I watched a snail crawl along the edge of a straight razor...

I watched a snail crawl along the edge of a straight razor. That's my dream. That's my nightmare. Crawling, slithering, along the edge of a straight razor, and surviving ( Apocalypse Now).

What I am ultimately trying to produce is a political/economic theory or program that is not simply deconstructive, but rather can be used in a political sense of making the space of the political ethical in itself. However, this is extremely problematic and in the most part goes against the work of Laclau and Zizek. Yet I am continuing with it because I believe that there has to be something wrong with the material despair and suffering in the world. However, I cannot find a direct route to the ethical through psychoanalysis, so I am searching for an opportunity to do so whilst staying within the theoretical confines of psychoanalysis. I believe that Laclau and Zizek do this themselves; they also just can’t justify it.

So, what is the problem? I have stated what I believe the issue to be, why isn’t this enough? The problem starts with contingency and necessity. We see that essentialism is rejected because we have no access to the real, to Truth; everything is mediated through the system of meaning which is the symbolic. Therefore nothing is necessary; it is simply contingent on the discursive and the sliding of signifiers. However, if something is simply contingent, then relativism is the danger; if anything goes than everything stays. This presents three problems- one ontological, one normative, and the third of the relationship between them.

Ontologically, if contingency is necessary doesn’t this contradict the very basis of contingency? This is Judith Butler’s criticism, which Laclau firmly rejects- if historicity is purely historical than in this case is it possible to have a society look like that was ahistorical? Rather Laclau argues that it is the relationship between the two which is important; contingency can only occur within the necessary (the symbolic), but the symbolic is at the same time contingent. Zizek makes a similar point in relation to the concrete universal, which occurs when we see the contingency in the necessary. This contingency is the necessary exclusion of a singular, which creates the space for the concrete universal. The concrete universal is the ethical moment of the social; it is the process that keeps power fluid, and the key moment for both Laclau and Zizek, if in different ways. As Laclau states in Reflections on the revolutions of our time (211);

‘ A free society is not one where a social order has been established that is better adapted to human nature, but one which is more aware of the contingency and historicity of any order’

Laclau’s point here is certainly theoretically consistent, yet it is insufficient in itself for what I am trying to achieve. For one it is necessarily unable to politically construct, nor does is it able to produce an adequate account (for me) of why we should care for the disavowed, whose material suffering, I’m sure they would not agree, is not contingent. Therefore I find myself trying to theoretically devise a scheme around what I intuitively feel, rather than cognitively consider. It is easy to get into a quasi-solipsistic introspective spiral about the affective dimensions of my attempts at theorising. But we have bigger fish to fry. Hopefully. Thus, I am left wondering if we extend this ethical approach further (of contingency), can it deal with the kind of material suffering I am feeling for?


‘Once we accept the necessity of the political and the impossibility of a world without antagonism, what needs to be envisaged is how it is possible under those conditions to create or maintain a pluralistic democratic order; we must not have enemies to be destroyed, but adversaries to be tolerated’


Thus Laclau contends that a normative approach does arise from the ontological (the ethics of the universal- radical democracy). However, he does deny that any particular substance can come from the empty universal. This is my difficulty. It leaves me stuck back at the point that I have to wonder whether this is simply the ethic of psychoanalysis and there is a possibility of something outside of it which could potentially be developed. Here I am thinking about whether an ethics, based on psychoanalysis e.g. contingency can provide the base for a political system. This is mainly because of my second exception, that of the normative.

If all is contingent, why do we favour some above others? If anything goes, doesn’t everything stay? This is an accusation that Laclau strongly rejects, although I can’t really say why and indeed Laclau certainly prefers the left wing politics to the right. Why is this?

In some works, such as Contingency, Hegemony and Universality Laclau appears to deny taking a strong political position. He states that he is simply interested in the universal gap of the ethical which stays the same (in form) in every possible symbolisation. If we exploit this gap we can see the contingency of the social which is our goal, not human nature, even though, as ontological theory of the social and the subject, contingency as a value is as close to mapping human nature as a postmodern social theorist would get.

This, it seems to be is a half-arsed effort at emancipation. Laclau and Zizek appear to be prepared to reject any form of positive universalism and are aware of global issues, yet are not able/prepared to suggest a way forward outside of pure theory. Neither use contemporary political example nor analysis, and Zizek often ends up petering off into the kind of cultural analysis he dislikes so much. It is through this that we can emancipate human kind? Now of course such an effort is necessarily impossible. But that does not mean that politics cannot be a source of improvement, of emancipation still to come, a political form which is aware of its own impossibility, yet is able to address the horrible disavowed foundations of our society.

Sure, Zizek is right in suggesting that there is no freedom, other than the Leninist freedom to question the very parameters of society. However I believe that we need to take a further step to say that yes, this kind of freedom is vital to avoid/contain the horrific externalisation of lack that comes with any attempt at universalism, but there are steps that need to be taken to achieve this status. For example, the 100,000 dying of hunger everyday (http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2005/051028_Ziegler_PC.doc.htm) or the 25 million displaced by conflict war (http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/chap1.htm) have less of an opportunity to enjoy contingency than others.

Now one may argue that these are the result of other not being aware of the contingent and arbitrary nature of their own goals, and singular proof of the failure of the abstract universal. However, to deal with these issues, I believe a political/ethical system (of kinds) is required.

So what is my solution? Is the global institutionisation of radical democracy enough? This is a difficult area, and will be the start of a new piece. For here it is enough to identify the difficulty of any universal construction, even if it is empty, or striving to maintain the place of the ethical universal. Therefore we must deal with objections from Laclau, and most polemically Zizek. However, I believe that such a construction is a possible, if a difficult task.