a mainstream and ‘common sense’ concept, it cannot escape the reach of the dominant hegemonic discourse of the ‘economic’. The economic sphere provides what Laclau terms a ‘social imaginary’ in that it provides the conditions for the emergence of any social object (Torfing, 1999:114). This is not to say that for Laclau the economic is a universal, a notion Slavoj Zizek suggests in his conception of capitalism as the ‘symbolic real’, however it is the dominant social hegemony, and as such provides conditions for the development of other hegemonic discourses.

Thus any environmental demand has to be articulated against the background of the capitalist economic system. This contrasts with the ideas of many environmentalists, who believe that environmental discourse should not be linked in any way the ‘economic’. Objections to environmental demands being off-set against the prevailing economic system come in two forms; those who believe that the power of the economy is too great for environmental ideas to gain any traction and those that consider that the development of any hegemonic discourse, as a dominant mode of thought, contradicts the aims of the radical movement of human emancipation with which the environmental movement is often associated (Day, 2004). Although both of these positions relate to the interaction between the universal and the particular in hegemony, it is only the first that has some political potential, and we will return to the theoretical/political possibilities and difficulties that this position evokes shortly.

From a Laclauian perspective the second idea is misguided, and can be dealt with briefly.
Because identity in language cannot be singularly positive, any particular identity must be related to something outside of itself through the system of difference, and thus necessarily loses its ability to be pure. This does not suggest that a particularity cannot be outside of hegemonic systems of discourse, but rather that it cannot exist purely by itself; it must always be related to something else outside of its identity. Therefore there cannot be such a thing as a pure environmentalism, because it will necessarily be ‘contaminated’ by differences outside of its singular identity. This does not suggest that once a discourse becomes hegemonic it will remain so. Discourses, as we shall later see in a discussion on antagonism, can be deconstructed, but only from within, even if the deconstructive force has its origins in that which have been excluded.

Therefore from a Laclauian standpoint, rather than being articulated separately, to gain political traction a movement has to attach itself to something bigger than itself; it has to present itself as a universalism. But while it is necessary for a movement to be presented as a universalism, at the same time this is impossible. This paradox of impossibility rests on the limits of discourse. The notion of a limit to discourse, rather than the continually deferred language play of idealism (Glynos & Stavrakakis, 2003:114) is a meeting point for Lacan and Laclau. This is an important point, that will soon be revisited. However, first it is important to return to the first of our two objections to environmentalism being linked with to the economic. This objection contended that the economic sphere is simply too pervasive for environmental discourse to gain any true political traction within it, which is a valuable perspective.

Any particular identity that is articulated within a hegemonic universalism is bound to lose much of its identity, and thus political power. The wider the stretch of the universalism, such as with a social imaginary like the economic in capitalist societies, the more likely it is that a particular identity articulated within it, like environmentalism, will lose much of its political identity and power. This is not to say that the articulation of a particularism within a social imaginary does not and should not occur, or that such articulations cannot achieve social change. As noted above, given the hegemonic power of the economy, it is difficult to articulate any message without reference to the economic. As such, appeals to the economic is the most common technique used in the articulation of New Zealand environmental discourse.

An example of this par excellence is the environmental principle of New Zealand First’s 15 fundamental principles:

‘Wise Governments view the preservation and enhancement of the environment as sound economics. All environmental policies will be proactive with a view to creating employment and sustainable wealth whilst improving one of our few competitive advantages.’(NZFirst, 2005b)

Similarly, the National Party considers that ‘It makes good economic sense to achieve economic conservation’ (NationalParty, 2005a) and ‘National policy on climate change is about ensuring New Zealand jobs and growth are not sacrificed…’(NationalParty, 2005c).

Environment solutions are also often proposed in terms of market mechanisms and personal responsibility, as both United Future New Zealand (UnitedFuture, 2005) and ACT New Zealand suggest (ACTParty, 2005). ACT in particular emphasises the role that individual property rights have to play in environmental protection by including the protection of these rights in its environment and conservation policy (ACTParty, 2005).

The articulation of environmental ideas in economic terms is precursed on the nodal point of ‘sustainable development’. The term ‘sustainable development’ entered the discourse of environmentalism in the 1970’s, and received formal recognition in Agenda 21, at the United Nations Earth summit of 1992 in Rio (Fernado, 2003:7). Since this time, use of the term has become so prevalent that it has become the point around which environmentalism is centred. However, because of this universalising role and the partial nature of language, ‘sustainable development’ has been articulated into a variety of discourses, each giving it a different meaning.

This is evident in New Zealand, where the environmental policy of all currently represented political parties contains the signifier ‘sustainable’ (ACT Party, 2005; Maori Party, 2005; National Party, 2005b; NZ First, 2005a; United Future, 2005), and many ‘sustainable development’(Green Party, 2005c; Labour Party, 2005; Progressive Party, 2005b), whilst filling the term with entirely different meanings.

For example, while the ACT Party uses the term ‘sustainable’ congruently with individual responsibility and private property, the Progressive Party extends the term to include it as the central goal of the Ministry of Economic Development, encompassing both social development and environmental conservation. Similarly, the Labour Party, as part of its ‘Govt3’ program, extends the definition of sustainability to include economic, social and environmental factors. In these conceptions, ‘sustainable development’ means to sustain capitalist economic growth. Thus any environment solutions can occur only if they are economically beneficial. As an example, the United Future Party suggests that New Zealand should only continue to observe the Kyoto protocol if it is in New Zealand’s economic and environment interests (United Future, 2005).

By contrast, the Green Party attempts to fill the term with entirely different meanings. For the Green Party ‘sustainable development’ means having economic systems that do not adversely affect the natural environment; rather they sustain natural system (Gree nParty, 2005a). This contrasts starkly with New Zealand First’s position on ‘striking a balance between economic progress and appropriate economic goals’(emphasis added) (NZ First, 2005b).

Thus ‘sustainable development’ can be evoked to achieve environmental legitimacy, without any environmental purpose at all. For example in National’s Resource Management Act (1991) policy, which seeks to make the Act more development friendly, and thus reduce its environmental effectiveness, the National Party states ‘ We support the RMA’s commitment to sustainability, but…’(National Party, 2005b) and than proceeds to criticise the Act without any reference to environmental goals.

The alternative, although often complementary, discursive approach to articulating environmental discourse is to construct it without reference to the economic sphere. These articulations occur despite the obvious influence the economic has on the natural environment. This is not to say that discourse articulated without reference to the economic is outside of the influence of economic discourse. Rather, it is only because of the power of the economic sphere that environmental issues are forced to be articulated as either in harmony with economic discourse, or as not threatening the hegemony of the economy. A further possible option of evoking the economic as a root cause of environment problems appears unable to be articulated. This option shall be dealt with shortly.

The seemingly universal effect of the economic is a powerful demonstration of Laclau’s concept of a social imaginary, in that it sets the conditions for the articulation of an element. Whether environmentalism is articulated with the economic to gain political traction, as the aforementioned examples illustrated, or as pure environmentalism, as will be shown, environmental discourse is still influenced by the power of economic.

Environmental discourse articulated as outside of, or alongside economic discourse is termed ecological modernism or ecological economics (Barry, 2003:616). Ecological modernism does not seek to overthrow the capitalist system, but rather to work within it, often using market mechanisms to achieve ‘eco-efficiency’. Thus the green ‘expert’ has evolved from an anti-capitalist radical to a scientist, or policy specialist (Hajer, 1995).

It can be suggested that ‘sustainable development’ has largely reduced the conflict between economic growth and ecological protection because the conflicting perspectives now have a common ground over which to debate (Papadakis, 2000:81). However, this position has developed very much in favour of economic growth, rather than the win-win compromise it is proposed to represent. There can be environmental concerns, but not at the expense of economic returns (see Baldock, 2005). As Hartwick and Peet (2003:202) note, the World Trade Organisation dispute system has always found in favour of growth and trade and against the environment - a win-win situation, only for growth and trade.

Ecological modernism, based around the nodal point ‘sustainability’ is the most common articulation of environmental ideas in New Zealand politics. This can be seen in a multitude of similar policy suggestions from a variety of parties. For example, the Progressive Party suggests amongst other things ‘ increase Department of Conservation funding to better monitor ecosystems, protect endangered species and their habitats…’(Progressive Party, 2005a). At the other end of the political spectrum, the ACT party suggests that ‘the government has a duty to ensure that a full range of New Zealand’s natural heritage is protected in perpetuity..’ (ACT Party, 2005). Similar policy suggestions emanate from all the major parties. This technique is a moderately successful one because it plays on the hegemony of the environment movement, and the discourse of ‘clean, green New Zealand’, without disturbing the economic social imaginary. The lack of impact on the economic is evident in the examples cited above. The Progressive Party and the ACT Party have very different (in the New Zealand context) economic visions, but are both still able to make similar environmental policy suggestions. Thus while ecological modernism as a discourse may be successful in achieving small changes, if one takes the position that it is unrestrained capitalist economic growth that is at the heart of the environmental problem, then true change cannot be achieved from ecological modernism.


This discursive environment is a difficult one for the Green Party to operate in. It appears that environmentalism can only be articulated in either economic terms, e.g. ‘looking after the environment makes good economic sense’, or through discourses similar to that suggested in ecological modernism. As noted above, while these strategies can achieve minor and important changes, they do so without challenging the fundamental antagonism between economic growth and environmental degradation. Without the articulation of this antagonism, the overall goals of the environmental movement appear ultimately doomed. Any attempt to take a previously noted alternative option and directly evoke the fundamental form of the economy as the main cause of economic problems appears impossible to the point that it does not occur in parliamentary politics.

The nearest example is the Green Party critiquing the capitalist ethos, normally in internal documents, such as the Green Party Charter, which twice states that ‘ unlimited material growth is impossible’(Green Party, 2005e), or to receptive groups, such as Nandor Tanczos’ speech to the CTU Youth Council, in which he states ‘ the Greens believe we need a fundamentally different approach to the economy’ (Tanczos, 2005). Indeed Tanczos writes the foreword to ‘Babylon and Beyond : The Economics of Anti-Capitalist, Anti-Globalist and Radical Green Movements’(Wall, 2005). However, in the Green Party political discourse articulated with the general public in mind, no such alternative social imaginary for change is articulated. Instead, ideas are presented in much the same manner as for the other parties; in terms of economic benefits, or without reference to the economy.

A common technique used by the Greens is to try to frame discourse in business terms ‘the Green party recognises the importance of trade to our economy’ (Green Party, 2005g), or ‘I would like to make clear at the outset that the Green Party recognises successful businesses are crucial to a thriving economy’ (Donald, 2005b). Indeed, ‘green’ ideas are suggested as a better way of life within the capitalistic framework. Rather than bringing down the system which is causing the problems, the Green Party seeks to improve it: ‘a Green economy is not about going without, but rather doing things smarter’ (Ward, 2005). Alternatively, the Greens have attempted to articulate their environmental ideas as economic problems by (implicitly) redefining what is included in the economic. Describing economics as ‘about more than money- it about how we use resources’, the Green arty is dealing with the ‘big/global economic challenges that other parties ignore’ (Green Party, 2005b).

Conversely, Green Party environmental ideas have been articulated without reference to their environmental benefits, particularly those relating to either traffic/public transport, energy or ‘peak oil’. For example, a proposal to implement an electric rail system in Auckland is articulated in terms of ‘combating gridlock’ and ‘unclogging roads’ without mention of the potential environmental benefits (Locke, 2005). It is interesting to note that it is these ideas that have been included in the policy concessions won by the Greens in their co-operation agreement with Labour after the 2005 election(Labour led government co-operation agreement with the Green party, 2005).

However, as noted, neither of the above techniques is likely to bring about large scale change, and this is not a problem restricted to New Zealand. A similar issue can be seen in the British press, where environmentalism is generally articulated with reference to the importance of economic growth (Carvalho, 2005). The hegemonic power of the economy is such that environmental groups worldwide are forced to articulate their concerns in the very terms against which they are opposed (Fernado, 2003:15-16). However, it is difficult to simply reject a concept such as sustainability, or a discourse like ecological modernism because, as Fernado (2003:7) notes, to reject the concept in the contemporary climate of environmental discourse is to tacitly endorse unsustainable practices.

This paper has so far painted a picture of a deadlock for environmental discourse; the environment movement risks losing its identity if it is articulated with economics, but risks being irrelevant if it is articulated outside of it. However, Laclau would not suggest that this deadlock is in anyway unbreakable. It may be, as John Barry (2003:620) suggests, that radical change can only come from those environmental elements that are not articulated as part of the dominant economic discourse. This position is certainly congruent with that of Laclau.

The potential for social change through elements that are excluded from a discourse returns the debate to Laclau’s position on universalism. As noted above, Laclau considers universalism to be impossible, accept through a subversion of the system of signification that occurs only at the limits of discourse in the form of antagonism and empty signifiers. The analysis of the limits of signification and especially the notion of a (empty) signifier representing that which cannot be represented is a Lacanian position. However, Laclau’s position has not always been strictly Lacanian. In Laclau’s first enunciation of discourse theory, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (1985), Laclau, in conjunction with Chantal Mouffe, developed a notion of discourse from a predominately Post-structuralist line of reasoning. In this work the focus was on structural regularities created through the practice of articulation, which establishes a relationship amongst partial elements, which are known as floating signifiers (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985:105).

In this construction Laclau supplemented the Post-structuralist perspective with a limit point of language that was purely external. Laclau considered that the limit of society was established by what lay outside of it; the Real. The difficulty with this conception was that it implicitly suggested an ahistorical limit to discourse, something that Laclau has never endorsed. To avoid the construction of such a limit, Laclau later adopted Zizek’s critique, particularly Zizek’s work in Beyond Discourse Analysis (1990), where Zizek suggested that what is negated in symbolic has already been negated by the Real. Thus Laclau adopted the position that the Real is strictly internal to society. Therefore the limit to the discursive can only be shown within the discursive itself. Laclau terms this process social antagonism. Social antagonisms occur where discourses collide, thus, similar to empty signifiers, antagonism reveals the system limit of the social. It is through antagonism that meanings are challenged and destabilised, through those elements in the discursive that have been excluded. However, while antagonisms are a destructive force, they also provide the conditions for the development of new hegemonic discourse, and therefore are also productive (Howarth & Stavrakakis, 2000:9-14).

Thus, for Laclau the encounter with the limits of discourse, and as a result the Real produces a dislocation, or subversion of the process of symbolisation, which while showing the impossibility of universalism, is also the only possibility of universalism. This possibility comes in the form of an empty signifier. Empty signifiers take a vital role in the production of hegemonic discourses and provide the core of any social imaginary and thus anchor discourse (Laclau, 2000d: 207). Empty signifiers are a response to the negative limit of the discursive system. This limit cannot be another difference, but is rather the very possibility of difference itself. Therefore the pure negativity of the system limit cannot be directly signified, but rather shows itself through the breakdown of the process of signification (Laclau, 1996:37). However, this negativity can be positively symbolised, but only through empty signifiers, which become empty by removing any attachment to a signified. As a result the empty signifier represents not only the ontic content which it carries, but the very principle of representation itself (Laclau, 2000c:71). Thus as society starts to develop a fullness that will be ultimately denied, it produces empty signifiers as a discursive response to attempt to deal with this impossible fullness (Laclau, 2000d:185).

Although the empty signifier is empty by itself, it takes on a universal function. This universal function is filled with meaning by what is referred to as the ‘logic of equivalence’. This logic is a chain of signs which seek to fill the universal emptiness of the empty signifier. This logic is crucial for liberal democracy, as political representatives compete to fill the chain of equivalence. This is not to say that there is only one possible empty signifier operating within a discursive system. Competition occurs both through expansions of chains of equivalence and difference (which seek to deconstruct the universal signification) to fill the empty signifier, and between empty signifiers within the realm of the discursive.

Because the empty signifier is by definition empty, no ontic content necessarily stems from the system limit that produces empty signifiers. Instead the type of signifiers that fill an empty signifier are entirely reliant on the context in which they are created, and thus the uneveness of the social. The degree to which a signifier is empty is also dependent on the context in which it develops; the less institutionalised and controlled the discursive circumstance, the emptier the signifier is likely to be. Indeed the total logic of an empty signifier cannot be derived from its abstract formal possibility (Laclau, 2000d:192).

Nor are empty signifiers particulary stable, as they are constructed on a foundation of negativity (the limit of the discursive). Because of this an empty signifier (and thus a hegemony or social imaginary) is never stable, or as noted previously, universal. Rather any foundation is always historical and contingent. Because of this historicity, the possibility exists for the rearticulation of environmental discourse, and more importantly, of the discursive conception of the economy. It is the latter that holds the most hope for the environmental movement from a Laclauian point of view. Laclau suggests that environmental discourse needs to get at the fundamental point of antagonism between environmentalism and economics, and begin to rearticulate environmentalism as economics, such as the Green Party’s earlier noted suggestion of that environmental issues are economic issues.

Laclau emphasises the need to present a positive social imaginary for the reconstruction of society, rather than just negative demands which contrast to the existing order (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985:189). Laclau terms this the difference between a ‘strategy of opposition’ and a ‘strategy of construction of a new order’(ibid:189). In his opinion any strategy which takes the former route is ‘condemned to marginality’(ibid:189).

The Green Party follows the strategy of positive construction of a new social imaginary, however it appears that they almost take it too far; they generally do not seek to deconstruct the power of the economic at the same time. The Green Party constructs a social imaginary broadly based on the discourse of ecological modernism that was introduced earlier. Thus they seek to positively develop a new social imaginary on top of the existing economic order, and rearticulate the economic towards the environmental movement. However, in doing this they do not deal with the fundamental antagonism between economics and environmentalism. This is the point of departure in the analysis from Laclau’s work. As noted previously, Laclau’s theoretical position is limited to an abstract level of analysis, so there is no formal theoretical suggestion as to whether this strategy will ultimately be successful for the Green movement in the long term, the analysis must be purely context dependent, particulary focused on the uneveness of the social. The major concern for the environmental movement would be that by not deconstructing the fundamental issues at the heart of the economic/environmental antagonism, those of the capitalist ethos and the use of natural resources, the economic is more likely to overpower the environmental.

Slavoj Zizek would certainly agree that a change in economic system cannot occur purely through the articulation of environmental concerns, although for different reasons than those suggested from a Laclauian perspective. Zizek’s approach places more emphasis on the effects of the Real and also use of fantasy to support the symbolic and prevent the subject from the effects of the Real. However, Zizek’s position is not far removed from Laclau’s. Indeed, Zizek endorses the majority of the basic premises of discourse theory (Zizek, 1990). However, Zizek’s work does vary from Laclau’s in its political conclusions, and can produce further insights in the analysis of New Zealand environmental discourse.

Zizek’s notions of the symbolic and imaginary, taken from his reading of Lacan, are particularly useful tools to add to the Laclauian analysis of environmental discourse. Of particular interest is the role the imaginary plays in supporting the symbolic ‘against’ the effect of the Real. However, to properly understand these concepts, one must first understand the Zizekian concept of the Real, which varies slightly, but importantly, from that proposed by Laclau.

With his Lacanian background, Zizek led Laclau in the development of the concept of the Real, a term which Laclau is reluctant to use (Laclau, 2000d:66). Like Laclau, Zizek considers the empty signifier as the point around which the socio-symbolic field is structured (Zizek, 1990:249). However, in contrast to Laclau, Zizek is more concerned with the effects of the Real. Zizek considers the Real not only in terms of empty signifiers and antagonisms, but also as a traumatic impossibility of the discursive. Zizek also proposes a hierarchy of antagonism, between the fundamental impossibility of the discursive (the Real) and the interplay within discourse (caused by the partially fixed nature of discourse) in terms of Saussurean differential relations (Zizek, 2000b:215).

Zizek terms the ontological separation that he believes is necessary in Laclau’s work as the ‘double’, because there is a double negation at work. Not only can the Real not be fully represented by discourse, but neither is it able to fully represent this negation (ibid). Thus in Zizek’s hierarchy of antagonisms, there is the ahistorical level of the Real, and the historical plane of discursive social antagonism.

While Zizek proposes an ahistorical dimension of the Real, he does not suggest that the Real is an external positive force. Much like Laclau, Zizek considers that the Real can only be experienced through the disruption of the symbolic. However, at the same time the Real can be conceived to precede the symbolic order (Zizek, 1989:169). This paradoxical state of affairs can only be understood by rejecting the positivistic notion of cause and effect. The Real can only show itself through the failure of symbolisation, in subversion of the process of symbolisation (such as empty signifiers), or through paradox and contradiction. Thus it appears as an effect without a cause. This is not to say that a cause does not exist, but rather that the cause can only be viewed retroactively and through symbolic mediation.

Thus the affects of the Real can be felt, but not directly. This affect can only be seen through failures in symbolisation (empty signifiers and antagonism), or paradoxes and anxiety (Stavrakakis, 1999:85). Although the impossibility of the Real prevents certainty over its effects, one can suggest possible ways in which it is disrupting symbolisation. One of these possible means is through paradox, which can be seen in the Green Party’s position on overseas investment. While the Greens encourage the expansion of New Zealand’s refugee program (Green Party, 2005f), and generally take a global approach to environment issues, they take a surprisingly nationalistic approach to both trade (Green Party, 2005g) and overseas investment (Green Party, 2005a). Because this cannot be put down to nationalism or xenophobia, given the previous noted positions, it can be tentatively suggest that this is an example of symbolism failing in Green discourse. While it appears that the Greens implicitly seek to take an anti-capitalist, or at least anti-growth position, it seems that this position simply cannot be articulated, and thus comes out in a paradoxical nationalist position.

The Real can only be viewed through these breakdowns in symbolisation because it is not anything by itself; it is lack, the absence of presence, a negative ontic dimension. Therefore one can only depend on symbolic and imaginary constructs to deal with the trauma and anxiety that it evokes. It is the role of the imaginary, commonly termed fantasy, which is particularly productive for this analysis. Zizek articulated this importance most lucidly in his analysis of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in Welcome to the Desert of the Real (2002b). The 9/11 attacks are a good example of an intrusion of the Real into the symbolic order. This occurred in two ways. Firstly, the material world of violence and terror intruded to places that it had never been before (corporate America), and secondly, and perhaps controversy, we have the violent intrusion of the disavowaled foundations of American (and western) capitalist society. Those elements that could not previously be articulated (that the capitalist system was based on an exploitation of the third world) had violently intruded upon the silent order. This is not to suggest that the Real exists as a physical entity in contradistinction to our previous definition. Rather, the Real is the failure of discourse and the break down of symbolisation; those things that simply cannot be acknowledged for the symbolic order to continue in its current form. Their intrusion marks a failure of symbolisation as the symbolic order is broken down and dislocated.

However, although it appears that the 9/11 attacks were an intrusion of the Real, and thus should have produced a symbolic dislocation of discourse, this dislocation did not occur in American culture. George W. Bush did not proclaim that he had seen the error of America’s ways and commit to ending world poverty. Rather he sought to rid the world of the ‘evil’ that had carried out the attacks, with well known consequences. For Zizek America’s response to the attacks marked an intrusion of the realm of fantasy into the Real (Zizek, 2002b:16). A dislocation of the symbolic did not occur because the intrusion of the Real was too easily papered over by the resources of fantasy available. Zizek claims the attacks could be too easily perceived as a Hollywood blockbuster, and thus were too easily integrated into the world of fantasy. However, rather than this being the Real influencing the register of fantasy, conversely we saw the realm of fantasy influencing how we were affected by the Real. As evidence Zizek cites the difference between the reporting of the 9/11 attacks and that of violence in other parts of the world. Third world news reports are often accompanied with the disclaimer ‘Some scenes are extremely graphic and may offend viewers’. But, Zizek asks, 'where were these scenes in 9/11?' Where was the blood, or the bodies, or any evidence of the human carnage? There was none. This allowed the public to go on with their normal lives without dislocation: violence like that does not happen ‘here’ (Zizek, 2002b).

This example is of vital importance for the analysis of environmental discourse. Intrusions of the Real, seen through the limits and failure of discourse, can only be felt through the symbolic and resources of fantasy available. For example, a National Institute of Water and Atmospheric Research (NIWA) study showed that 95% of New Zealand’s lowland rivers and streams were too polluted for people to swim in or drink from (Larned, Scarsbrook, Snelder, Norton, & Biggs, 2004). This report received no press or political attention outside of attempts by the Green Party at articulating this information (e.g. Fitzsimons, 2005), including an aborted billboard campaign (Green Party, 2005d). It appears that this study, which is in complete contrast to New Zealand’s ‘clean, green’ image, simply could not be articulated within the given symbolic and imaginary resources available in New Zealand political discourse, and thus received no media or political attention.

A similar avoidance of the antagonism between economic growth and environmental preservation is evident in the 2005 report of the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment (PCE, 2005). While the report expressly criticises over-consumption in New Zealand as one of the major causes of pollution, the report adds that the Commissioner is not advocating an ‘anti-growth agenda’(PCE, 2005:5). The report also suggests that New Zealand has an unsustainable ecological footprint ( a measure of the use of the natural environment) (PCE, 2005:32), yet still most New Zealanders hold a positive image of our environment. Further to this, the PCE report adds that most of New Zealand’s efforts in sustainable development are aimed at waste reduction, an individual problem, rather than waste prevention, which would require a change to the consumer society of which the report is so critical (PCE, 2005:110-113). In the end, the report arrives at no firm conclusion, and is simply unable to articulate the antagonism that it implicitly suggests.

From a Zizekian perspective the antagonism between capitalist economics and environmental preservation simply cannot be articulated within the exisiting symbolic resources without a dislocation of that symbolic order. Therefore in the context of New Zealand’s environmental discourse, this antagonism becomes the Real, the limit point of the discursive, the point at which the symbolic order fails. However, evoking a conception of the Real as a positive ontic force appears in contradistinction to the previous definition of the Real.

Zizek’s contends that this form of the Real is not the ‘real’ Real that was previously defined, but rather the symbolic Real. In For they know not what they want to do, Zizek expands on the three registers that Lacan suggests: the symbolic, the real and the imaginary. To this triad, Zizek suggests that the entire triad is again evoked in each of the registers (Zizek, 2002a:xii). The symbolic real is the consistent backdrop for the social - what it always refers back to and as such the limit point of the discourse. Zizek contends that in contemporary western society, the historical ground of all contemporary hegemony is constituted in capitalism. Thus, like in New Zealand politics, no one can envisage a social imaginary that is alternative to capitalism, and therefore the Green Party cannot articulate a radically different environmental social imaginary (Zizek, 2000b:223; 2000c:319). In these circumstances it is capitalism as the Real in symbolic form that is distorting symbolisation.

The notion of a symbolic real in the form of capitalism suggests an ahistorical limit to discourse, something that Laclau rejects as a form of essentialism. Judith Butler, however, also considers essentialism present in Laclau’s work. Butler suggests that Laclau establishes an ahistorical structural limit to language. She considers that this limit occurs because what can be said about language users - that there is a structural impossibility at work - can be said about all language users (Bulter, 2000:34). Butler contends that this has important connotations for social change and particularly the capacity for hegemony to be truly contingent (Bulter, 2000:13).

Zizek accepts that he did originally evoke an ahistorical limit. In the introduction to the second edition of For they know not what they do, Zizek concedes that in The Sublime Object of Ideology (1989), he endorsed a quasi-transcendental reading of Lacan, which lead to an apparent celebration of failure and limitation, similar to that suggested by Butler (Zizek, 2002a:xii). Zizek attributed this mistake to a failure to properly articulate the complexity of the Real, and in particular its relationship to the other two registers in the Lacanian triad, the symbolic and the imaginary. However, in his dialogue with Butler and Laclau, in which Butler’s critique was enunciated, Zizek denies evoking a form of essentialism is his contemporary work and with this he is supported by Laclau. Laclau considers that a limit that is a negative limit and thus requires no ontic determination, is not an ahistorical limit. Laclau also rejects the idea of capitalism as a Real, arguing that this does evoke an ahistorical limit (Laclau, 2000a:292). However, Zizek would deny that the symbolic Real is an essentialist notion. Rather it forms the very condition of historicity itself. The symbolic Real is not the pure absence of presence of the real Real, but forms the base of the second element of Zizek’s double; it provides the conditions for hegemony. Thus the symbolic Real cannot be ahistorical because it is totally context dependent; by itself it has no ontic content.

As well as an expansion of the Real, Zizek also importantly supplements discourse theory with his Lacanian notion of fantasy, particularly ideological fantasy, that was introduced earlier. Fantasy occurs because of the constitutive lack inherent in the subject. The function of fantasy is to provide an imaginary state of affairs which positively fills the void inherent in the barred subject (Zizek, 2005:277). Ideological fantasy is different from the regular conception of ideology. Rather than distorting an underlying positively, as in the traditional negative Marxist sense, ideology provides a consistency against the Real, removing traces of the Real and presenting the symbolic as ontologically filled.

Thus ideology functions as a double movement. Not only is the constitutive lack of the subject masked, but so is the very illusion itself. The very existence of ideology implies that those participating in its process are unaware of its essence (Zizek, 1989:21). Thus through ideology the subject does not escape from reality, but rather escapes from the prospect of the Real (ibid, 45). Ideology often functions by externalising this lack, elevating the ideological objective onto the level of the impossible. The externalisation of the affects of the Real is seen consistently in environmental discourse. For New Zealand First (NZFirst, 2005a) and United Future (United Future, 2005), New Zealand can continue to fulfil its obligations to the Kyoto protocol, but only if our major trading partners do so as well. Thus there is a basic lack, New Zealand can never be totally environmentally friendly, it cannot live up to its ‘clean, green, 100% pure’ image. To deal with the impossibility of living up to this image, the lack is externalised to the other in the form of our major trading partners.

Indeed, the Kyoto protocol is an example of ideological fantasy in itself. The Kyoto protocol is ecological modernism par excellence, in that it seeks partial solutions through technological advancement, rather than looking at the root causes of environmental problems. For Zizek, these partial solutions are a classic example of ideological fantasy at work. While partial solutions do not produce major changes in the protection of the environment, they fulfil a vital role in maintaining the central environmental fantasy of western environmentalism. This is the fantasy of win-win environmentalism and economic growth, the main fantasy being that people can go on living their consumerist lives, gaining pleasure from the consumption of products (Glynos & Stavrakakis, 2003:120), without having to be concerned with the environmental effect of this consumption. The lack that is inherent in the antagonism between these positions can be externalised through partial solutions (e.g. eco-efficiency), which allows the subject to feel environmentally friendly, while continuing on with a pleasurable life of consumption.

The role of pleasure and enjoyment is vital to the power of fantasy, and in many ways accounts for the difficulty of displacing existing political orders (Glynos & Stavrakakis, 2003:120). This effect of pleasure and enjoyment is played out in desire, where the lack inherent in the symbolic through the effect of the Real is positivized into the form of fantasy and presented as an object-cause of desire; Lacan’s object petit a (ibid:117) As Glynos & Stavrakakis (ibid:120) illustrate, jouissance and enjoyment cannot be seen as a simple supplement to Lacan’s work, but indeed constitute its main explanatory power. Thus, because Laclau takes on so much of Lacan’s work, it is difficult to understand why he largely ignores the pleasure/fantasy aspect of Lacan. For Laclau there is a symbolic positivization of lack in terms of empty signifiers, which as Anna Marie Smith suggests, provide a jouissance of their own through the prospect of a return to pleasure before language, which would explain the power of empty signifiers in discourse (A. M. Smith, 1998:80). Yet Laclau does not extend this to an imaginary dimension of positivization as Lacan does (Glynos & Stavrakakis, 2003:118). Because of this silence, it is important to consider Zizek’s contribution to these matters, given that Zizek agrees with the basic constructs of discourse theory.

Jouissance is a kind of re-symbolic Real pleasure/fulfilment which is necessarily lost (Glynos & Stavrakakis, 2003:117). Jouissance is the part of the subject that is lost upon entry into language. Fantasy promises a (postponed) encounter with this lost jouissance (ibid, 117). However, the aim of fantasy is not to quench desire completely, but rather to support and structure it (ibid, 121).

The structuring of desires is an important facet of fantasy, particularly in relation to the symbolic register/discourse. Jouissance and fantasy support and structure identifications and articulations and thus provide a second step on top of the symbolic. They offer an enjoyment aspect to symbolic identifications(Zizek, 1989:125). This is not to suggest that fantasy functions only as a supplement to discourse and that the process is simply one way. Rather, the two interact to produce political identifications and articulations. As Laclau suggests, although in different terms, fantasy, and indeed the intrusion of the Real, can only occur within the symbolic resources available. However, it is these elements, rather than the purely symbolic, that in Zizek’s view are the most powerful factors. For Zizek, we have to acknowledge that political views are not created by rational dialogue, but rather the underlying fantasies and pleasure that supports these exchanges (A. M. Smith, 1998).

Therefore any analysis of politics from a Zizekian point of view must necessarily exist not only at the level of the symbolic, but also at the level of fantasy as well (ibid). Political battles cannot be fought purely at the level of discourse, over the ‘facts’, but must deal with the fantasies that provide the conditions of possibility for these facts (Torfing, 1999:114). This is a mistake that the Greens made in their attempted post-election dialogue with business leaders, wanting ‘a rational debate based on facts rather than anecdote’ (Donald, 2005a). However, this position ignores the manner in which the Greens were presented in discourse during the election, mainly as an externalised other, extremist and outside of the mainstream. For example, United Future suggested that ‘If the Greens get in power the environment with become a no-go zone for humans’ (United Future, 2005). Although not explicitly directed at the Green party, both New Zealand First and the National Party make similar attempts to externalise the environmental movement as extreme, New Zealand First suggesting that the Resource Management Act (1991) has become an act of political correctness designed for special interests groups (NZ First, 2005a) and National, whilst discussing the same Act, suggesting the need to remove ‘frivolous’ objectors from the process(National Party, 2005b). Thus, from a Zizekian point of view the Greens could/should not stake their case based on rational facts, but must deal with the underlying fantasies that are supporting the use of the ‘facts’. The form and content of these underlying fantasies is outside of the scope of this paper and requires a larger analysis, not only in terms of Zizekian theory, but also of a wider range of discursive material, particulary popular culture, from which Zizek finds much of his inspiration.

Although Laclau ignores the role of pleasure and enjoyment in political life, Laclau and Zizek’s positions are not radically different. Indeed, Laclau states that he agrees with the Zizekian notion of ideological fantasy in terms of the positive externalising of an impossible object, as he does with the category of the empty signifier (Laclau, 2000d:198). However, what Laclau does question is whether the relationship between the fundamental impossibility of symbolisation and the external object is always an arbitrary one. Laclau suggests that often the external obstacles preventing the fullness of society, such as apartheid, are concrete and practical rather than the collective imaginary constructs of the psyche; they are discursive, rather than imaginary (ibid, 199). Therefore it is submitted that Laclau would argue that the environmental movement in New Zealand faces not only the externalisation of its impossibility into fantasy in Zizekian terms, but also practical obstacles as well. For example, the current legal framework is not purely a construction of ideological fantasy, yet still provides an external obstacle to the fufillment of the environmental movement. Thus, the ecological modernism evident in Green Party policy, such as extended producer reponsibility for production (Ward, 2005), is an important step is creating social change, particulary if it can be tied to a positive and concrete alternative social imaginary.

It can be suggested that Laclau’s silence on jouissance revolves around its essentialist qualities, a transcendentalist aspect of social thought that Laclau is at pains to avoid (Glynos & Stavrakakis, 2003:119). However, much like the Laclauian notion of the negativity of the Real which requires no ahistorical consideration, jouissance fits into the same category, as it is also unrepresentable; like the Real it is an effect that is felt without a cause.

Perhaps Laclau’s silence on these matters is linked to his dislike of the psychoanalytical political project, of which Zizek is the most prominent contemporary advocate. In the dialogue between Laclau, Zizek and Judith Butler, in Contingency, Hegemony and Universality, Laclau contends that Zizek’s thought is not politically based, but is rather psychoanalytically founded and simply uses examples from the political field (Laclau, 2000a:289). Laclau makes this allegation against the background of Zizek’s wish to overthrow capitalism and with it liberal democracy, without presenting a viable alternative. Zizek describes this action as traversing the fantasy, and thus evoking the miracle of the Real. In Zizek opinion, it is only through radical actions like this which are especially traumatic and cannot be maintained, that true radical social change can occur. This contrasts heavily with Laclau’s alternative of partial solutions in the name of a necessarily impossible radical imaginary.


Laclau says that while he does not seek compromises, such as Anthony Giddens’ notion of the ‘Third Way’, he considers that no demand can be satisfied as a separate entity, it always has to be in the name of some imaginary. This requires some degree of systematicity, rather than the gradualism of a neutral administrative centre (Laclau, 2000d:198). Nor can these demands be purely negative, instead they must present a concrete alternative upon which demands can be placed (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985). Laclau states that all the major societal changes during the 20th century occurred because of alternations in the name of a global social imaginary (Laclau, 2000d:198).

However, for Zizek this kind of solution is the antithesis of change. It might produce minor change within the contours of the system, but it will leave the system itself intact. This is because the partial solutions that Laclau advocates fuel Zizek’s conceptions of fantasy, because by achieving small changes, such as increased eco-efficiency, the illusion of true change is evoked, without really achieving anything at all. Thus partial solutions absolve the subject of ethno-political responsibility; in response to this Zizek desires an evocation of the Real, by traversing the closure of fantasy (Stavrakakis, 1999:84). To step into the Real is not to abandon language, but rather remove the illusion of fantasy as an external cause of the lack inherent in the symbolic Other (Zizek, 2003:69). By doing this the subject is open to dislocation from the effects of the Real. However, this is not to state that by simply traversing the fantasy the system can be radically changed in a politically progressive manner. Like Laclau, Zizek believes that a dislocation can only occur within the symbolic resources available.

Therefore, perhaps a conflation of Laclau’s and Zizek’s approach would be the best strategy for the Green Party to take. Zizek has shown the manner in which fantasy prevents radical change occurring through the rational play of language. However, at the same time the resources created by discursive articulation, best examined by discourse theory, create the conditions for fantasy, or possible intrusions of the Real. Consequently, the Green Party could attempt to rearticulate environmental and economic discourse to best take advantage of the role of fantasy and the possibility of dislocation. This strategy is one that is currently used, particularly with the notion of ‘peak oil’. Peak oil is not a concept that presently operates as a discursive nodal point, even in environmental discourse, however were peak oil to grip discourse, and in particular economic discourse, this would most likely produce a dislocation, as the collective realisation that the current economic system cannot continue at its existing pace is currently outside of the limits of New Zealand economic discourse. Were ‘peak oil’ to become a mainstream political issue, the Green Party would be well placed to rearticulate the economic more in terms of the environmental movement. Such a dislocation could also produce a radical change from the current economic social imaginary. However, such is the nature of intrusions of the Real, that not only can an intrusion not be predicted, but if peak oil were to produce a dislocation, it could not be fully controlled. While symbolic resources could be articulated to prepare for such a dislocation, one could not be sure that the dislocation would result in a move towards environmentalism. As Zizek notes, the power of fantasy is such that it can often paper over dislocations.

However, an alternative Zizekian method which focused on fantasy appears to be practically unfeasible without a substitute social imaginary. But, for Zizek proposing an alternative social imaginary creates another fantasy, and would contradict the notion of traversing fantasy. Yet without an alternative imaginary the result of such as traverse could only be random. It may produce radical change but this change may not be better than the existing social order. Without an alternative imaginary would the natural environment be better with the removal of liberal capitalism? This is necessarily unknowable, and thus it seems practically unfeasible.

Therefore one cannot suggest that the Green Party evoke a Zizekian approach. Even if it is considered that evoking a (random) radical change is politically progressive, failure to create such a change would risk the Green Party and the environmental movement in New Zealand, becoming irrelevant if the concerns they articulated in trying to deconstruct fantasy did gain a discursive grip. Therefore it is wise for the Green Party to take Laclau’s stance and attempt to rearticulate environmental discourse, in terms of a positive alternative social imaginary. This imaginary can become incrementally more radical to reflect what change has been achieved. This strategy is as risky as Zizek’s in that at may only achieve change that does not really change anything.

The Green Party is placed in a difficult situation, one which the work of neither Laclau nor Zizek is able to resolve. Although the current Green Party strategy, predominately based on ecological modernism, is certainly a limited approach in what it can achieve, Zizek’s alternative method also risks irrelevancy. However, both Laclau and Zizek offer vital insights into environmental discourse in New Zealand. Particularly productive are Laclau’s notions of hegemony, social imaginary and empty signifiers. Zizek takes on the basic premises of these notions, and supplements them with conceptions of fantasy, ideology and jouissance. Without these elements, Laclau’s discourse theory appears to be able to produce only limited political solutions. One is left wondering whether discourse theory can integrate the notions of fantasy and pleasure and produce a political and theoretical method similar to its current conception, or does discourse theory have to be radically deconstructed to integrate fantasy and pleasure? If discourse theory cannot include fantasy and pleasure, is there an alternative to Zizek’s psychoanalytically based political strategy? The answers to these questions are unfortunately beyond the scope of this paper. What is required is a new formulation that deals with these impasses, yet retains the productive elements of both Laclau’s and Zizek’s work. Only a new formulation can possibility provide a political method that can deal with the dilemmas that this paper highlights for environmental discourse in New Zealand.






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