In Zizek more than himself?

My interest is in the applications, and limits, of Slavoj Zizek’s work for anti-capitalist political theorist. Zizek’s central political value is lies in his notion of ideology and in ideological critique as a form of political intervention. Zizek’s concept of ideology is based on the split movement between the founding negative ontology of the social and the imaginary ‘want-to-be’ for universality qua full identity. Zizek uses ideology to theorise the economies of enjoyment that are incited by this paradoxical process. It is enjoyment via ideology that pushes the subject to identify with ‘abstract/imaginary’ universality rather than coming to grips with negativity. The latter identification causes the potential for radical change. Thus, via ideological critique, Zizek’s analysis of the social is highly productive for negative politics and potentially for inducing radical social change. On the other hand, there are two major problems with his theoretical edifice that I seek to examine;

Firstly, whilst Zizek persists in calling for a repoliticisation of the capitalist economy, through the sustained and concrete application of ideological critique, he himself does not fully accomplish this task. I seek to investigate whether this is a contingent oversight, or reveals a certain (necessary) failure in Zizek’s work. Secondly Zizek’s work, following a (post)modern rejection of normatively, allows for no inherent basis to an alternative order.

We must ask then;
- What is the value of Zizek for anti-capitalist political theory?
- Can these failures be avoided with the addition of another signifier/extension of Zizek’s work?
- Or, by applying Zizek’s theory to himself should we consider these failures his own concrete universal, the exception to his work which acts as its positive condition?
- If this is the case, should Zizek’s work be abandoned by the anti-capitalist cause, or short-circuit to go beyond its own boundaries?


To establish the value of Zizek’s work for anti-capitalist political theory, we must first examine his conception of ideology and ideological critique. As a philosopher of what exists (and, correspondingly, that what is non-existent – the Real) Zizek is exceptional. His work utilises Lacanian psychoanalysis, combined with Hegelian dialectics, to produce notions of ideology and universality which are highly productive for political analysis. The operation of ideology is what maintains the capitalist system, despite its apparent contradictions/exceptions (extreme poverty, environmental degradation etc…). Thus any form of critique which seeks to destabilise capitalism must consider the functioning of ideology within capital.

Ideology operates because of the negative ontology which modulates the operation of the symbolic order. The symbolic is negativity charged because symbolisation always fails; it is never completely able to represent the ‘thing’. The failure of symbolisation produces a lack in the subject; the failure of the symbolic produces the Real, that which the symbolic has been unable to signify. Yet the subject is constituted by an imaginary ‘want-to-be’ which attempts to revoke the affect of the Real. This desire means that the lack of the Real is experienced by the subject as a positive condition, pushing the subject to find that one additional signifier that will fully suture the social.

Desire qua identification operates through ideological fantasy; fantasy teaches the subject how to desire, supporting their desire. Ideological fantasy attempts to produce a universal identification by grouping signifiers together around a master signifier, otherwise known in Lacanian terms as objet petit a, the object of the subject’s desire. The illusion is that by obtaining the missing object/signifier the subject can be whole – universal. In order to produce this affect of wholeness, those signifiers which do not fit with the master signifier must be excluded; these exclusions are an affect of the Real.

The existence of non-identity within identity takes two predominant forms. The most commonly identified form of non-identity is the constitutive outside, which operates as an external antagonism. The constitutive outside establishes the identity of the inside. The standard ideological operation is to produce a false dichotomy of us/them. ‘They’ being responsible for the failure of the universalising imaginary. The displacement of lack through ideology dilutes the ontological anxiety caused by non-identity. This is not to suggest that a constitutive outside is an ideological illusion. All systems require an exterior to define the boundaries of the system. What is ideological is the use of the exterior to give cause to the dislocatory affect of the Real.

The affect of the Real within the symbolic is given form by symptoms, which are epiphenomena of the concrete universal. The operation of universality is split in a parallax between abstract universality and concrete universality. Abstract universality is the systematic performance which facilitates the subjects ‘want-to-be’ in terms of identification. As noted, the central mechanism of abstract universality is ideological fantasy. What ideological fantasy has to deal with is the ontological anxiety produced by the split in universality. The other side of the parallax within universality is the concrete universal. The concrete universal is the necessary exception to the abstract imaginary, the element which is strictly not of the genus, but yet is necessary for its continued functioning. Thus, for the abstract universal to function, it must repression the concrete universal. The effect is an ontological parallax; one cannot hold the split forms of universality together. The gap within universality is the Real; it is the materialist Truth of the symbolic system – the concrete universal is the concrete representation of existence.

A symptom is the evidence of the concrete universal within the universal imaginary. As such, the symptom produces much anxiety. It is this anxiety which ideological fantasy seeks to nullify. The operation of ideology is particularly complex, functioning according to the concrete circumstances of the situation. We can, however, seek to understand (as Zizek does) the formal operation of ideology, given the overall direction of its functioning; servicing the subjects want-to-be in the face of the lack in the Other. In the social, this lack is expressed as exclusions; the role of ideology is to nullify these exclusions in order to maintain the hegemonic horizon. The most common ideological operation is to reproduce exclusion in a more palpable form, either as a contingent and temporal blimp, or as the result of external elements. The latter operation is particularly powerful, based as it is on the postulated of a ‘constitutive outside’ that maintains the status of identity.

Two other mechanisms operate within capitalist identity, that of super-ego and cynical reason/fetishism. Super-ego demand operates in the apparent face of the failure of capital, acting a suturing device and a point of enjoyment for the subject. Super-ego demand can only produce a limited suturing, as we see with the operation of charities – after a while the subject says enough – before reverting back to an ideological position. The ultimate effect of super-ego is that it forestalls the anxiety of the symptom, providing a temporary suture by helping the subject see the structural necessity of exclusion.

In contrast, cynical reason has the structure of a fetish. Rather than Marx’s ‘They don’t know that they are doing it, but they are’, Zizek suggests that the structure of late capitalist subjectivity is such that “They know very well what they are doing, but they are still doing it”. Thus the subject may well know that capitalism is a flawed system, causing misery that they themselves find unacceptable, yet they still operate as if this is not the cause. Such reasoning is built on a fetish, generally a commodity fetish, which provides objects of affective investment for the subject, such that the dislocating power of the exception can be ignored. Additionally, there is a fetish of a false dichotomy; communism has failed, capitalism has proved successful, therefore the failures of capitalism can only be dealt with by capitalism itself. Such an argument relies on a formalist logic, rejected by Zizek’s ideological critique.

Zizek’s notion of ideological critique employs a dialectical materialist logic. The central premise of ideological critique, states Zizek, is not to reveal something new, but rather to unveil a disturbing underside to that which is already known. As an illustration, the presence of absolute and horrific poverty is well acknowledged in the western world. The various ideological mechanisms documented in this article are employed to pacified the anxiety which stems from this element of non-identity (poverty in a system designed for wealth production). The role of ideological critique is to break down the functioning of ideology, thus loosening the effectiveness of its stabilising mechanisms. In doing so that which is hidden by ideology (in form, not content) is revealed – that poverty is constitutive of capitalism.

As a result, Zizek’s work on ideological critique functions as a mode of political intervention. Zizek’s ideological critique seeks to identify those symptomatic elements within ideology that can be loosened from its grasp. These symptoms are evidence of the concrete universal – the necessary exclusion within an abstract universal imaginary – which offer the prospect of the radical overturning of the current order. Through ideological critique, Zizek seeks to produce an ontological anxiety which cannot be sutured via another signifier.

There appears, on the surface at least, little reason why such a political method cannot be applied to an analysis of capitalism. Certainly Zizek attends to this task in a typically eclectic fashion. What his work lacks is the applied analysis of capitalism, identifying those symptomatic elements which, in their incomplete relationship with ideology, may hold possibility for political transformation. Additionally, I may find it beneficial to use Marxist economic analysis to accomplish this task.

It is the addition of Marxism, however, which has proven controversial in Zizek’s work. Many critics, such as otherwise ally Ernesto Laclau have argued that Zizek’s work is made up of sophisticated Lacanian theory and unrefined Marxist-Leninism. Perhaps here we need to distinguish between Zizek’s use of the latter for economic analysis and political prescription[i]. It is Zizek’s politics, in terms of Zizek’s positing of positive alternative political compositions, which has proved more controversial.

Zizek rejects any political change within the existing capitalist formation. Instead, he argues, a whole new matrix of ideological understanding is required. The socio-political form of this conceptual matrix, however, is a manner on which Zizek is noticeable silent. This silence contains both the production of structural alternatives to the current hegemony – alternative systems for the production and reproduction of shared social life - or the normative values which could underlay that system. Indeed, one is not even certain if Zizek truly believes that an alternative system is possible in the sense that what is to come will not be recognised as a system at all by our current co-ordinates. Again, in this formulation, Zizek cannot get past purely negative politics, a form of politics which seeks to destruct the present within the possibility of a future.

If Zizek does produce normative/alternative statements, these appear to have a ‘journalistic quality’ or to be a matter of person opinion. In both cases there appears to be little link with has theoretical edifice. Certainly the theoretical depth which is evident in his work on universality and ideology is absent. My question is whether this discrepancy is purely contingent, or is it necessary, taking on the concrete universal of Zizek’s work. If the latter is the case, then must Zizek’s work be dismissed as a political alternative? (Or used for what it is; a brilliantly insightful form of ideological critique, but nothing more?). Alternatively, in a Zizekian twist, can this lack be seen as a positive condition for Zizek’s work? Still further, can we short-circuit Zizek, say through the use of a Marxist analysis of political economy in order to take Zizek beyond his own inherent confinement?

Following the identification of problems here, I need to undertake a literature review of the various critiques of Zizek. This will enable me to see what is out there and do it better, or at least differently. At this stage I am envisioning that my thesis is still a Zizekian thesis (that is, pro-Zizek). I do not want to reject Zizek, but rather to move beyond him. The question is how to do this; to go back to his original sources (as Wendy suggests) and find different interpretations, or is to use differing discourses to short-circuit his work. Perhaps a discussion on theoretical/research method would be valuable. Can a critique of Zizek be achieved in Zizekian manner?$

[i] Nonetheless, there do remain several issues with the fusion of Lacan and Marx