The hole in the whole is the whole

The Universal is a vital concept in Slavoj Zizek’s theoretical and political apparatus. Zizek’s universality is neither a neutral place holder, nor positive and objective. The twin rejections of the traditional notions of universality give Zizek license to rehabilitate the concept of universality through the work of Jacques Lacan and Georg Hegel. These philosophers share a belief in the negativity of the social which prevents a full universal from occurring.

The key to Zizek’s notion of universality is the existence of an exception to the universal. This necessary exception- the singular or symptom- reveals the truth of the ‘abstract universal’. It is this side of the universal, known as the concrete universal, which can be identified with to achieve political change, similar to the psychoanalytic process of identifying with the symptom.

Although one cannot doubt that Lacan is the main influence on Zizek’s thought, Zizek has also re-read Hegel, après-coup to give a political edge to Lacan’s mostly apolitical thought. Likewise, Zizek has re-read Hegel through Lacan to make the former a philosopher of the real (Kay, 2003:17). This political edge is achieved through the Hegelian dialectic, which Zizek has renewed in the name of dialectical materialism.

The common bond between Hegel and Lacan is their belief in the radical negativity which reins at the heart of the social (Kay, 2003:17). This negative ontology occurs because of the nature of the symbolic universe. One cannot have access to things-in-themselves, all knowledge is mediated through the symbolic and therefore a gap, or lack, is introduced into the system. Therefore the signified only has a retroactive influence on the signifier. The play of signifiers creates meanings, however through ideological closure, these meaning are made, retroactively appear natural, as if they have developed naturally from the signifier. This same process is seen with the universal. Although a universal cannot objectively and fully develop, any universal is necessarily false. However, they are not posited this way. Instead a false, or abstract universal, appears to be both natural and universal. If is for this reason that focusing on the contingency and the necessary exclusion of and within the process of universality is politically advantageous.

Consequently the negative ontology of the social is the key focus for Zizek’s thought on universality. For Lacan it means that universality can never be fully constituted in itself. Instead any form of identity has to be abstracted from a particular, and as such must exclude to achieve this abstraction (Zizek, 1999:180). In contrast a positive ontology would create a natural universal, producing natural laws, such as the neo-liberal view of the market. Therefore, what is presented as a universal is an illusion; its truth lies in its exception. This exception is known as the universal singular (Kay, 2003:38-44; Zizek, 1999:188).

The universal singular leads to the concept of concrete universality, which is best exemplified through the Hegelian dialectic. The basic law of dialectics is to search for the exception to the series (Zizek, 2000:241). The dialectic has three stages to it;
- Reflection
- External reflection
- Determine reflection.

In terms of universality, in the first stage (reflection), an identity is posited in itself. We can describe this as abstract universality. Of course it is important to note that this universality is already negated in itself. It is this contradiction ( that the universal is never fully universal) which provides the main stimulus for the dialectical process (Zizek, 2002:42)

External reflection provides a negation of the first negation, in revealing that the universal is not universal, but rather a split particular. As an illustration, human rights maybe presented as a universal concept. However, this universal can never be fully universal; human rights always have to exclude something (Zizek, 1999:103). Therefore, through a negation of the negation, it can be revealed that human rights are not universal, but simply particular. In our current circumstance we could reveal that human rights are not universal, but rather particular to the propertied power elite.

However, it is determinate reflection which is the significant stage for universality. In determinate reflection it is revealed that the second negation, rather than being an impediment to the universal (e.g. we have not quite achieved a notion of universal human rights- but we are getting there), is rather the condition of the universal. Consequently the universal singular is the truth of the universal, of the gap between the universal and the particular (Zizek, 1999:180-1). As a result, it is important not to compare the universal with what it seeks to represent (e.g. Are these really universal human rights?), but rather with that which the abstract universal excludes to constitute itself; concrete universality (Zizek, 2002:160).
It is important to note that Zizek’s concrete universality is not the same as is usually cited from Hegel; that of unity with itself. Rather it is the exclusion within universality to which concrete universality refers, instead of the result of an absolute synthesis (Zizek, 2005:217). The exclusion that occurs within universality is thus the gap between abstract universality and concrete universality (Zizek, 2006:30).

Hence the concrete universal is not the singular in itself, or its gap, but rather the gap that the singular opens up, an inexplicable and uncanny gap between unity and excess; it is a constant stain on the abstract universal (Zizek, 1999:113; 2006:31). Therefore we see that the only possible identity contains a degree of non-identity (Kay, 2003:26).

In determinate reflection, the subject comes to recognise that the element of non-identity, the exclusion within universality which does not correspond with itself and identify with it; take responsibility for it. Therefore determinate reflection gives positive value to external reflection and it is in this sense that political change can be achieved (ibid: 37).

As such, concrete universality can be compared with the symptom (Zizek, 1989:180). Zizek defines as ‘… strictly speaking, a particular element which subverts its own universality’ (ibid :21). However, the symptom does not exist predominantly at the level of meaning. Rather, the symptom is also a real root of enjoyment that returns; the return of the repressed (ibid: 69). Accordingly, the symptom is psychoanalysis’ answer to idealism and Post-structuralism; the real jouissance adds the materialism to dialectical materialism. It is because of the symptom and its associated enjoyment that meanings stick, and universality grips the subject (ibid: 72).

It is through fantasy that we learn to control jouissance and structure our desire (Zizek, 1989:118). Fantasy masks the antagonistic fissure of the social, but is never in itself complete, it always takes its own failure into account. We see this with ideology. Although ideology helps to maintain a sense of ontological consistency, critically it provides a certain distance from the horror of that consistency. In this sense we get jouissance from ideological fantasy, both in the manner in which it provides the subject with fullness and prevents the subject from ever achieving that fullness.

Universality operates in much the same fashion as ideology. Universality exists at both the level of meaning and the level of enjoyment. The fantasmatic background of the level of enjoyment holds together the universal. While it is the empty/master signifier structures the symbolic, the flip side of the symbolic is its structuring of jouissance and desire. Therefore the obscene underside of the master signifier is objet a, which operates as both the cause and logic of desire. It is the cause since it acts to fill the lack in the symbolic, and the logic because objet a becomes the objet of desire. As a result, it is vital to search beyond the symbolic role of the universal, and understand the hidden fantasmatic process which ensures that certain notion’s of universality grip the subject and are thus difficult to dislodge. It is the role of psychoanalytic politics to reveal these hidden process that maintain the universal and political orders (Zizek, 1999:191). Political battles cannot be fought purely at the level of discourse, over the ‘facts’, but must deal with the fantasies that provide the conditions of possibility for these facts (Torfing, 1999:114).

This effect is in operation in the universality of the market in the capitalist system. The market is presented as a universal; it is a natural, objective device that brings maximum wealth and well-being to all. When the market fails to achieve this task, this failure is fantasised as an impediment to the market. The failure, which represents the singular of the universal and shows its contingency, is not considered a condition of the market, but rather something to be fixed; a solution-in-coming. It is fantasy which hides the true, universal (concrete) nature of the market, and prevents the disavowed violence which founds the creation of any universal (Zizek, 2002:33-4).

This constant failure, and thus the constant need for minor alteration in the name of universality provides jouissance in the same manner as ideology. The goal of universality is both necessarily and impossible. But this does not mean that it cannot be suspended, that we have to continue to operate within the rules of hegemony (Zizek, 1999:187). Indeed, the very suspension of hegemony, and the progression from the possible to the impossible (by altering the grounds upon which politics is fought) can be counted as the very foundation of authentic politics.

The fundamental failure of the market and the absolute poverty that marks it is the sinthome of capitalism. A sinthome is a system of meaning permeated with jouissance; it is the ultimate combination of jouissance and signification. As such the sinthome is fundamentally the only source of support for the being and consistency of the subject (Zizek, 1989:75). The sinthome, connected to a drive, is not an exception to the universal (in the sense of being outside of the universal), but the universal which is an exception in itself (Butler, 2006:64).
For Zizek, it is class which is the sinthome of the social as it currently stands. Class is the underlying antagonism of society and as such the impossibility within the social (ibid: 62). Similarly Zizek extends the concept of the real, in terms of the symbolic real, to capital; it is that which always returns to its place. Hence there is nothing outside of capital (or the social); it is its own exception (ibid: 64). We see this in the manner in which capitalism turns crisis into opportunity.

Given this ‘quality’ to capitalism, how can the notion of universality produce anti-capitalist change? This Zizek’s core question;
‘ how we are to reformulate a leftist, anti-capitalist political project in an era of global capitalism and its ideological supplement, liberal democratic multiculturalism’ (Zizek, 1989:4).

Perhaps the simplest project is to reveal that the singular of capitalism (as absolute poverty or environmental degradation) is not an impediment to be worked on, but rather the condition of the capitalist system. This would require a traversal of the fundamental fantasy of capitalism and thus an authentic political act (perhaps without the violence?)- it would be able to escape commoditification- that would change the conditions of possibility and repoliticise the economy.

The act is a fundamental force in Zizek’s political program. An authentic political act is a gesture which disturbs the fundamental fantasy of the system, and brings forward the full force of negativity that underlies it (Zizek, 1999:377). The act traverses the fantasy and thus disturbs the passionate attachment of the subject with the object (Zizek, 2000:220). A political act changes the very conditions of possibility of the system, and therefore the results of which can necessarily not be known in advance. The necessarily unknown future of the act is controversial. One must wonder whether such a project is morally and politically too risky.

However, this is not to dismiss the basic thesis of the act- to change the conditions of possible, to invoke the impossible; to repoliticise the economy. I believe this can best occur through identification with concrete universality/singular and an attempt to break up the sinthome. If we were to identify with the symptom (as a condition, not impediment) and traverse the fantasy (which would require an act- politics of the impossible) we would breakdown the sinthome and hence the system as a whole.















References

Butler, R. (2006). Live Theory. Continuum: London.
Kay, S. (2003). Zizek: A Critical Introduction. Cambridge: Polity.
Torfing, J. (1999). New Theories of Discourse; Laclau, Mouffe and Zizek. Oxford: Blackwell.
Zizek, S. (1989). The Sublime Object of Ideology. London: Verso.
Zizek, S. (1999). The Ticklish Subject. London: Verso.
Zizek, S. (2000). Da Capo senza Fine. In J. Bulter, E. Laclau & S. Zizek (Eds.), Contingency, Hegemony and Universality. London: Verso.
Zizek, S. (2002). For they know not what they do: Enjoyment as a political factor (2nd ed.). London: Verso.
Zizek, S. (2005). Interrogating the Real. New York: Continuum.
Zizek, S. (2006). The Parallex View. London: Verso.